United States v. Corey Felder , 457 F. App'x 316 ( 2011 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-4183
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff − Appellee,
    v.
    COREY CHRISTOPHER FELDER,
    Defendant − Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Baltimore.    Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
    (1:09−cr−00306−CCB−1)
    Argued:   September 23, 2011            Decided:   December 13, 2011
    Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion,
    in which Judge Motz and Judge Keenan joined.
    ARGUED: Lisa Jo Sansone, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
    Peter Marshall Nothstein, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
    Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.   ON BRIEF: Warren A. Brown,
    LAW OFFICE OF WARREN A. BROWN, Baltimore, Maryland, for
    Appellant.     Rod   J.  Rosenstein,  United  States  Attorney,
    Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    DIAZ, Circuit Judge:
    Corey Christopher Felder pleaded guilty to one count of
    possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a), and one count of possession of a firearm in
    furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 924
    (c).     Felder reserved the right to appeal the denial
    of a pretrial motion to suppress.               On appeal, Felder contends
    the   district    court   erred   by        failing    to    suppress   evidence
    obtained from a series of searches conducted at two apartments
    he occupied.      We find the searches were lawful and therefore
    affirm.
    I.
    A.
    Early in the morning on July 10, 2008, officers from the
    Maryland Division of Parole and Probation went to Apartment 707
    at 601 North Eutaw Place, Baltimore, Maryland (“601 N. Eutaw”)
    to execute a parole retake warrant for Felder’s brother, Martin
    Felder.     Martin Felder had reported to his parole officer that
    601 N. Eutaw was his place of residence.                   Officers entered the
    apartment    at   approximately   7:00       a.m.     to    execute   the   arrest
    warrant but found no one inside.             While searching the apartment
    for Martin Felder, officers observed two boxes of .50 caliber
    ammunition in plain view.
    2
    A maintenance worker at the apartment building confirmed
    that Martin Felder lived at 601 N. Eutaw and described his two
    vehicles to officers.             Officers observed that neither vehicle
    was present that morning.             A second employee told officers that
    Corey Felder was the sole lessee of 601 N. Eutaw and that Corey
    and Martin Felder were in the process of moving out.
    Officers relayed their findings to Detective Sergeant Allen
    Meyer of the Baltimore County Police Department who, in turn,
    applied for and obtained a search warrant for 601 N. Eutaw.                      The
    application    for    the    warrant    averred       that   there   was   probable
    cause to believe that Martin Felder, who was a convicted felon,
    possessed    ammunition      in    violation     of   state    and   federal     law.
    Although the application and affidavit correctly identified the
    place to be searched and items to be seized, the search warrant
    itself contained several errors.               First, the warrant incorrectly
    listed the place to be searched as “8601 N. Eutaw.”                        Next, in
    reciting the basis for probable cause, the warrant misstated the
    caliber of the ammunition identified by officers—referring to it
    as .25 caliber rather than .50 caliber.                       The probable cause
    section of the warrant also referred to an individual with no
    connection    to     the    instant    case,    Jamie    Lee    Overton,    as    the
    subject of the search.            Finally, the list of items subject to
    seizure referred to a second individual, David Paul Frederick,
    who also had no involvement in the case.                     Despite the errors,
    3
    the warrant correctly identified the apartment number and stated
    that it was occupied by Martin Felder.
    Early in the evening on July 10, Meyer and other officers
    executed the search warrant at 601 N. Eutaw.                               They discovered
    several    boxes    of     ammunition,        a     bag     containing        six    smaller
    baggies      of     marijuana,          a     bag        containing          cocaine,       an
    identification      card    for    Martin         Felder,      a    work    identification
    card for Corey Felder covered in suspected cocaine residue, and
    mail    addressed    to    both    Felders.          Officers        also    discovered      a
    rental truck receipt that indicated Corey Felder had moved to a
    different apartment building in Baltimore located at 511 West
    Pratt Street.
    Following the search, Meyer went to 511 West Pratt Street
    to investigate.       There he learned that Corey Felder had recently
    rented and moved in to 511 West Pratt Street, Apartment 1607
    (“511 W. Pratt”).          Detective Ryan Guinn and other officers went
    to the apartment door and knocked several times with no answer.
