United States v. Bidcar Orozco Orozco , 579 F. App'x 172 ( 2014 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 13-4991
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    BIDCAR EDUARDO OROZCO OROZCO, a/k/a Bidcar Eduardo Orosco,
    a/k/a Bidcar Ezer Orozco-Orozco, a/k/a Jesus Miguel Sosa,
    a/k/a Eric Castro, a/k/a Erik Rodriguez Castro, a/k/a
    Castillo Erik Rodriguez, a/k/a Ruben Matias Calmo Porfirio,
    a/k/a Justo Pastor Padilla,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
    District Judge. (1:13-cr-00225-TDS-1)
    Submitted:   July 24, 2014                     Decided: July 28, 2014
    Before FLOYD and    THACKER,   Circuit   Judges,   and   DAVIS,   Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Sandra Baughn Jelovsek, LAW OFFICE OF SANDRA BAUGHN JELOVSEK,
    Johnson City, Tennessee, for Appellant. Kyle David Pousson,
    OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North
    Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Bidcar    Eduardo   Orozco       Orozco     appeals      his    conviction
    and ninety-six-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea
    to   illegal   reentry     subsequent       to    an    aggravated        felony,    in
    violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a), (b)(2) (2012).                           On appeal,
    counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious issues
    for review but questioning whether (1) Orozco Orozco’s plea was
    knowing and voluntary, (2) Orozco Orozco’s prior conviction was
    properly designated an “aggravated felony” under § 1326(b)(2),
    (3) the district court imposed a reasonable sentence, (4) Orozco
    Orozco’s statements to law enforcement were taken in violation
    of   Miranda   v.   Arizona,   
    384 U.S. 436
       (1966),     and    (5)   Orozco
    Orozco was informed after his arrest of his rights under the
    Vienna Convention.     For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    Before    accepting   a    guilty       plea,     the    district     court
    must conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant
    of, and determines that he comprehends, the nature of the charge
    to which he is pleading guilty, the maximum possible penalty he
    faces,   any   mandatory    minimum     penalty,       and    the    rights     he   is
    relinquishing by pleading guilty.                 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1);
    United States v. DeFusco, 
    949 F.2d 114
    , 116 (4th Cir. 1991).
    The court also must ensure that the plea is voluntary, supported
    by an independent factual basis, and not the result of force,
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    threats, or promises outside the plea agreement.                      Fed. R. Crim.
    P. 11(b)(2), (3).            Because Orozco Orozco did not challenge his
    guilty plea in the district court, we review the plea colloquy
    for plain error.            United States v. Martinez, 
    277 F.3d 517
    , 525
    (4th Cir. 2002); see Henderson v. United States, 
    133 S. Ct. 1121
    , 1126-27 (2013) (discussing standard of review).
    Here,     the       district    court       fully    complied     with    the
    requirements of Rule 11, ensuring that Orozco Orozco’s plea was
    knowing and voluntary and supported by an independent factual
    basis.       We    discern         no    basis    to       doubt   Orozco     Orozco’s
    understanding      of       the    statutory     penalties       applicable    to    his
    offense, or to question his knowing and voluntary plea as a
    result of the advisements regarding those penalties provided to
    him during the plea colloquy.
    A defendant who illegally reenters the United States
    after    having    been       removed     following         a   conviction     for    an
    aggravated     felony         is    subject      to    a    twenty-year       term    of
    imprisonment.           
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (b)(2).           Aggravated    felonies
    includes “crime[s] of violence,” as defined in 
    18 U.S.C. § 16
    (2012), for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year.
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (43)(F) (2012).                  A “crime of violence” includes
    “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
    threatened use of physical force against the person or property
    of another.”       
    18 U.S.C. § 16
    (a).             As counsel concedes, Orozco
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    Orozco’s conviction for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting
    serious      bodily    injury      is    properly       classified          as   a   “crime    of
    violence.”          See     
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32
           (2013);      see     also
    State v. Walker, 
    694 S.E.2d 484
    , 494-95 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010)
    (defining “serious injury”).
    We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a
    deferential         abuse-of-discretion              standard.”             Gall     v.     United
    States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 41 (2007).                         We “first ensure that the
    district      court       committed       no    significant             procedural        error,”
    including       improper         calculation          of        the     Guidelines         range,
    insufficient        consideration         of    the    
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)       (2012)
    factors,      and    inadequate         explanation        of     the    sentence         imposed.
    
    Id. at 51
    .           If we find no procedural error, we examine the
    substantive reasonableness of the sentence under “the totality
    of the circumstances.”              
    Id.
            The sentence must be “sufficient,
    but   not     greater       than    necessary,”            to    satisfy      the     goals    of
    sentencing.         
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).               A within-Guidelines sentence
    is presumed on appeal to be substantively reasonable, and the
    defendant      bears       the     burden       to     “rebut         the    presumption       by
    demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
    against the § 3553(a) factors.”                     United States v. Montes-Pineda,
    
    445 F.3d 375
    ,    379    (4th       Cir.    2006)      (internal         quotation      marks
    omitted).
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    Our review of the record before us demonstrates that
    the sentence is procedurally reasonable, as the district court
    properly    calculated         the        Guidelines     range,      considered       the
    parties’ arguments, and provided a thorough explanation for the
    sentence imposed.            Further, Orozco Orozco fails to rebut the
    presumption      of    reasonableness         accorded      his     within-Guidelines
    sentence.
    Counsel also questions whether Orozco Orozco’s arrest
    violated his rights under the Vienna Convention and whether his
    post-arrest      questioning         violated       Miranda.        However,     Orozco
    Orozco’s guilty plea forecloses relief on these grounds.                              See
    United States v. Moussaoui, 
    591 F.3d 263
    , 279 (4th Cir. 2010)
    (“[T]he defendant who has pled guilty has no non-jurisdictional
    ground upon which to attack that judgment except the inadequacy
    of the plea or the government’s power to bring any indictment at
    all.”    (internal         quotation        marks     and     citations      omitted)).
    Additionally,         we     have        reviewed     Orozco      Orozco’s     pro     se
    supplemental      brief      and     discern     from    it    no   valid    basis    to
    overturn the criminal judgment.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
    in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
    We   therefore    affirm       Orozco      Orozco’s     conviction     and    sentence.
    This    court    requires      that       counsel     inform      Orozco    Orozco,    in
    writing,    of   his       right    to    petition    the   Supreme    Court    of    the
    5
    United States for further review.                 If Orozco Orozco requests
    that    a    petition     be   filed,   but   counsel   believes    that    such   a
    petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
    for leave to withdraw from representation.                    Counsel’s motion
    must state that a copy thereof was served on Orozco Orozco.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal       contentions    are   adequately     presented    in    the   materials
    before      this   court   and   argument     would   not   aid   the    decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
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