United States v. Christopher Williams , 578 F. App'x 319 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4064
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Richard Mark Gergel, District
Judge. (2:12-cr-00499-RMG-2)
Submitted: July 24, 2014 Decided: July 28, 2014
Before FLOYD and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
T. Kirk Truslow, T. KIRK TRUSLOW, P.A., North Myrtle Beach,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Peter Thomas Phillips, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Williams pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to using a communication facility to facilitate the
commission of a controlled substance offense and aiding and
abetting the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) and 21
U.S.C. § 843(b) (2012). After granting Williams’ motion for a
downward variance, the district court sentenced Williams to
thirty-seven months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed
a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but
questioning whether the district court complied with Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 in accepting Williams’ guilty plea and whether
Williams’ sentence is reasonable. Williams was advised of his
right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he did not do so.
We affirm.
Because Williams did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, we review the Rule 11 hearing for
plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th
Cir. 2002). To establish plain error, Williams must show:
(1) there was error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error
affected his substantial rights. Henderson v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (2013). In the guilty plea context, a
defendant meets his burden by showing a reasonable probability
2
that he would not have pled guilty but for the Rule 11 omission.
United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2009).
After reviewing the transcript of Williams’ guilty
plea hearing pursuant to Anders, we conclude that the district
court substantially complied with Rule 11 in accepting Williams’
guilty plea and that any omission by the court did not affect
Williams’ substantial rights. Critically, the district court
ensured that the plea was supported by an independent factual
basis, that Williams entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily,
and that Williams understood the nature of the charge to which
he pled guilty, the maximum term of imprisonment he faced, and
the rights he relinquished by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th
Cir. 1991).
We review Williams’ sentence for reasonableness “under
a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). A sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the court properly calculates the defendant’s
advisory Guidelines range, gives the parties an opportunity to
argue for an appropriate sentence, considers the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012) factors, does not rely on clearly erroneous
facts, and sufficiently explains the selected sentence. Id. at
49-51. After reviewing the sentencing transcript pursuant to
Anders, we conclude that Williams’ sentence is procedurally
3
reasonable. Williams has also failed to rebut the presumption
that his below-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable.
United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012)
(explaining presumption); United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445
F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that defendant may
rebut presumption by showing “that the sentence is unreasonable
when measured against the § 3553(a) factors” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the
remainder of the record in this case and have found no
meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the
district court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel
inform Williams, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Williams requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Williams. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
4