United States v. Larry Taylor , 608 F. App'x 137 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4709
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LARRY DONNELL TAYLOR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:12-cr-00326-F-1)
Submitted: June 25, 2015 Decided: June 29, 2015
Before GREGORY, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Deborrah L. Newton, NEWTON LAW, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Larry Donnell Taylor pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute 280 grams or more of crack cocaine and 5 kilograms or
more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012), and conspiracy to commit
money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (2012). He was sentenced to
a below-Guidelines total term of 240 months’ imprisonment. His
attorney has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which she asserts that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal but questions whether the district
court erred in rejecting the Government’s request for a sentence
that was 50% below his Sentencing Guidelines range and instead
imposing a sentence that was 25% below his Guidelines range.
Although informed of his right to file a supplemental pro se brief,
Taylor has not done so. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness under an abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). This review requires consideration of both the procedural
and substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id. First, this
court must assess whether the district court properly calculated
the Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and
sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49–50; see
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). We also
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must consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
“examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances to see whether the
sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the
sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).”
United States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir.
2010). Where, as here, the Government has moved for a downward
departure under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1 (2012),
the court “has broad discretion in deciding whether to depart
downward and to what extent.” United States v. Pearce, 191 F.3d
488, 492 (4th Cir. 1999). If the sentence is within or below the
Guidelines range, we presume on appeal that the sentence is
reasonable. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346–56 (2007)
(permitting appellate presumption of reasonableness for within-
Guidelines sentence).
Here, the district court correctly calculated and considered
the advisory Guidelines range and heard argument from counsel and
allocution from Taylor. The court considered the relevant §
3553(a) factors and explained that the chosen sentence was
warranted in light of the nature and circumstances of the offense.
Further, Taylor offers no grounds to rebut the presumption on
appeal that his below-Guidelines sentence is reasonable. Thus, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Taylor.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Taylor, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If Taylor requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Taylor. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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