Pagidipati Enterprises, Inc. v. Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings ( 2013 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-1649
    PAGIDIPATI ENTERPRISES, INC.,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS,
    Defendant – Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.   N. Carlton Tilley,
    Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:10-cv-00742-NCT-LPA)
    Argued:   March 21, 2013                  Decided:   April 11, 2013
    Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and Robert E. PAYNE,
    Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
    Virginia, sitting by designation.
    Affirmed by unpublished opinion.        Judge Duncan wrote     the
    opinion, in which Judge Motz and Senior Judge Payne joined.
    ARGUED: Robert Steiner, KELLEY DRYE & WARREN, LLP, New York, New
    York, for Appellant.     Reid Lloyd Phillips, BROOKS, PIERCE,
    MCLENDON, HUMPHREY & LEONARD, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
    Appellee. ON BRIEF: Adam H. Charnes, Chad D. Hansen, KILPATRICK
    TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
    Appellant.   Joseph A. Ponzi, BROOKS, PIERCE, MCLENDON, HUMPHREY
    & LEONARD, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    2
    DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:
    In    this    breach    of     contract       action,    Appellee   Pagidipati
    Enterprises      (“PEI”)     sued    Appellant       Laboratory     Corporation     of
    America (“LabCorp”) to recover payments due under their Asset
    Purchase Agreement (“APA”).            LabCorp asserted mutual mistake as
    an affirmative defense, arguing that the APA as written does not
    provide    for    compensation        for        growth   attributable      only    to
    customers PEI brought to the deal, which is what the parties
    intended it to reflect.           Finding that LabCorp’s omission of some
    of its own prior customers from the APA did not constitute a
    mutual    mistake   under     North    Carolina       law,    the   district   court
    granted PEI’s motion for summary judgment.                    For the reasons that
    follow, we affirm.
    I.
    A.
    In late 2007, LabCorp, a New York corporation that operates
    a nationwide medical laboratory network, became interested in
    purchasing       PEI,   a     family-owned          Florida     corporation        then
    operating clinical laboratories and testing centers in seventeen
    Florida counties.       The parties began negotiations.               About a year
    later    PEI   agreed   to    sell    its    assets,      including   its   customer
    list, to LabCorp for an initial purchase price of $13 million,
    as well as two Earnout Period Payments that PEI would receive if
    3
    certain conditions were met.             This agreement was finalized in a
    31-page contract--the APA.
    The      contested    provisions      of     the    APA    are    Section    2.3,
    entitled “Earnout Amount,” and the accompanying Exhibit 2.3(a),
    which lists “Shared Customers.”                See J.A. 44-45, 91.              Section
    2.3 sets out the time period and formula for calculating the two
    Earnout Period Payments.               These Payments are based on (1) a
    Revenue Minimum Target Amount (“RMTA”), which the parties set at
    $4,901,214,     reflective      of     PEI’s    2007    revenue;      (2)   a   Revenue
    Multiplier, set at 2.1; and (3) “Revenues” for the first and
    second years following the APA, defined as LabCorp’s revenues
    “for any and all services provided and billed to any customer
    listed   on    [PEI’s]     Customer      List,”    as    well    a    percentage    of
    revenues for services provided to their shared customers.                           Id.
    at 44.     Section 2.3 further defines “shared customers” as “those
    customers      listed     on   Exhibit     2.3(a),      which      include      certain
    customers . . . who were customers of both Seller and Purchaser
    during the period from January 1, 2007 through and including
    September 30, 2007.”           Id. 1     For each customer on the Shared
    1
    For the First Earnout Period (Year One), PEI was to obtain
    a payout equal to (Year One Revenues – $4,901,214) x 2.1, not to
    exceed $2 million.     The Second Earnout Period operated in a
    similar way, such that the payout equals ((Year Two Revenues -
    $4,901,214) x 2.1) – First Earnout Period Payment, with the
    combined payouts for years one and two not to exceed $4 million.
    See id.
    4
    Customer   List   at    Exhibit    2.3,      PEI   would    only   earn   “partial
    credit” for increased revenues, which the parties intended to be
    “based on the historical percentage of business each company
    generated from those shared clients.”                 Appellant’s Br. at 13;
    see also J.A. 91.
