Powers v. Treasures & Trinkets ( 1997 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
MARTHA M. POWERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
ANGEL WORLD INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff, No. 96-1776
v.
TREASURES AND TRINKETS,
INCORPORATED,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville.
G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-95-1349-6-3)
Submitted: May 29, 1997
Decided: June 11, 1997
Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Martha M. Powers, Appellant Pro Se. Steven Paul Hollman, HOGAN
& HARTSON, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Martha M. Powers and Angel World, Inc., brought this action
against Treasures & Trinkets, Inc., alleging trademark infringement
and false designation of origin under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1051 (1994), unfair competition under the common law of
South Carolina, and unfair trade practices under state law. Treasures
& Trinkets counterclaimed under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994), for false designation of origin and unfair
competition. On Treasures' motion, the district court entered sum-
mary judgment for Treasures' claim of trademark rights on the paper
goods line of "Guardian Angel" products. Further, the district court
permanently enjoined Powers from using the "Guardian Angel" trade-
mark on paper goods. The district court denied Treasures' motion for
summary judgment as to the claims relating to jewelry and the case
proceeded to trial on the issue. The jury returned a verdict as to Pow-
ers' claims and Treasures' counterclaim in favor of Treasures, finding
that Treasures is entitled to the trademark "Guardian Angel" as it
relates to jewelry products.
On appeal, Powers makes numerous complaints which are merit-
less. First, Powers' complaint that her counsel were incompetent and
inexperienced is unavailing because there is no right to effective
counsel in a civil trial. See Sanchez v. United States Postal Serv., 785
F.2d 1236, 1237 (5th Cir. 1986). Powers' contention that the judge
did not maintain control of the courtroom is unsupported by the
record. See Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F.3d 264, 271 (6th Cir. 1994); cf. In
re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 236 (1962). Powers' averment that the
case should have been judged solely on the trademark infringement
issue is incorrect because Treasures counterclaimed. Cf. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 13(a).
To the extent that Powers challenges the the district court's eviden-
tiary rulings, we find, after reviewing the record, that the district court
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did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969,
974 (4th Cir. 1994). Next, Powers' claim that the district court
improperly awarded damages is unavailing because the district court
did not award damages, but only costs. Furthermore, to the extent that
Powers appeals the award of costs, the court did not abuse its discre-
tion in awarding costs because it found that Powers engaged in willful
infringement of Treasures' trademark, caused unnecessary delay, and
increased the costs of litigation. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994); see
also Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 47 (3d
Cir. 1991) (concluding that costs may be awarded in infringement
case where there is finding of bad faith, malice, or knowing infringe-
ment). We also find that Powers' complaint about the typographical
error in the judgment is more appropriately addressed by way of
motion in the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a).
Additionally, Powers raises several issues which were not pre-
served for appeal. Powers cannot appeal the jury instructions because
she failed to object to them at trial. See Waters v. Massey-Ferguson,
Inc., 775 F.2d 587, 590-91 n.2 (4th Cir. 1985); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51.
Additionally, because Powers did not move for a directed verdict and
because we find no plain error, appellate review of the sufficiency of
the evidence is foreclosed. Tights, Inc. v. Acme-McCrary Corp., 541
F.2d 1047, 1058 (4th Cir. 1976) (noting that sufficiency of evidence
to support verdict is not reviewable on appeal unless motion for
directed verdict is made in trial court); see also Harris v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 527 F.2d 528, 529 (8th Cir. 1975) (stating that where motion for
directed verdict was not made at trial, appellate court is powerless to
review sufficiency of evidence except for plain error).
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materi-
als before the court and argument would not aid the decisional pro-
cess.
AFFIRMED
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