United States v. James Williams ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4629
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES ANTWANN WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:10-cr-00289-D-1)
Submitted: February 27, 2015 Decided: March 18, 2015
Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Robert E. Waters,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Seth M. Wood, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James Antwann Williams appeals the district court’s
judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to
sixty months’ imprisonment. Williams contends that his sentence
is plainly unreasonable because the court considered
impermissible sentencing factors and that his sentence is
greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Because Williams did not object to the district court’s
consideration of the purportedly impermissible sentencing
factors at the revocation hearing, we review this claim for
plain error. United States v. Lemon, __ F.3d __, 2015 WL
294329, at *2 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2015); United States v. Webb,
738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). To establish plain error,
Williams must show “(1) that the district court erred, (2) that
the error is clear or obvious, and (3) that the error affected
his substantial rights, meaning that it affected the outcome of
the district court proceedings.” Webb, 738 F.3d at 640-41
(internal quotation marks omitted). Even if Williams meets his
burden, we retain discretion whether to recognize the error and
will deny relief unless the error “seriously affects the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. at 641 (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted).
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“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” Id. at 640.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
release if it is within the applicable statutory maximum and not
plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a revocation
sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the sentence
for unreasonableness, generally following the procedural and
substantive considerations that are at issue in review of
original sentences. Id. at 438-39.
In exercising its discretion, the “district court is guided
by the Chapter Seven policy statements in the federal Guidelines
manual, as well as the statutory factors applicable to
revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e),” and
“should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust,
while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness
of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the
violator.” Webb, 738 F.3d at 641. In determining the length of
a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release, 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012) requires a sentencing court to consider
all but two of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
One of the excluded factors is the need for the sentence “to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
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the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.” 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
We have recognized that “[a]lthough § 3583(e) enumerates
the factors a district court should consider when formulating a
revocation sentence, it does not expressly prohibit a court from
referencing other relevant factors omitted from the statute.”
Webb, 738 F.3d at 641. As long as a court does not base a
revocation sentence predominantly on the § 3553(a)(2)(A)
factors, “mere reference to such considerations does not render
a revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable when those
factors are relevant to, and considered in conjunction with, the
enumerated § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 642.
We conclude that the district court imposed the sixty-month
sentence predominantly on permissible factors. The court stated
that its “principal focus” was on Williams’ multiple breaches of
trust. (J.A. 18). It referenced the seriousness of the offense
and the need to promote respect for the law in conjunction with
the need to sanction Williams for his breaches of trust, the
nature and circumstances of the offense, Williams’ history and
characteristics, and the need to protect the public. See Webb,
738 F.3d at 642 (references to omitted sentencing factors were
related to references to permissible sentencing factors). Any
ambiguity in the district court’s use of the phrase “breach of
trust” for both the violations and the underlying criminal
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conduct is not “clear or obvious” as required under plain error
review. Therefore, this claim entitles Williams to no relief.
We next review the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence, which Williams asserts is greater than necessary to
comply with the goals of § 3553(a). A revocation sentence is
substantively reasonable if the district court states a proper
basis for concluding that the defendant should receive the
sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d
at 440. As we have said, the district court identified
appropriate grounds for the 60-month, statutory maximum
sentence. The sentence is thus substantively reasonable.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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