    Guinn    smelled    what     he    believed         to    be       the    strong     odor   of
    marijuana,    and    he    and    the    other      officers        thought    they     heard
    movement from within the apartment.                       Officers obtained a key
    from    building    management          and   entered       511      W.     Pratt.      They
    discovered no one inside but did see in plain view a plastic bag
    containing marijuana and two handguns.                         Officers then secured
    the apartment while Guinn left to obtain a search warrant.
    4
    In his affidavit seeking the search warrant, Guinn first
    summarized         the        evidence      discovered       by     officers       during        the
    earlier search at 601 N. Eutaw, including the ammunition, bags
    of marijuana, cocaine residue on Corey Felder’s identification
    card,       and    truck      rental       receipt    that    led    officers       to     511    W.
    Pratt.         Next, Guinn described the officers’ observations when
    they        arrived      at    511    W.    Pratt,    including       that        they   smelled
    marijuana          and     heard       movement       as     they    stood        outside        the
    apartment.            Finally, Guinn stated that officers saw marijuana
    and handguns in plain view after entering the apartment.                                         The
    judge’s signature indicated the warrant for 511 W. Pratt issued
    at 7:31 p.m.
    With the search warrant for 511 W. Pratt in hand, officers
    seized       the    firearms         and    marijuana       discovered       in    plain    view.
    Additionally,             officers          found       a     carry         bag     containing
    approximately 325 grams of heroin and digital scales, a safe
    containing approximately $71,000 in cash, and a box of 9 mm
    ammunition.           The return for the warrant noted that the search of
    511 W. Pratt took place at 7:10 p.m.
    While      officers       were      executing       the    search    warrant,       Corey
    Felder arrived at 511 W. Pratt.                            Officers immediately placed
    Felder       under       arrest      and    advised    him    of    his     Miranda 1    rights.
    1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966).
    5
    Felder stated that he understood his rights and proceeded to
    answer          questions    without       requesting   an   attorney.         Felder
    confirmed that he had leased the apartment at 511 W. Pratt.                        He
    also told officers that he had not been selling drugs long and
    that       he    was   not   afraid   of    retaliation   for   losing   the    drugs
    because they “were paid for.”                J.A. 97.
    B.
    Felder was charged in a superseding indictment with the
    following four counts:                Count One, possession with intent to
    distribute cocaine or cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1); Count Two, conspiracy to possess with intent to
    distribute heroin, cocaine, or cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    ; Count Three, possession with intent to distribute
    heroin, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1); and Count Four,
    possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
    crime, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 924
    (c). 2
    Prior to trial, Felder moved to suppress all unlawfully
    seized evidence and all involuntary statements or admissions.
    At the suppression hearing, Felder challenged the searches at
    both apartments.             Felder argued that the search warrant for 601
    2
    Several of Felder’s charges stemmed from evidence obtained
    from a confidential informant who purchased cocaine from Felder.
    We do not recite those facts here, however, because Felder has
    not challenged his conviction on those counts.
    6
    N. Eutaw contained numerous errors and was therefore invalid,
    and   that   there     were    no    exigent     circumstances          justifying    the
    warrantless entry of 511 W. Pratt, which in turn tainted the
    second search warrant. 3
    The district court concluded that the searches were lawful.
    The court found that the errors in the search warrant for 601 N.
    Eutaw resulted from “careless[ness] with [a] word processor” but
    nevertheless        held     that    the   search    was     “valid”       because    the
    application      for    the    search      contained      “the    specific     accurate
    information on which the search was based.”                             J.A. 47.      With
    respect to the search of 511 W. Pratt, the court did not reach
    the    issue     of     exigent       circumstances        but      instead        ignored
    references     to     what    officers     saw   when     they    first    entered    the
    apartment.          The      court    concluded      that        even     without    that
    information there was sufficient evidence to support a finding
    of    probable      cause.      Accordingly,        the    court    denied     Felder’s
    motion.
    Felder entered a conditional plea of guilty to Counts One
    and Four of the superseding indictment, reserving his right to
    appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.                      The district court
    3
    Felder        also noted an objection to admission of the
    statements he         made to officers following his arrest.      The
    district court       reserved ruling on the issue but later dismissed
    the claim in a       brief order.
    7
    sentenced Felder to 120 months on Count One and 60 months on
    Count Four to run consecutively.          Felder timely appealed.
    II.
