United States v. Wilbert Sampson ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4361
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILBERT SAMPSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:10-cr-00775-RDB-7)
Submitted: February 27, 2013 Decided: March 14, 2013
Before KING, GREGORY, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Allen H. Orenberg, THE ORENBERG LAW FIRM, P.C., North Bethesda,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Ayn B. Ducao, Assistant United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Wilbert Sampson was convicted by a jury of one count
of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 (2006).
He appeals, contending that the Government did not present
sufficient evidence of his involvement in a conspiracy to
support his conviction. Finding no error, we affirm.
This Court reviews de novo the district court’s denial
of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v.
Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010). This Court reviews
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction by
determining whether, in the light most favorable to the
Government, there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the conviction. Id. “Substantial evidence” is
“evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence is
appropriate only in cases where the Government’s failure to
present substantial evidence is clear.
To obtain a drug conspiracy conviction, the Government
must prove the following elements: (1) an agreement between two
or more people to possess drugs with intent to distribute,
(2) defendant’s knowledge of the conspiracy, and (3) defendant’s
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knowing and voluntary participation in the conspiracy. United
States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir. 1996). A drug
conspiracy may be proved entirely by circumstantial evidence.
Id. at 858. Moreover, the Government is not required to prove
that the defendant knew all of the conspiracy’s details or
members. Green, 599 F.3d at 367. A drug conspiracy conviction
requires only “a slight connection between a defendant and the
conspiracy.” Id.While Sampson does not contest the existence of a
conspiracy, he contends that the Government failed to present
sufficient evidence of his participation in it because its only
evidence was various wiretapped phone conversations between him
and a known conspirator, which were not explicitly drug-related.
Sampson also argues that various Government witnesses —
including several of Sampson’s alleged co-conspirators — had
little or no knowledge of him, that he was never the subject of
a search warrant, and that no drugs were ever found in his
possession. The Government contends that the wiretapped phone
calls and their content constitute substantial evidence of
Sampson’s knowing participation in a conspiracy, and therefore
that sufficient evidence supports Sampson’s conviction.
We conclude that the Government’s evidence was
sufficient to permit the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Sampson was a knowing member of a conspiracy. The phone
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conversations attributed to Sampson, while not explicitly drug-
related, unmistakably suggest drug trafficking transactions.
The conversations consisted of suspicious language, including
code words such as “demonstration,” “food caps,” and “7s and
8s,” which a government agent testified indicated a gun, heroin
packaging material, and the quality of heroin on a scale of one
to ten. Moreover, the wiretapped calls were placed from a phone
found in Sampson’s possession, and made to a line belonging to a
known member of the conspiracy that he used exclusively for
drug-related communications. While the Government did not
present evidence that all of its witnesses knew and could
identify Sampson, or that Sampson was the subject of a search
warrant or was ever caught possessing heroin, it was not
required to do so, in light of its other evidence. See Green,
599 F.3d at 367. From that evidence, a jury could reasonably
find that Sampson knowingly participated in a conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin. See
id.Accordingly, we affirm Sampson’s conviction. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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