Svetlana Kuusk v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 732 F.3d 302 ( 2013 )

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2367
SVETLANA KUUSK,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Argued: September 17, 2013 Decided: October 16, 2013
Before MOTZ and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and John A. GIBNEY, Jr.,
United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Petition for review denied by published opinion. Judge Motz
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Diaz and Judge Gibney joined.
ARGUED: Jonathan Scott Greene, GREENE LAW FIRM, LLC, Columbia,
Maryland, for Petitioner. Nicole N. Murley, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON
BRIEF: Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
William C. Peachey, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration
Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,
D.C., for Respondent.
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
Svetlana Kuusk, an Estonian-born citizen of Russia,
petitions this court for review of an order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her untimely motion to
reopen removal proceedings. Kuusk argues that the BIA
erroneously concluded that her circumstances did not warrant
equitable tolling of the statutory filing deadline. We deny
Kuusk’s petition for review.
I.
On June 1, 2003, Kuusk entered the United States on a four-
month J-1 visa. She overstayed her visa. On October 12, 2005,
she was served with a notice to appear before an immigration
judge (“IJ”). Kuusk conceded her removability before the IJ,
but applied for asylum and withholding of removal pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1158 and § 1231(b)(3)(2006), respectively. The IJ
denied both applications.
Kuusk timely appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. During
the pendency of her appeal, Kuusk married a citizen of the
United States. On October 18, 2011, Kuusk attended an
“InfoPass” appointment with a U.S. Customs and Immigration
Services (USCIS) officer. Kuusk contends that this officer
informed her that she “could file for a marriage-based green
card directly with the USCIS based on [her] marriage to a U.S.
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citizen . . . even though [her] case was currently on an asylum
appeal from the immigration court,” and that “if anything was
wrong with the filing, it would be rejected or [she] would be
notified.” AR 24. She further contends that she understood
these words to mean that she did not additionally need to pursue
her case before the BIA regarding her removal proceedings.
A week after receiving the USCIS officer’s advice, on
October 25, Kuusk informed her immigration attorney via e-mail
of her plan “to file papers now through marriage.” AR 36. Her
attorney responded the same day, warning her:
Remember that for immigrants in proceedings—getting a
marriage green card is complicated. . . . Also,
please know that you need to file a motion to reopen
your case before the BIA within 90 days of . . . its
final decision. This deadline is firm, and if you do
not meet it, nothing can be done. Don’t mess around,
[and] be sure you do everything right.
Id. On November 30, 2011, the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s
denial of Kuusk’s application for asylum, and entered a final
order of removal. Eleven days later, on December 11, Kuusk’s
attorney notified her of the denial via e-mail and warned her
that she “now ha[d] about 70 days to file a motion to reopen the
case based upon marriage to a US citizen,” and that if she
“wait[ed] beyond that period, [her] removal order w[ould] become
fixed and [she would] not be able to remain in the [United
States] legally.” AR 37.
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Kuusk did not file a motion to reopen her case within
ninety days of the BIA’s final order (i.e., by February 28). On
March 22, 2012, the USCIS denied Kuusk’s I-485 application for a
green card because she was subject to a deportation order.
Six weeks later, Kuusk filed an untimely motion to reopen
her removal proceedings to seek adjustment of her immigration
status. Kuusk asked the BIA to apply equitable tolling
principles and disregard her untimeliness because of her
reliance on the USCIS officer’s assertedly incorrect advice, or
to exercise its authority to reopen her case sua sponte.
The BIA denied Kuusk’s motion. Applying the equitable
tolling standard that we have applied in other contexts, the BIA
concluded that Kuusk had failed to show that: (1) wrongful
conduct by the opposing party prevented her from timely
asserting her claim; or (2) extraordinary circumstances beyond
her control made it impossible for her to comply with the
statutory time limit. See Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325,
330 (4th Cir. 2000). Kuusk noted a timely appeal. ∗
We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo, giving
appropriate deference to its interpretation of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) in accordance with principles of
∗
The BIA also declined to exercise its discretionary
authority to reopen Kuusk’s case sua sponte. Kuusk does not
appeal this portion of the BIA’s order.
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administrative law. Hui Zheng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 647, 651 (4th
Cir. 2009). “We review denials of motions to reopen claims for
asylum and claims for withholding of [removal] under an abuse of
discretion standard.” Id.II.
