United States v. Elijah Hearns , 476 F. App'x 512 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4399
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ELIJAH ELDON HEARNS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, Chief District
Judge. (2:10-cr-00152-DCN-1)
Submitted: December 6, 2011 Decided: December 15, 2011
Before AGEE and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Russell Warren Mace, III, THE MACE FIRM, Myrtle Beach, South
Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States
Attorney, Alston C. Badger, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Elijah Eldon Hearns appeals the ninety-seven-month
sentence imposed following his guilty plea to one count of
possession with intent to distribute a quantity of
Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA”) and a quantity of
marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C),
(b)(1)(D) (West Supp. 2011); and one count of entering the
United States at a time and place other than one designated by
immigration officers, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1), (2)
(2006). On appeal, Hearns argues that the district court erred
in denying his motion to suppress MDMA and marijuana seized
after Hearns was detained pending the arrival of a drug-sniffing
canine following a routine traffic stop. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.
We review the factual findings underlying a district
court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for clear error and the
court’s legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Kelly, 592
F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3374 (2010).
When evaluating the denial of a suppression motion, we construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the
prevailing party below. Id.An automobile stop is a “seizure” falling under the
Fourth Amendment’s protection. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 809-10 (1996). “Observing a traffic violation provides
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sufficient justification for a police officer to detain the
offending vehicle for as long as it takes to perform the
traditional incidents of a routine traffic stop.” United
States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008). A police
officer may extend the detention beyond the scope of a routine
traffic stop if the driver consents or the officer has
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 336. To
satisfy the reasonable suspicion requirement, a police officer
“must simply point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, evince
more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of
criminal activity.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Hearns challenges the district court’s conclusion that
reasonable suspicion existed to detain Hearns pending the
arrival of a canine unit following the issuance of a warning
ticket to Hearns for following too closely. We hold that the
district court did not err in determining that the police
officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on
the totality of the circumstances. When the officer stopped
Hearns, he noticed a strong smell commonly associated with
vehicle repairs, despite a lack of visible repairs to the
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vehicle. * The floorboard of the car was littered with
caffeinated and energy drinks, and Hearns appeared to be tired
and nervous. Further, Hearns provided a highly unusual
explanation for how he came to possess the car, and was unsure
whether it was a rental. Taken together, this evidence was
sufficient, as the district court stated, to “lead a reasonably
trained officer to suspect that defendant was involved in
transporting contraband in an altered vehicle over long
distances, attempting to make few, if any stops along the way.”
Thus the officer had reasonable suspicion justifying Hearns’s
twenty to twenty-five minute detention following the officer’s
issuance of the warning ticket and pending the arrival of a
drug-detecting canine.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
The officer had specialized training in hidden
compartments and drug trafficking trends.
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