United States v. Edward Crow , 612 F. App'x 666 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4822
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
EDWARD C. CROW,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley,
District Judge. (1:14-cr-00009-IMK-JSK-1)
Submitted: April 30, 2015 Decided: May 19, 2015
Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, Clarksburg, West
Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United
States Attorney, Andrew R. Cogar, Assistant United States
Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Edward Crow was convicted of conspiring to assault with
intent to commit murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012);
assaulting with intent to murder and assaulting with a dangerous
weapon with intent to do bodily harm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2, 7(3), 113(a)(1) (2012); assaulting another inmate
resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2, 7(3), 113(a)(6); and possessing a prohibited object, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2), (b)(3) (2012). The
district court sentenced Crow to 275 months of imprisonment. On
appeal, Crow argues that the district court imposed an
unreasonable sentence. We affirm.
We review Crow’s claim that the district court imposed an
unreasonable sentence for abuse of discretion. See Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In reviewing a sentence
for reasonableness, we first ensure that the district court
committed no “significant procedural error,” including
insufficient consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
factors or inadequate explanation of the sentence imposed.
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In its explanation, the district court need not
“robotically tick” through every § 3553(a) factor on the record,
particularly when its sentence is within the properly calculated
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Sentencing Guidelines range. United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d
339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). At the same time, the district court
“must make an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. “This individualized
assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy, but it must provide
a rationale tailored to the particular case at hand and adequate
to permit meaningful appellate review.” United States v.
Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). We conclude that the district court committed
no such procedural error.
We must also examine the substantive reasonableness of the
sentences, considering the “totality of the circumstances.”
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The sentence imposed must be “sufficient,
but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the purposes of
sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). A properly calculated,
within-Guidelines sentence is presumed reasonable on appeal, and
an appellant bears the burden to “rebut the presumption by
demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda,
445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In this case, the district court’s sentence was
substantively reasonable. Crow’s sentence fell within the
Guidelines range. Moreover, the district court effectively
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balanced the applicable § 3553(a) factors, considering the
seriousness of the offense and its effect on the victim, as well
as Crow’s difficult past and personal characteristics.
While the district court’s sentence was consecutive,
“[j]udges have long been understood to have discretion to select
whether the sentences they impose will run concurrently or
consecutively with respect to other sentences that they impose,
or that have been imposed in other proceedings.” Setser v.
United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1468 (2012). Here, the district
court appropriately recognized that the instant offense was
separate and distinct from the previous offense. We thus
conclude that the district court’s sentence was reasonable.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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