Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Nautilus, Inc. ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-2247
SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO.,
Third Party Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
NAUTILUS, INC.,
Third Party Defendant - Appellee,
DAVID A. NEWMAN; CASSANDRA HALL NEWMAN,
Plaintiffs.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William Connelly, Magistrate Judge.
(1:12-cv-03328-WGC)
Submitted: June 30, 2015 Decided: July 22, 2015
Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joseph L. Beavers, Alexander P. Creticos, MILES & STOCKBRIDGE, PC,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Ward B. Coe, III, James D.
Bragdon, GALLAGHER EVELIUS & JONES LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM
Third Party Plaintiff Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Sears), appeals
from the magistrate judge’s order * granting summary judgment to
Third Party Defendant Nautilus, Inc. (Nautilus), and denying its
motion for summary judgment in its third party action for breach
of contract. We affirm.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant or denial
of motions for summary judgment, Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d
865, 873 (4th Cir. 2013); Henson v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 61 F.3d
270, 274 (4th Cir. 1995). A grant of summary judgment is
appropriate “only if the record shows ‘that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’” Woollard, 712 F.3d at 873 (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). The relevant inquiry on summary judgment
is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that
one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). Additionally, this court
may affirm on any ground presented in the record, even if it was
not the basis on which the district court relied in awarding
*
The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate
judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (2012).
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summary judgment. Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124,
132 (4th Cir. 2002).
We conclude after review of the record and the parties’ briefs
that the magistrate judge did not reversibly err in granting
summary judgment to Nautilus on counts II and III of Sears’
complaint and denying summary judgment to Sears on these counts.
Judgment as a matter of law was properly granted to Nautilus on
these counts alleging failure to procure insurance and failure to
insure. This is so because the agreement between Sears and
Nautilus does not require insurance coverage for the negligence
claims brought against Sears alone by plaintiffs David Newman and
Cassandra Hall Newman. See Buenz v. Frontline Transp. Co., 882
N.E.2d 525, 529 (Ill. 2008); Westinghouse Elec. Elevator Co. v. La
Salle Monroe Bldg. Corp., 70 N.E.2d 604, 606-07 (Ill. 1947); Tanns
v. Ben A. Borenstein & Co., 688 N.E.2d 667, 670 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997); Svenson v. Miller Builders, Inc., 392 N.E.2d 628, 638 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979); see also Nielsen v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n,
612 N.E.2d 526, 529 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (listing elements of a
breach of contract action). We reject as without merit Sears’
arguments that Illinois law requires a contrary reading of the
agreement’s insurance provision.
Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate judge’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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