    The Shared Customer List was the product of negotiation
    between the parties.          LabCorp initially drafted the list because
    it was unwilling to disclose its entire customer database to
    PEI.     PEI   never    had    access   to    LabCorp’s     customer      database,
    receiving only the list of shared customers created by LabCorp.
    Notably, the parties agree that not all shared customers
    merited placement on the final list.                For example, because PEI
    began referring certain customers to LabCorp before closing, PEI
    negotiated with LabCorp to omit those customers from the Shared
    Customer List.     Thus, it is undisputed that the Shared Customer
    List attached to the APA was intentionally underinclusive, and
    does not, nor was it ever meant to, “accurately” include all
    customers shared between LabCorp and PEI.
    It is also undisputed that, under the APA as written, PEI
    is entitled to the full $4 million Earnout Amount.                         LabCorp
    nonetheless    argues    that     the   APA    should      not   be   enforced   as
    written, and has refused to pay.
    5
    B.
    PEI   filed     this       breach    of      contract    action       under    North
    Carolina law in the Middle District of North Carolina, asserting
    federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.                           LabCorp
    answered, defending its failure to pay any Earnout Payment to
    PEI on grounds of mutual mistake.                    Specifically, LabCorp argued
    that its own failure to correctly identify all customers shared
    between the parties resulted in a Shared Customer List that did
    not    effectuate      the    parties’         mutual    intent   to     reward      growth
    attributable      to    customers        PEI    brought    to   the    deal.      LabCorp
    sought    reformation        of    the     Shared     Customer    List       attached    as
    Exhibit 2.3(a) to the APA.               PEI moved for summary judgment.
    The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report
    and recommendation, which rejected LabCorp’s affirmative defense
    of mutual mistake.            The court reasoned that LabCorp had failed
    to proffer any evidence that the parties had agreed to include
    any specific customers on the Shared Customer List that did not
    appear on the final list.                Instead, “Defendant seeks reformation
    based on the prospect that a fact-finder might conclude that
    Plaintiff would have accepted an Exhibit 2.3(a) to the APA that
    included     on   the    list       of     ‘Shared      Customers’     the     additional
    customers now belatedly identified by Defendant.”                              J.A. 999.
    The court determined that LabCorp’s asserted mistake did not
    fall     within   the     scope      of     North       Carolina’s     mutual     mistake
    6
    doctrine, under which “a meeting of the minds as to the specific
    terms” is required, and the “general intent” of the parties to
    achieve some objective that the contract as written fails to
    achieve will not suffice.    See id. at 1000 (emphasis omitted).
    Accordingly, the district court entered summary judgment in
    PEI’s favor, awarding over $4.5 million for the full Earnout
    Period Payments plus pre-judgment interest and costs.      LabCorp
    timely appealed.
    II.
    As it did below, LabCorp asks this court to rewrite the
    Shared Customer List to add customers that currently appear on
    PEI’s Customer List but were apparently also shared by LabCorp,
    so as to reduce PEI’s Earnout Amount to zero.     This reformation
    is warranted, LabCorp argues, because the Shared Customer List
    does not accurately reflect the parties’ intent to account for
    growth attributable only to PEI’s customers.      Thus, the Shared
    Customer List drafted and agreed to by the parties constitutes a
    mutual mistake, and the district court erred in construing North
    Carolina law too narrowly.    We disagree.
    LabCorp’s argument fails for at least three reasons: (1)
    the “meeting of the minds” that LabCorp alleges the APA fails to
    embody is far more general than the mistake it asserts, and the
    reformation it seeks; (2) any mistake relating to the contents
    7
    of the Shared Customer List was not mutual, but rather LabCorp’s
    singular failure; and (3) even if it were warranted, LabCorp’s
    inability to identify a mutual mistake with any specificity also
    prevents the court’s reformation of the Shared Customer List.
