James Williams v. L. Calton ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-6882
JAMES WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
L. CALTON,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
B. CALTON; CAPTAIN LKU; TERRY O'BRIEN; LALOUDE, Staff
Counselor; CRUM; SHOEMAKER; CALTON, (brother to B. Calton);
CAMPBELL; DELORES; WILLIS; MR. CHAMBERS; LALONDE,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Glen E. Conrad, Chief
District Judge. (7:10-cv-00075-GEC-RSB)
Submitted: February 28, 2013 Decided: March 8, 2013
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Rick A. Mountcastle, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Roanoke, Virginia; James J. O’Keeffe, IV, GENTRY, LOCKE, RAKES &
MOORE, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. James Williams,
Appellee Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
James Williams filed a Bivens ∗ action against
Correctional Officer L. Calton, charging that Calton used
excessive force against him during an altercation that occurred
while Williams was incarcerated at United States Penitentiary
Lee in Jonesville, Virginia. Finding that Calton violated
Williams’ Eighth Amendment rights, the jury awarded $1000 in
compensatory damages to Williams but did not award punitive
damages. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), Calton moved for
judgment as a matter of law arguing, as he had in earlier
motions, that he was entitled to qualified immunity and that
Williams failed to establish that he acted with the malicious
and sadistic intent necessary to support an Eighth Amendment
claim. The district court denied Calton’s motion and Calton
appealed, challenging the denial of his motion for judgment as a
matter of law. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Whether a prison official has violated the Eighth
Amendment entails both subjective and objective considerations.
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). Specifically, we
must determine “whether the prison official acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective component) and
∗
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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whether the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted on the
inmate was sufficiently serious (objective component).”
Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). To
establish the subjective component in the context of an
excessive force claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
acted “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986).
Calton argues that the district court erred by denying his
motion for judgment as a matter of law because Williams failed
to establish this subjective component.
“Judgment as a matter of law is proper only ‘if there
can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.’”
Ocheltree v Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir.
2003) (en banc) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 250 (1986)). “If reasonable minds could differ about
the verdict, we are obliged to affirm.” King v. McMillan, 594
F.3d 301, 312 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). This court may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence and must disregard all
evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not
required to believe. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000).
With these standards in mind, we have reviewed the
evidence presented in this case and conclude that the evidence
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supports the jury’s verdict. Moreover, we find unpersuasive
Calton’s argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity
based on an intervening change in the standard for excessive
force claims. Compare Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1263 (4th
Cir. 1994), with Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 130 S. Ct. 1175,
1178 (2010).
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and law are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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