United States v. Anthony T. Champion ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4239
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY T. CHAMPION,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District
Judge. (3:13-cr-00097-JRS-1)
Argued: January 27, 2015 Decided: April 10, 2015
Before MOTZ and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Senior Judge Davis wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Diaz joined.
ARGUED: Daniel Paul Watkins, WILLIAMS MULLEN, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellant. Stephen Wiley Miller, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: John S. Davis, V, WILLIAMS MULLEN, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge:
Anthony T. Champion appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(i) for transportation of stolen firearms found in the
trunk of a car he was operating. Champion contends the denial of
his motion to suppress evidence from the vehicle search was
erroneous because the mere odor of burnt marijuana in the
passenger compartment is insufficient to establish probable
cause to search the trunk of a car. The government responds that
the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the car gave troopers
probable cause to search any part of the car that could contain
marijuana, including the trunk. We conclude that resolution of
the issue framed by the parties is unnecessary in this case. The
totality of the circumstances surrounding the traffic stop,
based on several facts in addition to the strong odor of burnt
marijuana, reveals that the troopers had probable cause to
search for contraband in both the passenger compartment and the
trunk of the car. Accordingly, we affirm.
In considering a district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress, we review its “legal determinations de novo and actual
findings for clear error.” United States v. Montieth, 662 F.3d
660, 664 (4th Cir. 2011). When a district court has denied a
suppression motion, “we construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
2
On January 13, 2013, Trooper A.B. Treakle was patrolling
Northbound Interstate 95 when he pulled over a car that appeared
to be speeding and violating a Virginia law that prohibits
dangling objects that obstruct the driver’s view of the highway.
When Trooper Treakle attempted to stop the car, the driver,
Appellant Champion, did not immediately pull over to the left
lane where he could have easily stopped. Rather, he started to
drive erratically, forcing Trooper Treakle to catch up to the
speeding car. Eventually, Trooper Treakle caught up to the car,
which was now pulled over on the right shoulder of the highway.
Champion exited the car, walking in the travel lane. A passenger
in the car, Karissa Wyatt, moved into the driver’s seat. In
addition to Wyatt, who was Champion’s girlfriend, there was a
third passenger in the car, Gabriel Shealy, who was holding a
puppy.
When Trooper Treakle confronted Champion about his erratic
driving, Champion eventually told the trooper that he did not
have a driver’s license. After talking to Champion, who was
still outside of the car, the trooper approached the driver’s
side of the car to talk to the passengers. As soon as he got to
the window of the car, he smelled a “fairly strong” odor of
3
marijuana. 1 J.A. 26. It was at this point that Trooper Treakle
decided that “a search of the vehicle” was necessary and that
“this was no longer a traffic stop.” J.A. 26-27. He therefore
requested a back-up trooper and, in the meantime, ran the
passengers’ drivers licenses in the computer system.
When the back-up trooper arrived, the troopers handcuffed
Champion and placed him in a police car. Trooper Treakle asked
Champion if there was any contraband in the car, and Champion
responded “none that I know of.” J.A. 107. The passengers were
ordered out of the car, searched, and positioned outside of the
car with the back-up trooper while the search proceeded.
Trooper Treakle first commenced a search of the passenger
compartment of the car, looking specifically for marijuana. As
he did so, the back-up trooper approached Treakle and told him
that the passengers stated that their destination was
Washington, D.C., which was inconsistent with Champion’s earlier
assertion that his destination was Boston. The passengers also
had admitted that they had smoked marijuana inside the car. 2
1
Trooper Treakle was accompanied by his drug detection dog
while patrolling the interstate. He testified that he did not
take the dog out to sniff the car because if a trooper smells
marijuana, the protocol is to not run the dog. J.A. 32.