    We address each of these reasons in turn.                       In doing so, we
    review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
    viewing   all   facts    and     drawing      all   reasonable        inferences         in
    LabCorp’s favor.       See Webster v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
    685 F.3d 411
    , 421 (4th Cir. 2012).             We also review de novo the district
    court’s   interpretation         of   North    Carolina     contract         law    in    a
    diversity case such as this one.               See Trimed, Inc. v. Sherwood
    Med. Co., 
    977 F.2d 885
    , 888 (4th Cir. 1992).
    A. A mutual mistake must be specific.
    We agree with the district court that LabCorp has failed to
    meet its burden of proof under North Carolina’s mutual mistake
    doctrine to show by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that
    some material part of the agreement was inadvertently omitted.
    Although the Shared Customer List may constitute a “mistake”
    insofar   as    the    Earnout    Amount      under   the   APA       does    not,       in
    LabCorp’s   present     estimation,      effectuate       the   parties’       general
    intent    for    the     payments      to     compensate        PEI     for        growth
    8
    attributable to PEI’s customers, that cannot justify the court’s
    intervention into their drafting failure. 2
    A mutual mistake is a mistake that is “‘common to both
    parties to a contract . . . wherein each labors under the same
    misconception    respecting     a     material    fact,   the   terms    of    the
    agreement, or the provisions of the written instrument designed
    to   embody   such     agreement.’”     Branch    Banking   &   Trust    Co.    v.
    Chicago Title Ins. Co., 
    714 S.E.2d 514
    , 518 (N.C. App. 2011)
    (“BB&T”) (quoting Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dillard, 
    487 S.E.2d 157
    ,   159    (N.C.   App.    1997)).      We   apply   a     “‘strong
    presumption in favor of the correctness of the instrument as
    written and executed, for it must be assumed that the parties
    knew what they agreed and have chosen fit and proper words to
    2
    LabCorp cites the following evidence to prove the
    inaccuracy of the Shared Customer List: (1) the declaration of
    LabCorp’s Director Greg Klenke, who states that the Shared
    Customer List is “not accurate,” that it “omits many long-
    standing clients of LabCorp,” and that these are “customers
    LabCorp had before the [PEI] transaction,” J.A. 979-80; and (2)
    the declaration of LabCorp’s Senior Vice President Robert
    Nelson, who states: “Providing [PEI] with earn out credit for
    LabCorp’s own customers is contrary to the intention of the
    parties, reflected, among other things, in the form of the
    transaction that contemplated the sale of a customer list as
    well as the obligation placed on the sellers post-closing to
    assist with the smooth transition of [PEI’s] customers to
    LabCorp in the hope that such a transition would lead to a
    growth in the business attributable to those customers,” J.A.
    1020.   Like LabCorp’s argument, its evidence skips a step.   As
    we discuss further, it does not necessarily follow from the fact
    that the Shared Customer List omits some customers of LabCorp
    that the Shared Customer List is “not accurate.”
    9
    express that agreement in its entirety.’”                       Hice v. Hi-Mil, Inc.,
    
    273 S.E.2d 268
    , 270 (N.C. 1981) (quoting Clements v. Life Ins.
    Co. of Va., 
    70 S.E. 1076
    , 1077 (N.C. 1911)).
    However, as in BB&T, LabCorp “does not allege that it had
    an oral agreement with [PEI] that was mistakenly omitted from
    the [APA].”        
    714 S.E.2d at 518
    .            Instead, LabCorp argues “that a
    mutual mistake by both it and [PEI] led to [an] ‘inadvertent
    windfall’” of sorts because neither party ever intended that the
    Earnout     Amount        would    exceed       growth        attributable        to    PEI’s
    customers.     See 
    id.
              But BB&T makes clear that more is required
    for reformation of a contract.                   LabCorp must “show that it and
    [PEI] had a meeting of the minds as to the specific terms of the
    [Shared Customer List], and that some material part of their
    agreement     was    mistakenly         omitted        from    the    [Shared      Customer
    List].”     
    Id. at 519
    .            LabCorp has not presented any evidence
    that   it   and     PEI    had     a   mutual    intention       to    include         certain
    customers     on     the     Shared      Customer        List    so    that       it     would
    adequately reflect growth, and that the Shared Customer List, as
    a result of a mutual mistake, failed to properly express those
    intentions.
