Shasta Staley v. Martin Gruenberg , 575 F. App'x 153 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1875
SHASTA D. STALEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MARTIN GRUENBERG, Acting Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
Judge. (1:12-cv-00530-GBL-JFA)
Submitted: May 30, 2014 Decided: June 6, 2014
Before WILKINSON, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gerald L. Gilliard, LAW OFFICE OF GERALD L. GILLIARD, ESQ., LLC,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, Acting United
States Attorney, Dennis C. Barghaan, Jr., Assistant United
States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
The President of the United States, through an
Executive Order, directed the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC” or “Defendant”) to decide promptly whether
to convert certain interns to permanent status. After the FDIC
decided not to convert Shasta Staley to permanent status, Staley
filed a complaint alleging that the FDIC retaliated against her
for engaging in protected activities, in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012); the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (2012); and the Rehabilitation
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2012). Staley alleged that she
engaged in the following protected activities: (1) requesting a
reasonable accommodation; (2) filing a grievance after her
request was denied; and (3) filing an informal and formal
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). The district court granted summary judgment to
Defendant on this claim, and Staley appeals. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, viewing the facts and drawing reasonable inferences in
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the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 1 Halpern v.
Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 460 (4th Cir.
2012). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). Summary judgment will be granted unless “a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” on the
evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). “Conclusory or speculative allegations do not
suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of
[the nonmoving party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power
Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Because Staley presented no direct evidence of
retaliation, we analyze her claim under the familiar burden-
shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209,
212 (4th Cir. 2004) (Title VII); Ennis v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. &
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Because the district court struck Staley’s memorandum in
opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and Staley
does not challenge that order on appeal, we confine our review
to Staley’s complaint and the evidence presented in the exhibits
accompanying Defendant’s memorandum in support of summary
judgment. See Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416
(4th Cir. 1993) (providing that facts presented in summary
judgment motion are “uncontroverted” if opposing party fails to
respond).
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Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 57-58 (4th Cir. 1995) (ADA &
Rehabilitation Act). “Importantly, although intermediate
evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under this framework,
[Staley retains] the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of
fact,” Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 336 (4th Cir.
2011) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted), that
her engagement in the protected activities was a “but for” cause
of her non-conversion to permanent status. Univ. of Tex. Sw.
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013); see Feist v.
La., Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d 450,
454 (5th Cir. 2013) (applying “but for” test to retaliation
claim under ADA).
The primary issue on appeal is whether Staley has
demonstrated that Defendant’s proffered reasons for her non-
conversion to permanent status were pretextual. 2 A plaintiff can
prove pretext by showing that the defendant’s “explanation is
2
Staley also suggests that the incidents identified in the
Letter of Warning and Letter of Admonishment are not legitimate,
non-retaliatory reasons for her non-conversion to permanent
status because they relate to her disability. However, “[t]he
law is well settled that the ADA is not violated when an
employer discharges an individual based on an employee’s
misconduct, even if the misconduct is related to a disability.”
Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 429 (4th Cir.
2009); see also Calhoun v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 576 F.3d 201,
214 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that insubordinate behavior is
sufficient to discharge the employer’s burden to produce a
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for an adverse employment
action).
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unworthy of credence or by offering other forms of
circumstantial evidence sufficiently probative of . . .
[retaliation].” Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 336 (4th Cir.
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] plaintiff’s
prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that
the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the
trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully
discriminated.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 148 (2000).
We conclude that Staley has failed to establish that
Defendant’s legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for not
converting her to permanent status were pretext for retaliation
— either for requesting a reasonable accommodation, filing a
grievance after that request was denied, or filing an informal
and formal complaint with the EEOC. To the contrary, the record
reveals that Staley was not converted to permanent status
because she disregarded FDIC policy, was disrespectful to
supervisors, and demonstrated poor judgment. Although Staley’s
non-conversion occurred shortly after she filed the formal EEOC
complaint, this temporal proximity alone is not sufficient to
establish that her engagement in protected activity was a “but
for” cause of her non-conversion. See Hernandez v. Yellow
Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 660 (5th Cir.) (holding that
“‘[b]ut for’ causation . . . cannot be established by temporal
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proximity alone”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 136 (2012). Nor is
there any evidence that Staley’s supervisors were conspiring to
prevent her non-conversion by creating a paper trail of “trumped
up” disciplinary charges. In any event, it is not for this
court to decide whether the decision by Staley’s supervisors was
wise. See DeJarnette v. Corning, Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th
Cir. 1998) (observing that “this [c]ourt does not sit as a kind
of super-personnel department weighing the prudence of
employment decisions made by firms charged with employment
discrimination” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, we affirm the entry of summary judgment
in favor of Defendant on Staley’s retaliation claim. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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