United States v. Jesse Goodwin , 578 F. App'x 308 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4265
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JESSE FRANKLIN GOODWIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Margaret B. Seymour, Senior
District Judge. (0:94-cr-00605-MBS-2)
Submitted: July 17, 2014 Decided: July 24, 2014
Before WILKINSON and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Allen B. Burnside, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Winston David Holliday, Jr.,
Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jesse Franklin Goodwin appeals the district court’s
judgment revoking his supervised release and imposing a sentence
of eight months imprisonment with no further supervised release.
Goodwin’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising the issue of whether
the sentence was imposed in violation of the law or is plainly
unreasonable, but concluding that there are no meritorious
grounds for appeal. Goodwin was notified of his right to file a
pro se supplemental brief but has not done so. We affirm.
We review a district court’s judgment revoking
supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th
Cir. 1992). Challenges to a district court’s jurisdiction or
authority are issues of law that we review de novo. United
States v. Winfield, 665 F.3d 107, 109 (4th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448, 451 (4th Cir. 2011).
To revoke supervised release, a district court need
only find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a
preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012).
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence
upon revocation of supervised release.” United States v. Webb,
738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). In exercising such
discretion, the court “is guided by the Chapter Seven policy
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statements in the federal Guidelines manual, as well as the
statutory factors applicable to revocation sentences under 18
U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e).” Id. at 641. While a district
court must explain its sentence, the court “need not be as
detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it
must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence.” United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider whether
the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id.
at 438. In this initial inquiry, we take a more deferential
posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion
than reasonableness review for Guidelines sentences. United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if
we find the sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable
must we decide whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657. We
presume that a sentence within the Chapter Seven policy
statement range is reasonable. Webb, 738 F.3d at 642.
We have reviewed the record and conclude that
Goodwin’s sentence is reasonable, and the district court did not
err or abuse its discretion. The sentence is within both the
prescribed statutory range and the policy statement range, and
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the district court reasonably determined that a sentence at the
low end of the policy statement range was appropriate in this
case. Moreover, in accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the
entire record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform his or her client, in
writing, of his or her right to petition the Supreme Court of
the United States for further review. If the client requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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