    LabCorp cites a legal treatise in support of a more lenient
    burden it would have us apply here.                    In a generic summary of the
    law, that treatise teaches: “To establish a mutual mistake in an
    instrument    so     as    to     authorize      its    reformation      .    .   .     it   is
    10
    sufficient to show that [the parties] agreed to accomplish a
    particular object by the instrument to be executed and that such
    instrument,         as   executed,   is    insufficient    to   effectuate    their
    intention.”          66 Am. Jur. 2d Reformation of Instruments § 22.
    Although that language is admittedly broader than the language
    from BB&T upon which the district court relied, this treatise
    does not supply the North Carolina law we are bound to apply in
    this case.
    Nor do we find that LabCorp has met even the lesser burden
    it presses upon us.            Although LabCorp’s evidence does tend to
    show that the purpose of the Earnout Period Payments was to
    reward PEI for additional growth attributable to PEI’s customers
    beyond that anticipated at the time of the sale, 3 none of the
    evidence shows that the Shared Customer List does not accomplish
    that       objective--at     least   to     the   extent   that   objective    was
    mutual.       On the basis of this evidence, we cannot conclude that
    LabCorp       has    shown    the    APA    insufficiently      effectuates    the
    3
    To prove the parties’ mutual intent, LabCorp also
    supplies, in addition to the Klenke and Nelson declarations
    already discussed, supra note 2, (1) documentary evidence
    concerning the negotiation and drafting of the APA, including
    emails between the parties, and a memorandum written by PEI; and
    (2) the deposition testimony of several of PEI’s shareholders
    and officers, generally supporting the notion that the purpose
    of   the Earnout    Payments  was  to  provide   PEI  additional
    compensation if its customers produced increasing profits.   See
    Appellant’s Br. at 3.
    11
    parties’ mutual intent, so as to authorize its reformation, even
    under its proposed formulation of the rule.
    None     of    the      North    Carolina     precedent     LabCorp          cites    in
    support of its argument requires a contrary conclusion.                                    For
    example, in Dettor v. BHI Prop. Co. No. 101, 
    379 S.E.2d 851
    , 853
    (N.C.   1989),       the      North    Carolina     Supreme     Court    reversed          the
    district court’s grant of partial summary judgment, ruling that
    a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the parties to a
    land sale had a mutual understanding that a creek running near a
    ten-acre tract of land would provide the southern boundary, or
    whether      the    specific        acreage      listed   in     the    agreement          was
    intended to control.            That holding has no bearing on our present
    inquiry, because there is no question of fact as to whether
    LabCorp and PEI intended the Customer Lists attached to the APA
    to control, or “provide the boundary for,” the Earnout Amount.
    At the time they entered into the APA, both parties agreed to
    the   Shared       Customer     List    as   the    proper     means    of    calculating
    growth attributable to any shared customers for the purpose of
    determining the Earnout Payments.
    Indeed,       as   it    must,    LabCorp     concedes     that    this       was    the
    parties’ mutual intent.               Nonetheless, it now seeks to move a few
    names   from       PEI’s   Customer       List     to   the   Shared     Customer         List
    without      providing        any     evidence     whatsoever     that       the    parties
    intended or agreed to do so.                  There is no mutual mistake to be
    12
    found on these facts, merely an apparent lack of diligence by
    LabCorp.       The court can provide no remedy for that mistake,
    which is the result LabCorp negotiated and agreed to.
    B. Any mistake was unilateral, not mutual.
    It follows that the mistake upon which LabCorp seeks to
    rely is solely its own.             “The mistake of one party . . . alone,
    not induced by the fraud of the other, affords no ground for
    relief by reformation.”              Matthews v. Shamrock Van Lines, Inc.,
    
    142 S.E.2d 665
    ,   668     (N.C.    1965)        (internal    quotation      marks
    omitted).       Here,    full       responsibility       for    comparison       of   the
    parties’ existing customer lists rested with LabCorp, because
    LabCorp was unwilling to disclose all of its customers to PEI.
    PEI   never    had   access     to    LabCorp’s       secret    customer       database,
    which is what LabCorp used to draft the Shared Customer List.
