United States v. Quinton Wiley , 449 F. App'x 269 ( 2011 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-4224
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    QUINTON WILEY, a/k/a Quintin Oniel Wiley, a/k/a Quinton Oniel
    Wiley, a/k/a Quintion Wiley,
    Defendant – Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Charleston.      Solomon Blatt, Jr., Senior
    District Judge. (9:08-cr-00689-SB-1)
    Submitted:   September 13, 2011           Decided:   October 12, 2011
    Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF
    THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, South Carolina, for
    Appellant.   William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, OFFICE
    OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, and
    Sean Kittrell, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
    UNITED   STATES   ATTORNEY,  Charleston, South   Carolina,  for
    Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Quinton Wiley appeals his criminal sentence.                                For the
    reasons that follow, we affirm.
    Wiley, who was then a convicted felon, pled guilty to
    illegally     possessing       a     firearm       in     violation       of       18    U.S.C.
    § 922(g).     Ordinarily, the maximum sentence for a § 922(g) crime
    is 10 years of imprisonment, but under the Armed Career Criminal
    Act (“ACCA”), if the felon had three previous convictions for a
    “violent felony” or “serious drug offense,” the punishment is
    increased    to    a   minimum       term     of    15    years.         See       18     U.S.C.
    §§ 924(a)(2),      924(e).         Without       objection,       the    district             court
    found that Wiley had three ACCA prior offenses and sentenced him
    to a 210-month term of imprisonment.
    On     appeal,      Wiley       contends       that     his      prior        South
    Carolina    convictions        for   assault        and    battery      of     a    high       and
    aggravated    nature       (“ABHAN”)        and    strong     arm       robbery          do    not
    constitute       violent      felonies       under       § 924(e)       and,       therefore,
    should not have been counted as ACCA prior offenses.                                     Because
    Wiley did not object at sentencing to being designated an armed
    career criminal, our review is for plain error.
    Under      Rule    52(b)    of    the       Federal    Rules       of       Criminal
    Procedure, “[a] plain error that affects substantial rights may
    be considered even though it was not brought to the [district]
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    court’s attention.”          Interpreting Rule 52(b), the Supreme Court
    has instructed:
    [A]n appellate court may, in its discretion, correct
    an error not raised at trial only where the appellant
    demonstrates that (1) there is an error; (2) the error
    is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable
    dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant’s
    substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means
    it affected the outcome of the district court
    proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affect[s] the
    fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
    proceedings.
    United States v. Marcus, 
    130 S. Ct. 2159
    , 2164 (2010) (internal
    punctuation      and     citation         omitted).           “[T]he      burden   of
    establishing entitlement to relief for plain error is on the
    defendant claiming it,” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 
    542 U.S. 74
    , 82 (2004), and “[m]eeting all four prongs is difficult,
    as it should be,” Puckett v. United States, 
    129 S. Ct. 1423
    , 1429
    (2009) (internal punctuation and citation omitted).
    Our resolution of this appeal need not proceed past
    the   second    step   of    the    plain       error    analysis.      The   district
    court’s finding that Wiley’s South Carolina ABHAN and strong arm
    robbery convictions are violent felonies is consistent with our
    caselaw both at the time of sentencing and today.                         See United
    States   v.    Wright,      
    594 F.3d 259
    ,     263    (4th   Cir.   2010)   (S.C.
    aggravated     assault      and    battery       [i.e.,    ABHAN],   is   a   violent
    felony); United States v. Moultrie, No. 11-4277 (4th Cir. Sept.
    6, 2011) (S.C. ABHAN is a violent felony); United States v.
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    White, No. 10-5140 (4th Cir. July 29, 2011) (S.C. ABHAN is a
    crime of violence); United States v. Jones, 312 Fed. Appx. 559
    (4th Cir. 2009) (S.C. ABHAN and strong arm robbery are violent
    felonies); see also United States v. Walker, 
    595 F.3d 441
    (2d
    Cir. 2010) (S.C. strong arm robbery is a crime of violence);
    United States v. Guerrero-Robledo, 
    565 F.3d 940
    (5th Cir. 2009)
    (S.C. ABHAN is a crime of violence).*
    In light of this caselaw, if we now revisit the issue
    and assume for the sake of argument that Wiley is correct that
    his South Carolina ABHAN and/or strong arm robbery convictions
    are not ACCA violent felonies, we cannot say that the district
    court’s    error    in   sentencing   him   in   accord   with     our    prior
    precedent is “plain” within the meaning of Rule 52(b).                      See
    United States v. Beasley, 
    495 F.3d 142
    , 149-50 (4th Cir. 2007)
    (rejecting plain error argument where there “was no controlling
    ‘current law’ in this circuit” at the time of sentencing “nor is
    there    any    today”);   
    Guerrero-Robledo, 565 F.3d at 946
       (“It
    *
    The language defining a “violent felony” in § 924(e) is
    nearly identical to language defining a “crime of violence” in
    various provisions of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
    Consequently, we rely on case law interpreting all of these
    sections when examining whether a prior crime is an ACCA violent
    felony or a crime of violence under the Guidelines. See United
    States v. Rivers, 
    595 F.3d 558
    , 560 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010); United
    States v. Carillo-Pineda, 238 Fed. Appx. 912, 913 n.1 (4th Cir.
    2007).
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    certainly is not plain error for the district court to rely on
    an unpublished opinion that is squarely on point.”).
    Based on the foregoing, we affirm Wiley’s sentence.
    We   dispense   with   oral   argument   because   the   facts   and   legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court, and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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