Justin Mallory, Sr. v. Travis Holdorf , 575 F. App'x 108 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6290
JUSTIN WRIGHT MALLORY, SR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
TRAVIS HOLDORF; STAN SMITH; RANDY STRANGE,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Margaret B. Seymour, Senior
District Judge. (3:11-cv-03295-MBS)
Submitted: April 22, 2014 Decided: June 3, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Edward Bell, III, BELL LEGAL GROUP, Georgetown, South
Carolina; Jerry L. Finney, THE FINNEY LAW FIRM, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Andrew F. Lindemann, Robert D.
Garfield, DAVIDSON & LINDEMANN, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Justin Wright Mallory, Sr., appeals from the district
court’s order granting summary judgment to Travis Holdorf, Stan
Smith, and Randy Strange (collectively, “defendants”) 1 in this 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action. Mallory argues that defendants violated
his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting and prosecuting him for
the murder of his wife without probable cause, and violated his
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by fabricating
evidence against him. He argues that the district court
improperly applied the summary judgment standard, and that it
prematurely granted summary judgment because he was unable to
depose a key witness. Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
judgment, viewing the facts and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Glynn v. EDO Corp., 710 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2013).
A.
To establish a Fourth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must
establish that defendants “(1) caused (2) a seizure of the
1
At the time of the events relevant to this appeal,
defendants were employed as deputies with the Richland County,
South Carolina Sheriff’s Department.
2
plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable
cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff's
favor.” Evans v. Chambers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012).
The primary issue in this case is probable cause.
“An officer has probable cause for arrest when the facts
and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient
to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in
believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has
committed . . . an offense.” Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508,
514 (4th Cir. 2005) (alteration and internal quotation marks
omitted). After careful review of the record, we agree with the
district court that defendants had probable cause to arrest and
detain Mallory for the murder of his wife. 2 Therefore, we
conclude that summary judgment was appropriate on Mallory’s
Fourth Amendment claims.
B.
To demonstrate that defendants violated his Fourteenth
Amendment rights, Mallory must show that they “fabricated
evidence and that the fabrication resulted in a deprivation of
[his] liberty.” Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 282 (4th
Cir. 2005).
2
To bolster his argument as to probable cause, Mallory has
asked that we take judicial notice of medical reports not in the
record and not available to defendants when they arrested
Mallory. We deny the motion.
3
We conclude that Mallory has failed to demonstrate that
defendants’ alleged witness—coaching was the cause of his
pretrial detention. As discussed above, Mallory’s arrest was
supported by probable cause. And Mallory was released from
detention after the trial where the allegedly fabricated
evidence was used. Accordingly, we find that Mallory cannot
demonstrate a constitutional injury.
C.
Finally, we are unpersuaded by Mallory’s argument that
summary judgment was premature because he was unable to depose a
key witness. The testimony of the witness Mallory sought to
depose would not have created a material question of fact as to
whether probable cause existed to support Mallory’s arrest and
detention.
II.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the material before this
court and argument will not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4