United States v. Bobby Batts , 519 F. App'x 135 ( 2013 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-4334
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    BOBBY JULIAN BATTS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.   Louise W. Flanagan,
    District Judge. (5:10-cr-00209-FL-1)
    Submitted:   March 19, 2013                 Decided:   March 28, 2013
    Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Ronald Cohen, Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas
    G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker,
    Joshua L. Rogers, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh,
    North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Bobby      Julian     Batts       appeals       the    303–month        sentence
    imposed following his guilty plea to being a convicted felon in
    possession of one or more firearms, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1),        924    (2006).        On       appeal,      Batts    argues      that   the
    district court’s upward departure resulted in a substantively
    unreasonable sentence.             We reject this argument and affirm.
    We review any criminal sentence, “whether inside, just
    outside,    or      significantly         outside      the       Guidelines     range,”       for
    reasonableness,            “under     a         deferential          abuse-of-discretion
    standard.”       United States v. King, 
    673 F.3d 274
    , 283 (4th Cir.),
    cert. denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 216
     (2012); see Gall v. United States,
    
    552 U.S. 38
    , 46, 51 (2007).                 When the district court imposes a
    departure      or     variance      sentence,          “we       consider      whether       the
    sentencing       court     acted    reasonably            both    with     respect     to    its
    decision    to      impose   such     a    sentence        and     with    respect     to    the
    extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.”                                    United
    States   v.    Hernandez-Villanueva,                
    473 F.3d 118
    ,    123    (4th      Cir.
    2007).      The     district      court     “has      flexibility         in   fashioning      a
    sentence outside of the Guidelines range,” and need only “‘set
    forth    enough       to    satisfy       the       appellate       court      that    it    has
    considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis’” for
    its decision.         United States v. Diosdado-Star, 
    630 F.3d 359
    , 364
    (4th Cir.) (quoting Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 356
    2
    (2007))    (alteration    omitted),    cert.    denied,    
    131 S. Ct. 2946
    (2011).
    Where, as here, the defendant does not challenge the
    procedural reasonableness of his sentence, * we review only the
    substantive reasonableness of the sentence, applying the abuse-
    of-discretion standard.       Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 51
    ; United States v.
    Lynn, 
    592 F.3d 572
    , 575 (4th Cir. 2010).                  In doing so, this
    court assesses “whether the District Judge abused his discretion
    in determining that the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2006)] factors
    supported [the sentence] and justified a substantial deviation
    from the Guidelines range.”            Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 56
    .           We must
    “take into account the totality of the circumstances, including
    the extent of [the] variance from the Guidelines range.”                
    Id. at 51
    .   A more significant “departure should be supported by a more
    significant justification.”       
    Id. at 50
    .
    Batts argues that, in light of his serious medical
    conditions, which are undisputed, the district court abused its
    discretion and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence by
    upwardly    departing    based   on    the   under-representation      of   his
    criminal history.       We disagree.       Despite Batts’ assertion to the
    contrary, our review of the record confirms that the district
    *
    Indeed, appellate counsel concedes that there is no basis
    for   challenging  the   procedural  reasonableness   of  Batts’
    sentence.
    3
    court    did     indeed      factor    Batts’     health       conditions     into    the
    sentencing calculus, but simply rejected the argument that they
    warranted a reduced sentence.               Instead, the court reasoned that
    the     303-month      departure       sentence     was    justified         by    Batts’
    protracted history of violence; Batts’ chronic recidivism, which
    was unabated despite his medical conditions; and the need for
    the sentence to protect the public, deter future criminality,
    and promote respect for the law.                  See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(1),
    (a)(2)(A)-(C).
    On    this       record,   we   discern       no    basis   on    which    to
    conclude       that    the    court     abused     its     discretion        by    either
    departing upward or as to the extent of that departure.                           Rather,
    the    district       court’s    upward     departure      decision      “reflects      a
    thorough, individualized assessment of [Appellant’s] situation,
    in light of the § 3553(a) factors.”                   United States v. Rivera–
    Santana, 
    668 F.3d 95
    , 106 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 274
     (2012).       Accordingly, we hold the sentence is substantively
    reasonable and affirm the district court’s criminal judgment.
    We    dispense    with    oral    argument      because        the   facts   and    legal
    contentions      are    adequately      presented     in       the   materials      before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4