The statutory filing deadline at issue here provides that a
motion to reopen removal proceedings “shall be filed within 90
days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of
removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (2006). Every circuit
to have addressed the issue has held that this provision
constitutes a statute of limitations to which the principles of
equitable tolling apply. See Avila-Santoyo v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
713 F.3d 1357, 1363-64 (11th Cir. 2013)(per curiam); Hernandez-
Moran v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 496, 499-500 (8th Cir. 2005); Borges
v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 406 (3d Cir. 2005); Harchenko v. INS,
379 F.3d 405, 410 (6th Cir. 2004); Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253,
1258 (10th Cir. 2002); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176,
1193 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Iavorski v. U.S. INS, 232 F.3d
124, 130 (2d Cir. 2000). Although this court has not previously
addressed the issue, we agree with our sister circuits and now
hold that § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) sets forth a limitations period
that can be equitably tolled.
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The Government and Kuusk also agree that the statute
contains a limitations period that can be equitably tolled; they
disagree, however, as to what standard must be met to establish
a basis for equitable tolling. Kuusk argues that the BIA erred
in applying the standard we set forth in Harris, 209 F.3d at
330. The Government contends that the BIA acted within its
discretion in applying the Harris standard.
In Harris, we addressed equitable tolling in the context of
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We held equitable
tolling to be proper only when (1) “the plaintiffs were
prevented from asserting their claims by some kind of wrongful
conduct on the part of the defendant”; or (2) “extraordinary
circumstances beyond plaintiffs’ control made it impossible to
file the claims on time.” Id. (internal quotation mark
omitted). We recognized that “any invocation of equity to
relieve the strict application of a statute of limitations must
be guarded and infrequent, lest circumstances of individualized
hardship supplant the rules of clearly drafted statutes.” Id.To apply the doctrine generously “would loose the rule of law to
whims about the adequacy of excuses, divergent responses to
claims of hardship, and subjective notions of fair
accommodation.” Id.We concluded in Harris that this rigorous standard was
necessary to ensure that “any resort to equity . . . be reserved
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for those rare instances where -- due to circumstances external
to the party’s own conduct -- it would be unconscionable to
enforce the limitation period against the party and gross
injustice would result.” Id. Subsequently, we have applied the
Harris standard in other contexts. See Gayle v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 401 F.3d 222, 227 (4th Cir. 2005)(ERISA); Chao v.
Va. Dep’t of Transp., 291 F.3d 276, 283 (4th Cir. 2002) (FLSA).
Kuusk argues, however, that the BIA should not have applied
the Harris standard in the context of motions to reopen removal
proceedings, but instead should have adopted a more lenient
equitable tolling standard. She relies on the equitable tolling
standards articulated by other circuits in cases involving
untimely motions to reopen removal proceedings.
To be sure, the precise wording used to address the
appropriateness of equitable tolling in these cases differs from
that in Harris. See, e.g., Socop-Gonzalez, 272 F.3d at 1193(applying equitable tolling when, “despite all due diligence,
[the party invoking equitable tolling] is unable to obtain vital
information bearing on the existence of the claim . . . [due to]
circumstances beyond the party’s control” (first alteration in
original)); Hernandez-Moran, 408 F.3d at 499-500 (“Equitable
tolling is granted sparingly. Extraordinary circumstances far
beyond the litigant’s control must have prevented timely
filing.” (alteration omitted)); Borges, 402 F.3d at 406-07
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(explaining that petitioner must show both that he exercised due
diligence and that extraordinary circumstances, like fraud,
prevented him from timely asserting his claim).
But in none of the cases on which Kuusk relies, or in any
other, has a sister circuit fashioned a special, more lenient
equitable tolling standard for immigration proceedings. Rather,
each of our sister circuits applies, in immigration cases, its
general standard for equitable tolling. Most importantly,
although differently worded, each of those standards, like that
in Harris, adheres to the general principle that equitable
tolling will be granted “only sparingly,” not in “a garden
variety claim of excusable neglect.” Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990).
Kuusk has provided us with no rationale to support her
argument that we should fashion a special standard to apply in
immigration cases, and we see no reason to do so. Thus, we hold
that the Harris standard applies to untimely motions to reopen
removal proceedings. The BIA did not err in applying that
standard in this case.
III.
Alternatively, Kuusk maintains that the BIA incorrectly
applied the Harris standard to the facts of this case. This
argument also fails.