    On appeal, Felder contends that (1) the initial entry of
    601 N. Eutaw was unlawful because officers lacked a reasonable
    belief Martin Felder was there; (2) the search warrant for 601
    N. Eutaw contained numerous errors and was therefore invalid;
    (3) the search of 511 W. Pratt was unlawful because there were
    no exigent circumstances justifying the initial entry and the
    subsequently    obtained    search    warrant    was     invalid;   and    (4)
    Felder’s statements to officers were the product of an unlawful
    arrest   and   were   therefore   involuntary.      We   consider   each   of
    Felder’s claims in turn, reviewing the district court’s factual
    findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.               United
    States v. Blauvelt, 
    638 F.3d 281
    , 287 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing
    United States v. Blake, 
    571 F.3d 331
    , 338 (4th Cir. 2009)).
    A.
    Felder contends that the officers’ entry into 601 N. Eutaw
    to execute the arrest warrant for Martin Felder was unlawful and
    that it tainted the subsequent searches.            According to Felder,
    officers did not have reason to believe Martin Felder was at the
    8
    apartment     the    morning       of   July     10,    2008.       We    disagree     and
    conclude the officers’ entry was lawful.
    Officers     may    enter    a   home    “without       a   search    warrant   in
    order to execute an arrest warrant only if ‘there is reason to
    believe [that the subject of the warrant] is within.’ ”                           United
    States   v.   Hill,       
    649 F.3d 258
    ,    262    (4th     Cir.     2011)   (quoting
    Payton v. New York, 
    445 U.S. 573
    , 602 (1980)).                              If officers
    possess the requisite reasonable belief to enter a residence,
    they   may    search      any   place    within        that    residence     where     the
    suspect might be found.             United States v. Green, 
    599 F.3d 360
    ,
    375–76 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Maryland v. Buie, 
    494 U.S. 325
    ,
    332-33   (1990)).          To   determine       whether       officers    may    lawfully
    enter a residence to execute an arrest warrant, we apply a two-
    part test that evaluates “(1) whether there is reason to believe
    that the location is the defendant’s residence, and (2) whether
    or not there was a reasonable belief that he would be home.”
    Hill, 
    649 F.3d at 262
     (citations omitted).
    We consider first whether officers had reason to believe
    that Martin Felder was a resident of 601 N. Eutaw.                               Officers
    initially went to 601 N. Eutaw because Martin Felder reported it
    as his place of residence to parole officials.                             Parolees are
    obligated     to     provide       parole       officers       accurate,     up-to-date
    information regarding their place of residence.                        Accordingly, we
    find that officers had reason to believe that 601 N. Eutaw was
    9
    Martin Felder’s residence.        See United States v. Thomas, 
    429 F.3d 282
    , 286 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (concluding officers’ belief as
    to residency was reasonable because “[as] a condition of his
    parole, [the defendant] was required to keep his current address
    on file with his parole supervision officer”); United States v.
    Lovelock, 
    170 F.3d 339
    , 344 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasizing “that
    probationers are required to report to their probation officers
    any change of residence” as a key factor supporting officers’
    reasonable belief).
    We next consider whether officers had reason to believe
    Martin Felder was home on the morning of July 10 when they
    arrived at 601 N. Eutaw to execute the arrest warrant.                  The
    government relies on the early hour to support the officers’
    reasonable belief.      Felder counters that the officers could not
    reasonably believe his brother was home that morning because
    information obtained from apartment workers suggested otherwise.
    Courts routinely rely on the time of day as a key factor in
    determining   whether      officers    could   reasonably     believe   the
    subject of an arrest warrant was home.            E.g., United States v.
    Edmonds, 
    52 F.3d 1236
    , 1248 (3d Cir. 1995), vacated on other
    grounds, 
    80 F.3d 810
     (3d Cir. 1996) (reasoning that 6:45 a.m.
    was “early enough that it was unlikely someone living in the
    apartment   would   have   already     departed   for   the   day”).    The
    Eleventh Circuit has noted that “officers may presume that a
    10
    person is home at certain times of the day—a presumption which
    can be rebutted by contrary evidence regarding the suspect’s
    known schedule.”      United States v. Magluta, 
    44 F.3d 1530
    , 1535
    (11th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Bervaldi, 
    226 F.3d 1256
    , 1267 (11th Cir. 2000) (“It was reasonable to believe, in
    the absence of contrary evidence, that [the suspect] would be at
    his residence at 6:00 in the morning.”).                 Similarly, the D.C.
