United States v. Eli Stafford ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4281
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ELI STAFFORD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (4:10-cr-00075-FL-1)
Submitted: February 28, 2013 Decided: March 15, 2013
Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James S. Weidner, Jr., LAW OFFICE OF JAMES S. WEIDNER, JR.,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker,
United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Yvonne V.
Watford-McKinney, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Eli Stafford was found guilty following a jury trial
of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 851 (2006), use and
carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a drug
trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)
(2006), and being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2006), resulting in a
sentence of 420 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Stafford
argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress the fruits of a warrantless search of his automobile
after a prolonged traffic stop, and that the district court
erred by not requiring the Government to prove prior convictions
noticed under 21 U.S.C. § 851 (2006) beyond a reasonable doubt.
This appeal was placed in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s
decision in Florida v. Harris, No. 11-817, __ S. Ct. __, 2013 WL
598440 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2013). Harris was decided on February 19,
2013. Therefore, this appeal is now ripe for review. We
affirm.
Stafford first challenges the district court’s denial
of his suppression motion. In considering this claim, “we
review the district court’s legal determinations de novo and its
factual determinations for clear error.” United States v.
Vaughan, 700 F.3d 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2012). Using the analytic
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framework of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), we determine
first whether the officer’s actions were justified at the
inception of the traffic stop. If they were, we then address
“whether the continued stop was sufficiently limited in scope
and duration.” Vaughan, 700 F.3d at 709 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, it is undisputed that the initial traffic
stop was justified.
Following a traffic stop, an officer may:
detain the offending vehicle for as long as it takes
to perform the traditional incidents of a routine
traffic stop. . . . [The] officer may request a
driver’s license and vehicle registration, run a
computer check, and issue a citation. . . . [O]nce the
driver has demonstrated that he is entitled to operate
his vehicle, and the police officer has issued the
requisite warning or ticket, the driver must be
allowed to proceed on his way. . . . If a police
officer wants to detain a driver beyond the scope of a
routine traffic stop, . . . he must possess a
justification for doing so other than the initial
traffic violation. . . . Thus, a prolonged automobile
stop requires either the driver’s consent or a
reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is afoot.
United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008).
Here, we conclude that there was sufficient reasonable
suspicion to prolong the traffic stop by what was, at most, a
few minutes. The entire incident, from stop to arrest, was no
more than twenty minutes in total. The traffic stop was
extended in part because officers at the scene were unable to
verify Stafford’s identity. Under these circumstances,
Stafford’s nervous demeanor sufficed to create a reasonable
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suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, at least to justify
a minor intrusion. Therefore, we conclude that the district
court did not err when it denied Stafford’s motion to suppress.
Finally, Stafford contends that the district court
erred when it did not require the Government to prove the prior
convictions in its 21 U.S.C. § 851 (2006) notice beyond a
reasonable doubt. While noting that the Government was not
required to prove the disputed facts because Stafford did not
contest their validity below, we further conclude that any error
that the district court committed was harmless because the
convictions were more than five years old, and therefore
Stafford was barred from challenging them by 21 U.S.C. § 851(e)
(2006).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the material before this
court and argument will not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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