United States v. Autery , 358 F. App'x 464 ( 2009 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 09-4201
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    D’NEZ DEVON AUTERY,
    Defendant – Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
    Chief District Judge. (1:08-cr-00167-JAB-1)
    Submitted:    October 16, 2009              Decided:   December 31, 2009
    Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    J. Darren Byers, LAW OFFICES OF J. DARREN BYERS, P.A., Winston-
    Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant.       Anna Mills Wagoner,
    United States Attorney, Lisa B. Boggs, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    D’Nez Devon Autery pled guilty pursuant to a written
    plea agreement to possessing a firearm after being convicted of
    a felony, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) (2006).                     The
    court sentenced Autery to the statutory minimum sentence of 180
    months’ imprisonment as a result of his armed career criminal
    status, and he timely appealed.            Autery’s attorney filed a brief
    in accordance with Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967),
    certifying that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but
    questioning on Autery’s behalf whether the district court erred
    in finding he was an armed career criminal pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e) (2006).         Autery was given the opportunity to file a pro
    se supplemental brief, but declined.                 The Government filed a
    brief    urging    affirmance.       Finding    no    reversible   error,   we
    affirm.
    Autery contends the district court erred when it found
    he had at least three previous convictions for violent offenses
    and was thus subject to enhanced penalties as an armed career
    criminal pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e).              The evidence showed at
    least four predicate offenses, two convictions for breaking and
    entering, see United States v. Bowden, 
    975 F.2d 1080
    , 1082-85
    (4th    Cir.    1992),    one   conviction   for     attempted   breaking   and
    entering, see United States v. Custis, 
    988 F.2d 1355
    , 1364 (4th
    Cir. 1993), and one conviction for discharging a weapon into
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    occupied property.            The two breaking and entering convictions
    occurred      on     the     same    day     and    all    four     convictions           were
    consolidated at sentencing.
    In     considering      whether       the   district     court        properly
    designated Autery an armed career criminal, this court reviews
    the    district       court’s       legal    determinations       de      novo      and   its
    factual findings for clear error.                     United States v. Wardrick,
    
    350 F.3d 446
    ,    451    (4th    Cir.     2003).      A    person       who    violates
    § 922(g)(1), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and
    has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug
    offenses committed on different occasions is an armed career
    criminal       subject       to     enhanced       penalties.          See     
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(1).         “Occasions” are “those predicate offenses that can
    be isolated with a beginning and an end — ones that constitute
    an occurrence unto themselves.”                    United States v. Letterlough,
    
    63 F.3d 332
    ,    335    (4th    Cir.    1995).       Factors    to      look    at   are
    whether the convictions concern different geographical locations
    and different victims.                
    Id. at 335-36
    .            In Letterlough, two
    prior drug convictions occurred on separate occasions although
    the drug transactions were only two hours apart.                         Each drug sale
    was a complete and separate transaction.                        In United States v.
    James, 
    337 F.3d 387
    , 391 (4th Cir. 2003), the court found that
    two burglaries occurring at two different stores, across the
    street from each other, on the same day, occurred on separate
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    occasions.       In United States v. Hobbs, 
    136 F.3d 384
    , 387-89 &
    n.5    (4th    Cir.      1998),       the    court         found         that       each    of   three
    burglaries occurring in the space of a single hour “occurred on
    an occasion different from the others.”                             
    Id. at 389
    .
    Thus,    we    find        Autery      had      at    least          four    qualifying
    convictions       and        was     properly          designated              an     armed      career
    criminal.         Even    if       only     one       of    the      breaking         and     entering
    convictions       should           have     counted         as       a    predicate           § 924(e)
    conviction, there was no error because Autery still had three
    qualifying convictions.
    We find no error in the sentence as the district court
    was    without    discretion          to    impose         a   sentence             lower    than   the
    statutory minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment.                                          United
    States v. Robinson, 
    404 F.3d 850
    , 862 (4th Cir. 2005).
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
    in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
    We    therefore    affirm          Autery’s       conviction             and    sentence.           This
    court requires counsel inform Autery, in writing, of the right
    to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
    review.       If he requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
    believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
    may     move     in      this        court        for       leave         to        withdraw        from
    representation.          Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
    was served on Autery.                 We dispense with oral argument because
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    the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    materials   before   the   court   and   argument   would   not   aid   the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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