United States v. Norman , 395 F. App'x 964 ( 2010 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 09-4190
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    JASON WARD NORMAN,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of North Carolina, at Statesville.         Richard L.
    Voorhees, District Judge. (5:07-cr-00011-RLV-DCK-4)
    Submitted:   August 2, 2010              Decided:   September 16, 2010
    Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Claire J. Rauscher, Ann L. Hester, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN
    NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
    Edward R. Ryan, Acting United States Attorney, Mark A. Jones,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
    Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Jason Ward Norman pled guilty to conspiracy to possess
    with    intent       to    distribute          cocaine     and      cocaine     base    and
    possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (crack).                              The
    district court sentenced him to 168 months’ imprisonment.                                On
    appeal, Norman argues that the district court failed to address
    his     arguments         at     sentencing        and     failed     to      provide     an
    individualized       explanation         of    the   sentencing       factors    as     they
    apply to him.        We affirm.
    At sentencing, Norman contested the quantity of drugs
    that was attributed to him in the presentence report.                           The court
    heard testimony from the case agent and Norman and determined
    that the probation officer’s calculation of approximately 3,859
    grams of crack cocaine and 2,240 grams of powder cocaine was
    supported by a preponderance of the evidence.                        Norman’s attorney
    asked    the    court      to    consider      all   the    sentencing       factors    and
    “sentence [Norman] with leniency,” considering his health, the
    fact that he was an addict, the level of his culpability, and
    his family support.
    The   district         court     adopted      the     findings     in    the
    presentence report.              The applicable advisory guideline range was
    therefore      168   to        210   months’    imprisonment.          The    court     then
    referenced United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    (2005), and 18
    U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), and imposed a 168-month sentence.                              The
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    court further stated that it “ha[d] not identified factors in
    [§] 3553(a) that would mitigate the guideline range.”                                The court
    also commented, “This case illustrates the demons of drugs as
    well as any in that the defendant found himself helpless and
    nevertheless continued to participate in activities which spread
    drugs   about     to      others     who        would     therefore      be     in     similar
    circumstances to him.”
    An     appellate          court          reviews        a     sentence           for
    reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard.                                 Gall v.
    United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007).                            This review requires
    consideration        of      both         the       procedural          and     substantive
    reasonableness of a sentence.               
    Id. First, the
    court must assess
    whether the district court properly calculated the guidelines
    range, considered the § 3553(a) factors, analyzed any arguments
    presented    by    the      parties,        and      sufficiently         explained          the
    selected    sentence.             
    Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50
    ;       see     United
    States v.    Lynn,     
    592 F.3d 572
    ,      576    (4th    Cir.       2010)     (“[A]n
    individualized     explanation            must      accompany      every       sentence.”);
    United States v. Carter, 
    564 F.3d 325
    , 330 (4th Cir. 2009).
    Even if the sentence is procedurally reasonable, the court must
    consider    the    substantive             reasonableness          of     the        sentence,
    “examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances to see whether
    the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that
    the   sentence    it      chose    satisfied         the    standards         set    forth    in
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    § 3553(a).”       United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 
    597 F.3d 212
    , 216
    (4th Cir. 2010).
    Norman       argues     that       his     sentence         is     procedurally
    unreasonable because the district court did not consider the
    § 3553(a)     factors      and     failed       to    provide      an        individualized
    statement    of    how    the     factors      applied       in   his    case.        Norman
    preserved   the     issue    by    arguing      in     the    district        court   for   a
    lenient sentence.         See 
    Lynn, 592 F.3d at 577-78
    .
    The    district       court    is    not    required        to     “robotically
    tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection.”                         United States v.
    Johnson,    
    445 F.3d 339
    ,    345     (4th      Cir.    2006).           However,   the
    district    court    must       “place    on    the     record     an        individualized
    assessment based on the particular facts of the case before it.
    This individualized assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy,
    but it must provide a rationale tailored to the particular case
    at hand and adequate to permit meaningful appellate review.”
    
    Carter, 564 F.3d at 330
    (internal quotation marks, footnote, and
    citation omitted).          This is true even when the district court
    sentences a defendant within the applicable guidelines range.
    
    Id. An extensive
    explanation is not required as long as the
    appellate court is satisfied “‘that [the district court] has
    considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
    exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.’”                                United
    States v. Engle, 
    592 F.3d 495
    , 500 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting
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    Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 356 (2007)), petition for
    cert. filed, 
    78 U.S.L.W. 3764
    (U.S. 2010) (No. 09-1512).
    The        district           court        properly     calculated               Norman’s
    guidelines range.               In imposing sentence, the court commented on
    the    dangers         of       drugs,      and     illustrated          those       dangers         by
    referencing Norman’s particular case.                              We need not determine
    whether this constitutes an adequate explanation under Carter
    and   Supreme      Court         law.         Rather,      because       the    district           court
    explicitly        considered            the      § 3553(a)        factors       for       potential
    mitigation        of    the      sentence,         and    because     the       district           court
    sentenced Norman to the lowest point in the applicable guideline
    range, we conclude that any error was harmless.                                  See 
    Lynn, 592 F.3d at 582
    ; see also 
    Rita, 551 U.S. at 359
    (“Where . . . the
    record     makes       clear      that     the     sentencing       judge       considered           the
    evidence and arguments, we do not believe the law requires the
    judge to write more extensively.”); United States v. Boulware,
    
    604 F.3d 832
    , 838 (4th Cir. 2010) (procedural error is harmless
    if    it   “did    not       have      a   substantial        and    injurious            effect      or
    influence     on       the      result     and     we     can[]    say    with       .    .    .    fair
    assurance[]        .        .     .     that      the      district       court’s             explicit
    consideration          of       [the    defendant’s]        arguments          would       not      have
    affected the sentence imposed”).
    Having             determined         that     there        is     no       reversible
    procedural        error,         the    court      next     considers          the       substantive
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    reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account the totality
    of the circumstances.            
    Gall, 552 U.S. at 51
    .                   Because Norman’s
    sentence is within the appropriate guidelines range, we presume
    on appeal that it is substantively reasonable.                           United States v.
    Go, 
    517 F.3d 216
    , 218 (4th Cir. 2008).                          The presumption may be
    rebutted by a showing “that the sentence is unreasonable when
    measured    against     the      §    3553(a)       factors.”          United      States   v.
    Montes-Pineda,       
    445 F.3d 375
    ,    379    (4th      Cir.     2006)      (internal
    quotation      marks    omitted).              Norman      has     not      rebutted     that
    presumption.         Accordingly,         we       hold    that   the       district    court
    committed      no   significant        procedural          or    substantive        error   in
    sentencing Norman.            Accordingly, we affirm Norman’s 168-month
    sentence.      We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions       are       adequately      presented         in    the    materials
    before   the    court      and   argument          would    not    aid      the    decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
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