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Kuusk contends that the assertedly erroneous instructions
she received from the USCIS officer prevented her from filing a
timely motion to reopen her immigration case. She relies on
Socop-Gonzalez, in which the Ninth Circuit held equitable
tolling to be warranted when an INS officer gave erroneous
advice to a petitioner seeking a marriage-based adjustment of
status. 272 F.3d at 1193-96. In that case, after the petitioner
married a United States citizen during the pendency of his
asylum appeal, he asked an INS officer for advice on obtaining a
marriage-based adjustment of status. Id. at 1181. The officer
instructed him to “withdraw his asylum appeal and to file an
application for adjustment of status with the INS.” Id. When
the petitioner followed the officer’s advice, the withdrawal of
his asylum appeal immediately finalized his deportation order.
Id.The Ninth Circuit pointed out that the advice of the INS
officer was incorrect: “Instead of instructing Socop to
withdraw his asylum petition, the INS officer should have told
Socop to file a[] [green card] petition with the INS and wait
until it was approved.” Id. Because Socop followed the
officer’s incorrect instructions, he “unwittingly triggered his
own immediate deportation.” Id. at 1182. For this reason, the
court concluded that, due to the INS officer’s erroneous and
prejudicial advice, Socop was prevented “by circumstances beyond
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his control and going beyond ‘excusable neglect[]’ from
discovering . . . vital information he needed in order to
determine that a motion to reopen was required in order to
preserve his status.” Id. at 1194.
Socop-Gonzalez fundamentally differs from the case at hand.
Here, the USCIS officer did not provide “incorrect
instructions.” Rather, according to Kuusk’s own testimony, the
officer informed her that she should apply for a marriage-based
green card “directly with the USCIS based on [her] marriage to a
U.S. citizen . . . even though [her] case was currently on an
asylum appeal from the immigration court.” AR 24. This was
correct: Kuusk did in fact need to apply “directly with the
USCIS” for a marriage-based green card. This correct
instruction, however, did not excuse Kuusk from also pursuing
the other necessary course: a motion to reopen her proceedings
before the BIA. Unlike the INS officer in Socop-Gonzalez, the
USCIS officer here did not instruct Kuusk to abandon her
application for asylum or to forego filing a motion to reopen
her case before the immigration court. Moreover, in response to
Kuusk’s statement that she intended to file for a marriage-based
green card directly with the USCIS based on her marriage to a
United States citizen, Kuusk’s immigration attorney warned her
that she needed to “file a motion to reopen [her] case before
the BIA[.]” Both before and after the BIA denied her appeal,
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Kuusk’s attorney cautioned her as to the necessity and immediacy
of filing this motion.
Kuusk simply misunderstood the accurate, but limited,
advice given by a USCIS officer and then ignored two warnings
from her attorney that she needed to file a motion to reopen her
immigration case within the statutory time limit. Such
misunderstandings, however innocent, do not constitute
“extraordinary circumstances” beyond the petitioner’s control
sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. Harris, 209 F.3d at
330; see also Gayle, 401 F.3d at 227 (“The law has always, and
necessarily, held people responsible for innocent mistakes.”).
We therefore hold that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in
determining that equitable tolling was not warranted here.
This result is unfortunate because it appears that a timely
motion to reopen Kuusk’s case would in all likelihood have led
to an adjustment of her immigration status, thereby enabling her
to remain legally in this country with her husband. At oral
argument, we asked the Government to identify any steps an
individual in Kuusk’s position might take to obtain relief from
the Government in order to avoid prolonged separation from her
family. The Government indicated that Kuusk, through counsel,
could (1) ask the Department of Homeland Security to join her in
a motion to reopen her case; (2) ask the Government for a
favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which, if
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granted, would administratively close her case; or (3) ask the
Government to grant equitable relief in the form of deferred
action, in which case Kuusk would ask the Department not to
pursue removal. Oral Argument at 33:30-35:00, Kuusk v. Holder,
12-2367, September 17, 2013. Thus, although we cannot afford
Kuusk equitable relief, the “broad discretion exercised by
immigration officials,” which remains “[a] principal feature of
the removal system,” Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492,
2499 (2012), might still be marshaled to provide Kuusk relief.
IV.
In sum, we hold that when a petitioner fails to meet the
statutory deadline to file a motion to reopen her immigration
case, equitable tolling is appropriate only when (1) the
Government’s wrongful conduct prevented the petitioner from
filing a timely motion; or (2) extraordinary circumstances
beyond the petitioner’s control made it impossible to file
within the statutory deadline. Because Kuusk failed to satisfy
either of these criteria, her petition for review is
DENIED.
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