    LabCorp’s      assertion      that      the     “mistake”        here     was     mutual
    consequently strains credulity, in addition to failing to meet
    the clear requirements of North Carolina contract law.
    C. Lack of specificity renders reformation impossible.
    Finally, even if LabCorp were able to obtain reformation to
    fix its own mistake, it cannot simply point to a customer on
    PEI’s   Customer     List     and    argue     that    the     parties   intended      to
    include that customer on the Shared Customer List for the sole
    reason that it had also been a customer of LabCorp.                        As we have
    already     discussed,      the      Shared     Customer        List     was    not    an
    13
    exhaustive list of all shared customers.               In light of that fact,
    LabCorp’s      failure       to    identify      with        particularity        the
    circumstances       constituting      its   mistake--beyond        its     amorphous,
    unsupported assertion that some customers from PEI’s Customer
    List should have been added to the Shared Customer List--or to
    proffer any evidence from which it could be determined that the
    parties   intended     to    include    any    specific      omitted       customers,
    renders     the    reformation     task      LabCorp    asks       us    to    perform
    impossible.        It also underscores the flaws in LabCorp’s mutual
    mistake theory as a whole.
    “‘Reformation is a well-established equitable remedy used
    to reframe written instruments where, through mutual mistake or
    the unilateral mistake of one party induced by the fraud of
    another, the written instrument fails to embody the parties’
    actual,   original      agreement.’”          BB&T,    
    714 S.E.2d at 517-18
    (quoting Metro. Prop. & Cas., 
    487 S.E.2d at 159
    ).                        To qualify,
    LabCorp     must     state    “with     particularity        the        circumstances
    constituting mistake as to all of the parties to the written
    instrument.”       Best v. Ford Motor Co., 
    557 S.E.2d 163
    , 166 (N.C.
    App. 2001).
    Here,     the    undisputed      evidence    shows      that       the    parties
    negotiated extensively to arrive at the final list of shared
    customers that is embodied in the Shared Customer List attached
    to the APA.        According to its stated terms, the Shared Customer
    14
    List comprises only “certain customers . . . who were customers
    of both [PEI] and [LabCorp] during the period from January 1,
    2007 through and including September 30, 2007.”                          J.A. 44 at
    2.3(a) (emphasis added).
    Because the Shared Customer List was never intended to be
    inclusive of all customers shared between the parties, at the
    bare minimum LabCorp would need to show something to prove the
    parties     intended        that    each    omitted    customer    be   reflected    as
    shared in the APA.            Given LabCorp’s lack of evidence, we cannot
    discern any method for determining which “certain” customers we
    might      add    to    a   reformed       Shared   Customer   List     in   order    to
    effectuate the parties’ mutual agreement.                   LabCorp’s unsupported
    assertion that the Earnout Amount as currently calculated under
    the APA does not “accurately” account for growth attributable to
    PEI’s customers falls far short of providing such a method.                           It
    is   similarly         unclear     how   LabCorp    would   have   us   allocate     the
    percentage of revenues to each omitted customer in reforming the
    Shared Customer List. 4            From a practical standpoint then, we fail
    to   see    how    the      APA    possibly    could   be   refashioned      based   on
    LabCorp’s proffered evidence, even if reformation were legally
    warranted, which it is not.
    4
    Also noticeably absent is any justification or explanation
    by LabCorp for this “mutual” mistake.
    15
    Accordingly,   we    agree   with        the    district     court       that
    LabCorp’s   performance   under   the        APA’s   provision     for    PEI’s
    Earnout Amount, which embodies the parties’ actual, original,
    fully-negotiated,   specific   agreement,       is     not   excused     by   any
    mutual   mistake.   The   doctrine      of    mutual    mistake    cannot      be
    intended for use by a party seeking to rewrite a contract in
    order to obtain some benefit of a bargain better than the one it
    negotiated for itself, merely because it mistakenly thought it
    was getting a better deal.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
    court is
    AFFIRMED.
    16
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-1649

Judges: Motz, Duncan, Payne, Eastern, Virginia

Filed Date: 4/11/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/18/2024