United States v. Castellon , 382 F. App'x 326 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4910
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
EDY RENE CASTELLON, a/k/a Edward Chapinva,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema,
District Judge. (1:09-cr-00151-LMB-1)
Submitted: May 13, 2010 Decided: June 11, 2010
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lana M. Manitta, RICH ROSENTHAL BRINCEFIELD MANITTA DZUBIN &
KROEGER, LLP, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H.
MacBride, United States Attorney, Tracy Doherty-McCormick,
Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Edy Rene Castellon appeals his conviction of one count
of attempt to induce a minor to engage in prostitution and
criminal sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)
(2006), and one count of attempted sex trafficking of children
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(1) and 1594 (2006).
He was sentenced to a total of 180 months’ imprisonment. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Castellon first argues that the district court
improperly determined that an FBI agent’s “Significant Activity
Reports” were not subject to mandatory disclosure under the
Jencks Act. We review for clear error. United States v.
Roseboro, 87 F.3d 642, 645 (4th Cir. 1996). While we have not
addressed the subject directly, other courts have determined
that material similar to that in question here does not qualify
for disclosure under the Jencks Act. See, e.g., United
States v. Pennett, 496 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1974) (daily activity
reports that set forth daily activity in an extremely cursory
manner are not subject to the Jencks Act). We are persuaded
that these decisions are correct and therefore find that the
district court neither clearly erred nor abused its discretion
by denying Castellon’s motions to strike the agent as a witness
and for a mistrial.
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Castellon next challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his conviction. An appellant challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy burden. See
United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997).
“[A]n appellate court’s reversal of a conviction on grounds of
insufficiency of evidence should be ‘confined to cases where the
prosecution’s failure is clear.’” United States v. Jones, 735
F.2d 785, 791 (4th Cir. 1984). After reviewing the record, we
conclude that the Government set forth sufficient evidence to
convict Castellon on both counts.
Finally, Castellon argues that because he received the
statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for violating
§ 1591(b)(1), his sentence was unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court and this court have repeatedly upheld the
constitutionality of statutory mandatory minimum sentences,
however, and we see no basis to revisit those holdings today.
See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 107 (2007); United
States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir. 2005).
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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