United States v. Angel Santillan , 458 F. App'x 253 ( 2011 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-4378
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    ANGEL SANTILLAN,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
    Jr., District Judge. (1:10-cr-00269-WO-1)
    Submitted:   December 7, 2011             Decided:   December 16, 2011
    Before KING, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Mark A. Jones, BELL, DAVIS & PITTS, PA, Winston-Salem, North
    Carolina, for Appellant.    Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
    Michael   A.   DeFranco,   Assistant  United   States  Attorney,
    Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Angel         Santillan         appeals        his        thirty-month         sentence
    following        a    guilty       plea      to    possession          of    a   firearm         by    an
    unlawful alien, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(5) (2006).
    Santillan        argues        that        the     district           court      erred          by    (1)
    calculating          his   base     offense        level        at    twenty     based      upon      his
    possession of a “short-barreled rifle,” pursuant to the United
    States    Sentencing          Guidelines           (“USSG”)          § 2K2.1(a)(4);         and       (2)
    applying     a       two-level      enhancement           for        possession       of    a    stolen
    firearm, pursuant to USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4).                              We affirm.
    Santillan’s claims of sentencing error are raised for
    the first time on appeal.                         Therefore, we review the sentence
    imposed    for        plain    error.            See     Fed.    R.    Crim.     P.    52(b).          To
    establish plain error, Santillan must show that (1) an error was
    made;    (2)         the   error      is     plain;       (3)        the    error     affects         his
    substantial          rights;      and      (4)     the    error       seriously        affects        the
    fairness,            integrity,         or        public        reputation          of      judicial
    proceedings, warranting the exercise of this court’s discretion
    to correct the error.               United States v. Wilkinson, 
    137 F.3d 214
    ,
    223   (4th     Cir.        1998)    (internal            quotation         marks      and   citation
    omitted).             In    the     sentencing            context,          an     error        affects
    substantial rights if the defendant can show that the sentence
    imposed “was longer than that to which he would otherwise be
    subject.”        United States v. Washington, 
    404 F.3d 834
    , 849 (4th
    2
    Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Ford, 
    88 F.3d 1350
    , 1356
    (4th       Cir.       1996)        (“[S]entencing              a     defendant        at     the     wrong
    guideline range seriously affects the fairness, integrity, and
    public reputation of the judicial proceedings.”).
    USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4) provides a base offense level of
    twenty when a prohibited person commits an offense involving a
    “firearm         that         is   described       in      
    26 U.S.C. § 5845
    (a),”       which
    includes         a    short-barreled             rifle.             Santillan       argues     that       the
    district court committed plain error when it calculated his base
    offense level at twenty, pursuant to subsection (a)(4), “absent
    any evidence in the record that he knew that one of the two
    firearms was a short-barreled rifle.”
    We      decline      to     impose        a       scienter     requirement          under
    § 2K2.1(a).              See United States v. Saavedra, 
    523 F.3d 1287
    , 1289-
    90 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The text of § 2K2.1(a)(5) does not contain
    a     scienter           requirement,            and    we         will   not       presume        such    a
    requirement.”); United States v. Fry, 
    51 F.3d 543
    , 546 (5th Cir.
    1995) (“[Section 2K2.1(a)(3)] is plain on its face and should
    not    .     .       .    be       read     to    imply         a     scienter       requirement.”).
    Therefore, we hold the district court did not plainly err by
    calculating Santillan’s base offense level at twenty pursuant to
    § 2K2.1(a)(4).
    Santillan           next    contends              that   the       district       court’s
    application              of   a    two-level       enhancement            for       possession       of    a
    3
    stolen    firearm,       pursuant    to    USSG      §   2K2.1(b)(4),               constituted
    plain    error.        Santillan     argues       that    application              of    such    an
    enhancement, absent evidence of his knowledge that the firearm
    was   stolen,     violates     his   due     process        rights.            However,         the
    commentary to § 2K2.1 explicitly authorizes a two-level increase
    “regardless      of    whether   the      defendant       knew     or        had     reason     to
    believe    that    the    firearm      was       stolen.”         USSG        § 2K2.1,       cmt.
    n.8(B).       Moreover,        several       other       circuits            have       expressly
    rejected      constitutional          challenges            to         the      stolen          gun
    enhancement.          See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 
    339 F.3d 759
    , 762 (8th Cir. 2003) (“We now join every other circuit to
    have addressed this issue and explicitly hold that § 2K2.1(b)(4)
    does not violate the constitution.”); United States v. Murphy,
    
    96 F.3d 846
    , 849 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that stolen firearm
    enhancement      does    not   violate       due    process);          United        States      v.
    Griffiths, 
    41 F.3d 844
    , 846 (2d Cir. 1994) (“We now explicitly
    hold that § 2K2.1(b)(4) . . . does not violate the due process
    clause.”).       Thus, we find that the district court did not commit
    plain error in applying the two-level enhancement for possession
    of a stolen firearm.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
    We    dispense    with    oral   argument         because        the    facts        and    legal
    4
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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