2
There is some inconsistency in the hearing testimony. The
back-up trooper first testified that only one of the passengers
admitted that she smoked marijuana inside the car, J.A. 54, but
then later stated that “they stated that they were smoking
(Continued)
4
At some point after this interaction, Trooper Treakle gave
the car keys to his back-up and instructed him to search the
trunk. The search of the trunk revealed a “thin drawstring-style
gym bag,” J.A. 57, part of the contents of which, when the bag
was first touched, was immediately recognized as the handle of a
firearm. The bag contained nine firearms. After Mirandizing
Champion, the troopers questioned him, and he admitted he
purchased the guns but denied that they were stolen or that he
was a felon.
After the return of the indictment, Champion filed a motion
to suppress the firearms and the statements he made after he was
Mirandized. As to the search, the district court denied the
motion, concluding, in part, that the “Troopers ha[d] probable
inside the vehicle.” J.A. 65. There is also some dispute between
the parties over the timing of the passengers’ admission that
they smoked marijuana inside the car. Ultimately, the district
court found that one of the passengers “told [the back-up
trooper] that she and her companions had been smoking ‘weed’
while driving on the highway” and that this admission occurred
while Trooper Treakle was searching the passenger compartment of
the car (in other words, before the search of the trunk
occurred). J.A. 107.
Champion does not challenge these factual findings, which
are amply supported by the evidence. Consequently, to the extent
that he contends we should assess the evidence of probable cause
sufficient to search the trunk as of (or prior to) the moment
when Trooper Treakle first commenced the search of the passenger
compartment, we reject his contention. Rather, we assess the
sufficiency of the evidence based on all of the facts known to
the troopers before the search of the trunk commenced.
5
cause to search the trunk of the vehicle once they smell[ed]
marijuana in the passenger compartment.” J.A. 108. The factual
support for the existence of probable cause was bolstered, the
court reasoned, because the strong odor of marijuana was
“corroborated by the statement of Ms. Wyatt that each of the
occupants had possessed and smoked marijuana in the car while on
the highway.” J.A. 108. Champion subsequently pled guilty to the
indictment count of possession of a stolen firearm, but reserved
the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. 3 This
appeal followed.
As mentioned above, the parties have sought to draw us into
their debate over whether the mere odor of burnt marijuana in
the passenger compartment of a vehicle is ever sufficient to
give rise to probable cause to search the trunk of the vehicle,
a question we have not specifically addressed in a published
opinion and as to which there exists a circuit split. Compare
United States v. Parker, 72 F.3d 1444, 1450 (10th Cir.
1995)(“[A]n officer obtains probable cause to search the trunk
of a vehicle once he smells marijuana in the passenger
compartment and finds corroborating evidence of contraband.”),
with United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 686-87 (5th Cir.
3
Champion concedes, of course, that if probable cause
supported the search of the vehicle, no warrant was necessary.
6
1995)(citing cases in which the court had held that “the smell
of marihuana alone may be ground enough for a finding of
probable cause”), United States v. Winters, 221 F.3d 1039, 1041
(8th Cir. 2000) (affirming the lower court’s conclusion that
“once the trooper smelled marijuana, he had probable cause to
search the entire vehicle, including the trunk and all
containers therein, for controlled substances”), and United
States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Kayras’s
detection of the smell of burnt marijuana while he was
conducting the search for an open container gave him probable
cause to search the entire vehicle for drugs.”). But we find it
unnecessary to choose sides in this debate.
Here, the district court’s determination of probable cause
relied on more than the mere odor of marijuana. 4 Because the
record reveals other facts which amply support a finding of
probable cause, this case does not necessitate resolving the
more difficult question that the parties present.
4
Although the district court seemed to adopt a categorical
rule when it stated that the “Troopers [had] probable cause to
search the trunk of the vehicle once they smell[ed] marijuana in
the passenger compartment,” J.A. 108, the court went on to say
that its finding of probable cause was supported by the
statement of one of the passengers that “each of the occupants
had possessed and smoked marijuana in the car while on the
highway.” J.A. 108. Its determination of probable cause,
therefore, does not rely solely on the trooper’s testimony that
he smelled marijuana emanating from the passenger compartment of
the car.
