United States v. Jude Eligwe , 456 F. App'x 196 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4984
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JUDE ELIGWE,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 08-4986
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
GIOVANNI BELL,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 08-4992
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RICHOL GRINER,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 10-4860
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
GIOVANNI BELL,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 10-4863
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RICHOL GRINER,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 10-4864
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
2
JUDE ELIGWE,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District
Judge. (8:07-cr-00160-PJM-2; 8:07-cr-00160-PJM-1; 8:07-cr-
00160-PJM-3)
Argued: October 27, 2011 Decided: December 1, 2011
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Agee joined.
ARGUED: Gary Allen Ticknor, Elkridge, Maryland, for Appellants.
Emily Noel Glatfelter, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Arthur S.
Cheslock, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant Jude Eligwe; Mary
E. Davis, DAVIS & DAVIS, Washington, D.C., for Appellant Richol
Griner. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Baltimore,
Maryland, Deborah A. Johnston, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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SHEDD, Circuit Judge:
A jury convicted Jude Eligwe, Giovanni Bell, and Richol
Griner of conspiracy to commit bank robbery in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371. The jury also convicted Bell and Griner of bank
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) and of
brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). In this
consolidated appeal, the defendants raise a total of thirteen
issues. We address only one: the admissibility of Eligwe’s
post-arrest statements. 1
I.
Prior to trial, Eligwe moved to suppress his custodial
statements. The district court denied his motion, and the
following facts are relevant to our review of the district court
order. “We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Government, the prevailing party below.” United States v.
Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 548 (4th Cir. 1998).
After arresting Eligwe in connection with the bank robbery,
the Montgomery County Police transported him to police
headquarters, where Detective Mason interviewed him in a room
1
We have reviewed the remaining issues and find them to be
without merit.
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equipped with video recording. Before asking questions related
to the charges, Mason reviewed the Police Department’s advice of
rights form with Eligwe. Eligwe then executed the form,
indicating that he understood his rights and wanted to speak
with Mason.
At one point during this initial interview and after some
discussion of the bank robbery, Eligwe said, “I want a lawyer,”
and “I need a lawyer for that.” J.A. 589. Because Eligwe spoke
quickly and excitedly with a heavy accent, Mason asked for
clarification, “you don’t wanna talk to me[?]” Eligwe replied,
“I wanna talk to you sir but you gotta understand something.”
J.A. 589. Moments later, Eligwe said, “I’ll get a lawyer.”
J.A. 590. Mason testified that because Eligwe used the word
lawyer, he tried to ask clarifying questions of Eligwe, but
Eligwe indicated that he wanted to keep talking with Mason and
actually continued speaking over Mason.
After this initial interview, the police put Eligwe in a
holding cell. While in the cell, Eligwe asked to again speak
with Mason. Eligwe was then brought back into the interview
room. Mason asked Eligwe, “You say you wanted to talk to me[?]”
Eligwe responded, “Yeah, it’s very important I talk to you.”
J.A. 712. At this point, Eligwe told Mason that he had provided
information to a bank customer, including information about the
bank’s procedures, the times he worked, the vault timers, and
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where money was stored. Eligwe also admitted that he had
accessed a co-conspirator’s bank account after the robbery “to
see whether there was any money.” J.A. 1133.
Prior to trial, Eligwe moved to suppress these custodial
statements. The district court denied his motion, finding that
Eligwe’s references to wanting a lawyer were not unambiguous or
unequivocal requests for a lawyer and, therefore, his statements
were not barred by the Fifth Amendment.
II.
Eligwe argues that the district court violated his Fifth
Amendment rights by admitting his custodial statements into
evidence. 2 We review a district court’s legal conclusions made
pursuant to a suppression determination de novo and its factual
findings for clear error. Further, such rulings are subject to
harmless error review. See United States v. Johnson, 400 F.3d
187, 193 (4th Cir. 2005)(“We first determine whether the
district court should have suppressed . . . [the defendant’s]
2
Although Eligwe alleges a violation of both his Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights, his Sixth Amendment rights had not yet
attached. See United States v. Cain, 524 F.3d 477, 481 (4th
Cir. 2008) (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175
(1991))(“A criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel
attaches at the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings,
which at least includes the point of formal charge, indictment,
information, preliminary hearing, or arraignment.”).
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statements, and, then, if so, we ask whether the failure to do
so was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”). “In order to find
a district court's error harmless, we need only be able to say
with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without
stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment
was not substantially swayed by the error.” United States v.
Brooks, 111 F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir. 1997)(internal citation
marks omitted).
Although a suspect can waive his Fifth Amendment right to
counsel and agree to an interview with the police, “if a suspect
requests counsel at any time during the interview, he is not
subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made
available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation.”
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994) (citing Edwards
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–485 (1981)). However, such a
request must be unambiguous. “[I]f a suspect makes a reference
to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a
reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have
understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to
counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of
questioning.” Id.We find that Eligwe did not make an unambiguous request for
an attorney. When read out of context, Eligwe’s isolated
statements could perhaps be read as such a request. However,
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after reviewing the video-taped interview, we conclude that no
reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have
understood those statements to be an unequivocal request for a
lawyer. Eligwe spoke quickly and with a heavy accent, and when
Mason attempted to ask Eligwe clarifying questions, Eligwe spoke
over Mason and continued talking about the case. Furthermore,
even if Eligwe had invoked his right to counsel, the district
court did not err in introducing the custodial statements
because Eligwe made the statements at issue after he reinitiated
communication with Mason. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485(invocation of counsel can be waived if “the accused himself
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations
with the police”).
Alternatively, we conclude that, even assuming the district
court erred in admitting Eligwe’s custodial statements, any
error was harmless. In light of the Government’s overwhelming
evidence of guilt presented throughout the trial, there was
sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict even without
this challenged evidence. See Johnson, 400 F.3d at 197 (finding
that error in admitting custodial statements made after
defendant invoked his right to counsel was harmless, especially
as his statements did not amount to a full confession).
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III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions and
sentences of Jude Eligwe, Giovanni Bell, and Richol Griner.
AFFIRMED
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