United States v. Poag , 389 F. App'x 289 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4478
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERT L. POAG,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:05-cr-00395-REP-1)
Submitted: July 16, 2010 Decided: July 26, 2010
Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Valencia
Roberts-Brower, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Caroline S.
Platt, Research and Writing Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Angela
Mastandrea-Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM
Robert L. Poag appeals his twenty-four month sentence
imposed on revocation of supervised release. Poag argues that
the sentence imposed is plainly unreasonable because the
district court did not adequately explain its decision to depart
from the Guidelines range and because his sentence is
disproportionately high compared to others similarly situated.
The Government responds that the district court’s sentence is
not unreasonable. We affirm
In United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437
(4th Cir. 2006), we held that “revocation sentences should be
reviewed to determine whether they are ‘plainly unreasonable’
with regard to those [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) (2006) factors
applicable to supervised release revocation sentences.”
Although the district court must consider the Chapter Seven
policy statements and the applicable requirements of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006), “the court ultimately has broad
discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of
imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at
439 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A
sentencing court must provide a “statement of reasons for the
sentence imposed.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657
(4th Cir. 2007) (probation revocation). However, the court need
not “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection,” or
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“explicitly discuss every § 3553(a) factor on the record.”
United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006).
Our review of the record in this case convinces us
that the district court adequately considered and explained its
reasons for the sentence, and that sentence is neither
procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. See United States
v. Finley, 531 F.3d 288, 297 (4th Cir. 2008) (applying Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), in reviewing a sentence to
determine whether it is plainly unreasonable). Moreover, the
sentence imposed does not reflect an undue disparity as to
similarly situated defendants. Rather, the court opted to
depart due to Poag’s multiple supervised release violations and
his squandering of the prior drug treatment opportunity offered
by the court. The decision to upwardly depart in these
circumstances was not plainly unreasonable.
We therefore affirm Poag’s sentence. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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