Grange v. Southeastern Mechanical Services, Inc. , 427 F. App'x 269 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1004
THEODORE GRANGE,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
SOUTHEASTERN MECHANICAL SERVICES, INCORPORATED,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:09-cv-02725-JFM)
Submitted: April 28, 2011 Decided: May 3, 2011
Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Theodore Grange, Appellant Pro Se. Precious Murchison Gittens,
GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP, Washington, D.C.; David W. Long-Daniels,
Natasha L. Wilson, GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP, Atlanta, Georgia; John
Francis Scalia, GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP, McLean, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Theodore Grange appeals the district court’s order
granting Southeastern Mechanical Services, Inc.’s motion for
summary judgment on Grange’s race discrimination claim, brought
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2003 & Supp.
2010). Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
judgment. Howard v. Winter, 446 F.3d 559, 565 (4th Cir. 2006).
Summary judgment is appropriate when the “pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c).
To establish his discrimination claim, Grange was
first required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
under the burden-shifting framework adopted by the Supreme Court
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Thus, Grange was required to show that (1) he belongs to a
protected class; (2) he applied and was qualified for a job for
which Southeastern Mechanical was seeking applicants;
(3) despite his qualification, he was rejected; and (4) after
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his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants.
We hold that Grange failed to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination and, therefore, we need not proceed under
the McDonnell Douglas framework. Grange could not show that he
was qualified and rejected despite his qualifications. In fact,
the evidence showed that Southeastern Mechanical Services did
not hire Grange as a welder because he failed his pre-employment
welding test.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
Consequently, we deny Grange’s motion to appoint counsel. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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