United States v. Barajas-Garcia , 405 F. App'x 769 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4436
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MIGUEL BARAJAS-GARCIA, a/k/a Filimon Soto-Martinez,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:09-cr-00256-NCT-1)
Submitted: December 16, 2010 Decided: December 27, 2010
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P.
Clough, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. John W. Stone, Jr., Acting United
States Attorney, Michael F. Joseph, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Miguel Barajas-Garcia appeals the fifty-seven-month
sentence imposed following his guilty plea to illegal reentry by
an aggravated felon, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) (2006). He contends
that the sentence imposed was unreasonable. We affirm.
The court reviews Barajas-Garcia’s sentence for
reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). In reviewing
a sentence, this court must first ensure that the district court
committed no significant procedural error, such as incorrectly
calculating the guidelines range. United States v. Osborne, 514
F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cir. 2008). “When rendering a sentence, the
district court must make an individualized assessment based on
the facts presented,” applying the “relevant [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a) [(2006)] factors to the specific circumstances of the
case before it.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328
(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
The court must also “state in open court the particular reasons
supporting its chosen sentence” and “set forth enough to
satisfy” this Court that it has “considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own
legal decisionmaking authority.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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If the sentence is free from procedural error, we then
review it for substantive reasonableness. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
“Substantive reasonableness review entails taking into account
the ‘totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any
variance from the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Pauley,
511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at
51). Even if this court would have imposed a different
sentence, “this fact alone is ‘insufficient to justify reversal
of the district court.’” Id. at 474 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at
51).
Barajas-Garcia does not dispute that his guidelines
range was properly calculated. He argues instead that his
sentence is substantively unreasonable and the district court
should have imposed a sentence at the bottom of or below the
guideline range because his offense level and his criminal
history category overstate the seriousness of his offenses, and
because of the unavailability of the fast track departure
scheme.
We apply an appellate presumption that a sentence
imposed within the properly calculated guidelines range is
reasonable. United States v. Go, 517 F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir.
2008); see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346-56 (2007)
(upholding appellate presumption of reasonableness for within-
guidelines sentence). In rejecting Barajas-Garcia’s arguments
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for a lesser sentence, the district court thoroughly considered
the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and determined that they were
best served by the imposition of a within-guidelines sentence.
Furthermore, the court acknowledged its authority to impose a
downward variance sentence, but concluded that, in light of the
seriousness of Barajas-Garcia’s prior offenses, his lack of
respect for the law, his use of different names, and his
unlawful reentry into the United States after having been
deported, a variance was not warranted. We find no abuse of
discretion in this determination. See United States v.
Crawford, 18 F.3d 1173, 1174-76, 1179 (4th Cir. 1994) (upholding
unlawful reentry sentence where offense level was increased by
sixteen and criminal history points by six based on prior felony
offense); see also United States v. Perez-Pena, 453 F.3d 236(4th Cir. 2006) (holding that lack of fast track departure
scheme does not amount to sentencing disparity warranting a
lower sentence).
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a
fifty-seven-month sentence was appropriate. We further conclude
that Barajas-Garcia’s sentence is reasonable. Accordingly, we
affirm the sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
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materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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