In Re: Morrissey v. ( 2000 )


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  •                         UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    
    In Re: JOSEPH D. MORRISSEY,
             No. 00-4656
    Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
    Robert E. Payne, District Judge.
    (MISC-97-16)
    Submitted: December 8, 2000
    Decided: December 22, 2000
    Before WILLIAMS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and
    HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    Robert H. Smallenberg, James T. Maloney, Richmond, Virginia, for
    Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, James B. Comey,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    2                          IN RE: MORRISSEY
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Joseph P. Morrissey appeals a district court order revoking proba-
    tion and sentencing him to ninety days’ imprisonment. Morrissey
    argues that he was denied due process because the district court did
    not issue a written statement of its findings of fact forming the basis
    for its order revoking probation. Morrissey further argues that the dis-
    trict court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous. We affirm.
    After a hearing during which several witnesses testified, the district
    court made findings of fact from the bench and ordered Morrissey’s
    probation revoked. Those findings of fact have been transcribed and
    are in the record.
    As a matter of due process, prior to revocation of probation, Mor-
    rissey was entitled to: (1) written notice of the alleged violations of
    probations; (2) disclosure of the evidence against him; (3) opportunity
    to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evi-
    dence; (4) the right to confront witnesses; (5) a neutral and detached
    hearing body; and (6) a written statement by the factfinder as to the
    evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking probation. Gagnon
    v. Scarpelli, 
    411 U.S. 778
    , 786 (1973). "A transcribed oral finding can
    serve as a ‘written statement’ for due process purposes when the tran-
    script and record compiled before the trial judge enable the reviewing
    court to determine the basis of the trial court’s decision." United
    States v. Copley, 
    978 F.2d 829
    , 831 (4th Cir. 1992) (concerning revo-
    cation of supervised release); see also United States v. Barth, 
    899 F.2d 199
    , 201 (2d Cir. 1990) (same concerning revocation of proba-
    tion). Accordingly, we find that because the district court’s factual
    findings were transcribed there is no due process violation.
    A district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error.
    United States v. Rusher, 
    966 F.2d 868
    , 873 (4th Cir. 1992). The fact-
    finder, in this instance the district court, "not the reviewing court,
    weighs the credibility of the evidence and resolves any conflicts in the
    evidence presented." United States v. Murphy, 
    35 F.3d 143
    , 148 (4th
    Cir. 1994). We find that the district court’s factual findings are not
    clearly erroneous.
    IN RE: MORRISSEY                         3
    Accordingly, we affirm the order of the court. We dispense with
    oral argument because the facts and legal conclusions are adequately
    presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
    aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED