United States v. Smith , 281 F. App'x 198 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4934
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RANDALL SMITH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
District Judge. (3:06-cr-00416-FDW)
Submitted: May 12, 2008 Decided: June 13, 2008
Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Claire J. Rauscher, Executive Director, Ross Richardson, FEDERAL
DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States
Attorney, Adam Morris, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Randall Smith appeals his convictions and sentence after
a jury found him guilty of one count of bank robbery by force or
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (2000), one
count of bank larceny, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (2000),
and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime
of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000). The
district court sentenced Smith to concurrent terms of seventy-one
months of imprisonment on the bank robbery counts and a consecutive
eighty-four months on the firearm count, for a total of 155 months
of imprisonment. We affirm.
Smith first argues that the district court erred by
denying his motion to suppress his post-arrest statement, because
the officers conducting the interview ignored his request for an
attorney and violated his right to counsel. The district court
denied Smith’s motion based, in part, on its finding that he did
not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel and signed the waiver
form after commenting about a lawyer. The factual findings
underlying a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error, while
the legal determinations are reviewed de novo. See Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996); United States v. Rusher,
966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir. 1992). When a suppression motion has
been denied, this court reviews the evidence in the light most
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favorable to the government. See United States v. Seidman, 156
F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998).
In order to invoke his right to counsel and prevent
further interrogation, a defendant “must unambiguously request [the
assistance of] counsel.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459
(1994); United States v. Cardwell, 433 F.3d 378, 389 (4th Cir.
2005); Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 197-98 (4th Cir. 2000)
(holding that statement during interrogation, “I think I need a
lawyer,” did not amount to unequivocal request for counsel).
Merely mentioning the word “attorney” is not sufficient to invoke
the right to counsel and prevent further interrogation. Poyner v.
Murray, 964 F.2d 1404, 1410-12 (4th Cir. 1992). If a suspect
equivocates in his request for counsel, police officers may
continue to question the suspect. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-62.
In this case, Smith remarked “I think I might need to talk to a
lawyer,” and signed the waiver of his rights after he made this
statement. We conclude that the district court correctly found
that Smith did not clearly and unambiguously invoke his right to
counsel, and the officers did not violate that right by continuing
to advise him of his rights and questioning him after he signed a
written waiver of those rights. The motion to suppress was
properly denied.
Smith next argues that the district court erred in
admitting a photograph of him that was taken approximately six
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weeks after the bank robbery because it was unfairly prejudicial.
Under Fed. R. Evid. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence. Review of a district court’s
determination of the admissibility of evidence is for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Brooks, 111 F.3d 365, 371 (4th
Cir. 1997). This court has noted that “[p]rejudice, as used in
Rule 403, refers to evidence that has an undue tendency to suggest
decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one.” United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 994 (4th
Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our review of the
record convinces us that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the photograph.
Smith’s final assertion is that the district court erred
in denying his request for a two point reduction in his offense
level for acceptance of responsibility. A district court’s
determination as to the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility is
a factual question reviewed for clear error. United States v.
Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 388 (4th Cir. 1999). To receive an adjustment
for acceptance of responsibility, a defendant must “prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he has clearly recognized and
affirmatively accepted personal responsibility for his criminal
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conduct.” United States v. May, 359 F.3d 683, 693 (4th Cir. 2004)
(citing United States v. Nale, 101 F.3d 1000, 1005 (4th Cir.
1996)). The commentary to the Guideline provision governing
acceptance of responsibility provides that the adjustment is
generally not available to a defendant who pleads not guilty and
proceeds to a contested trial. The adjustment may be applicable,
however, in limited circumstances to a defendant who pleads not
guilty and “goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not
relate to factual guilt (e.g., to make a constitutional challenge
to a statute or a challenge to the applicability of a statute to
his conduct).” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1, cmt.
(n.2) (2006). We agree with the district court’s finding that this
was not one of the rare cases in which a defendant may proceed to
trial but receive an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.
Accordingly, we affirm Smith’s convictions and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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