7
We hold that the district court did not err in finding
there existed probable cause to search the trunk of the car. As
we explained in United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586 (4th Cir.
2010):
Probable cause is not readily, or even usefully,
reduced to a neat set of legal rules. However, the
Supreme Court has described it as existing where the
known facts and circumstances are sufficient to
warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.
When assessing probable cause, we must examine the
facts from the standpoint of an objectively
reasonable police officer, giving due weight to
inferences drawn from those facts by . . . local law
enforcement officers.
Id. at 591-92 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, several factors in the aggregate amounted to probable
cause for the troopers to believe that contraband existed
generally within the car, including the trunk.
First, the strong odor of marijuana is the most obvious
factor supporting a finding of probable cause. See United States
v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 2004) (“We have
repeatedly held that the odor of marijuana alone can provide
probable cause to believe that marijuana is present in a
particular place. . . . While smelling marijuana does not assure
that marijuana is still present, the odor certainly provides
probable cause to believe that it is.”). Trooper Treakle’s
undisputed testimony that he recognized the “strong odor” of
marijuana immediately upon his approach to the vehicle, coupled
8
with Champion’s tantalizingly ambiguous response to his inquiry
whether there was contraband in the car (“none that I know of”)
provide compelling evidence that it was reasonable for him to
conclude that there was a “fair probability” that marijuana (or
other contraband) was located generally within the car. See
Kelly, 592 F.3d at 592.
Second, Ms. Wyatt’s admission that the occupants of the car
had been smoking “weed” while driving on the highway further
supports the conclusion that the troopers had probable cause to
search the trunk, and not just the passenger compartment, for
contraband. This admission is especially important here because
of the temporal element: the passenger admitted that the
occupants had been smoking “weed” while on the highway on which
they were pulled over. Thus, the admission established a fair
probability that contraband, specifically marijuana, was present
in the car at the time it was pulled over. And, since even
personal use quantities of marijuana can be stored in a trunk,
there was a fair probability that marijuana would be found in
the trunk. See United States v. Turner, 119 F.3d 18, 20-21 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (rejecting defendant’s argument that evidence of
personal use of marijuana is insufficient to support a finding
of probable cause to search the trunk of the car and collecting
cases in which police officers were justified in searching the
trunk of cars after finding evidence of marijuana use).
9
Finally, the occupants’ inconsistent answers as to their
travel plans also contribute to a finding of probable cause to
search the trunk for contraband insofar as the inconsistencies
supported an inference of ongoing criminal activity. See United
States v. Ortiz, 669 F.3d 439, 445 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding
that a defendant’s “uncertainty and confusion about his
destination” supported a finding that probable cause existed to
search his car for contraband); United States v. Guevara, 731
F.3d 824, 831 (8th Cir. 2013) (affirming a finding of probable
cause to search a car in part on the basis that the defendant
and her sister “gave inconsistent answers about which relative
they were going to visit, and neither of them knew the address
of their final destination”).
In sum, a reasonable law enforcement officer could conclude
on this record that (1) the inconsistencies in the accounts of
the occupants’ journey, combined with (2) the strong odor of
marijuana, (3) the admission that the occupants smoked
marijuana in the car during the trip, and (4) Champion’s
apparent “uncertainty” whether there was contraband in the
vehicle he himself was driving (allegedly all the way to Boston
from Virginia) were, in the aggregate, indicative of criminal
activity, such as (but not necessarily limited to) distribution
or possession of illegal narcotics. As such, there was probable
cause to search the trunk, as both distribution and possession
10
quantities of narcotics can be found in the trunk of a car.
Thus, in light of the totality of the circumstances, there was
a fair probability that the car contained contraband and that
it was stored in the trunk. It follows that the district court
correctly denied the motion to suppress the firearms discovered
during a lawful search of the vehicle by the troopers.
The judgment is
AFFIRMED.
11