United States v. Markeith Loyd , 443 F. App'x 876 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4314
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MARKEITH LOYD,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Irene C. Berger,
District Judge. (5:10-cr-00119-1)
Submitted: August 18, 2011 Decided: August 23, 2011
Before WILKINSON, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Appellate Counsel, David R. Bungard, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Debbie H.
Stevens, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Abingdon,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Markeith Loyd pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C), to one count of
possession of items designed and intended to be weapons, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2), (d)(1)(B) (2006). The
district court imposed a twenty-seven–month sentence. On
appeal, Loyd’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he states that he
finds no meritorious issues for appeal, but questions whether
Loyd’s sentence is unreasonable because it is greater than
necessary to accomplish the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
Although informed of his right to do so, Loyd has not filed a
supplemental brief. The Government has declined to file a
response. We affirm.
We review a district court’s imposition of a sentence
under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. * See Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We presume that a
sentence within a properly-calculated Guidelines range is
reasonable. United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir.
*
Loyd’s plea agreement included a waiver barring an appeal
from a sentence within the range of twenty-four to thirty months
imprisonment. However, the Government has not filed a motion to
dismiss asserting the waiver, and we do not sua sponte enforce
appellate waivers. See generally United States v. Blick, 408
F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Brock,
211 F.3d 88, 90 n. 1 (4th Cir. 2000)).
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2007). Loyd’s counsel points to several factors that may have
lent support to a lower sentence in Loyd’s case, but none of
these considerations demonstrate that Loyd’s within-Guidelines
sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Montes–Pineda, 445
F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006). The district court provided a
sound explanation for rejecting Loyd’s request for a lesser term
of imprisonment at sentencing. The record does not support a
finding that the district court’s sentence is unreasonable in
this regard.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Loyd’s conviction and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform Loyd, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Loyd requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Loyd. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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