    Circuit has concluded, without citing any other factors, that
    “the    early   morning   hour    was   reason    enough”      for   officers   to
    believe a defendant was home when they attempted to execute an
    arrest warrant between 6:00 and 6:30 a.m.                Thomas, 
    429 F.3d at 284, 286
    .
    Based on these authorities, we find that it was reasonable
    for officers to believe, absent contrary evidence, that Martin
    Felder was home at 7:00 a.m. on the morning of July 10.                   Felder
    contends, however, that the officers had such contrary evidence
    because they knew that the apartment was not leased to Martin
    Felder, that Martin Felder’s cars were not in the parking lot,
    and that workers at the apartment building told the officers
    that Martin Felder had moved out.            The government responds that
    the warrant and affidavit show that the officers learned these
    facts    from   the   apartment    workers       after   the    initial   entry.
    11
    Because Felder did not request a Franks 4 hearing to challenge the
    officers’    statements        in    the    warrant          affidavit,    the    district
    court accepted them as true.
    Although the affidavit does not explicitly delineate the
    chronology,    the      description         of       the    officers’     initial    entry
    appears    prior   to    the    summary         of     their    discussions       with    the
    apartment workers.         Accordingly, the logical inference is that
    the officers learned that Martin Felder’s cars were not at the
    apartment   complex      and    that       he    had       recently   moved   out,       after
    their initial entry into the apartment.                         See United States v.
    Branch, 
    537 F.3d 328
    , 337 (4th Cir. 2008) (explaining that where
    the district court denies a defendant’s motion to suppress, we
    construe    the    evidence         in   the     light       most     favorable     to    the
    government) (citing United States v. Uzenski, 
    434 F.3d 690
    , 704
    (4th Cir. 2006)).
    We therefore hold that officers had reason to believe both
    that Martin Felder lived at 601 N. Eutaw and that he was home at
    7:00 a.m. on July 10.           Accordingly, the officers’ initial entry
    into the apartment at 601 N. Eutaw was lawful and did not taint
    the subsequent searches.
    4
    Franks v. Delaware, 
    438 U.S. 154
     (1978).
    12
    B.
    In the alternative, Felder argues that even if the initial
    entry into 601 N. Eutaw was lawful, the search warrant contained
    so many errors that it was invalid and could not be relied on by
    a reasonable officer.         Felder notes that the warrant incorrectly
    identified   the      caliber    of   the      ammunition    observed    by   the
    officers in plain view, misstated the address of the apartment,
    and   referred   to    two    individuals       with   no   connection   to   the
    instant case.      The district court determined that these errors
    were the result of drafters who were “careless with their word
    processor” but nevertheless concluded that the search warrant
    was valid.   J.A. 47.        We agree.
    The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment requires any
    warrant to “particularly describe[] the place to be searched,
    and the persons or things to be seized.”               U.S. Const. amend. IV.
    A search warrant satisfies the particularity requirement if the
    description enables an officer to ascertain and identify the
    place to be searched with reasonable effort.                  United States v.
    Owens, 
    848 F.2d 462
    , 463 (4th Cir. 1988).                   Accordingly, “[a]n
    erroneous description . . . does not necessarily invalidate a
    warrant and subsequent search.”               
    Id.
       Furthermore, we have held
    that “[a]s a general rule, a supporting affidavit or document
    may be read together with (and considered part of) a warrant
    that otherwise lacks sufficient particularity ‘if the warrant
    13
    uses appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting
    document accompanies the warrant.’ ”                      United States v. Hurwitz,
    
    459 F.3d 463
    , 470–71 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez,
    
    540 U.S. 551
    , 557–58 (2004)).
    Here, despite the typographical errors, the warrant for 601
    N. Eutaw correctly described Apartment 707 as the place to be
    searched      and    identified      Martin       Felder      as    a     resident.      The
    warrant also expressly incorporated and attached the affidavit
    filed in support of the search warrant.                       And unlike the warrant,
    the    affidavit     correctly       stated       the    address     of    601   N.    Eutaw.
    Thus, although the warrant was not prepared with care, it, along
    with    the     incorporated      affidavit,            was    sufficient        to    enable
    officers      to    identify   the     place       subject     to       search   and    items
    subject    to      seizure.     Accordingly,            the   warrant       satisfied    the
    Fourth Amendment and was valid.
    C.
    With respect to the search of 511 W. Pratt, Felder contends
    that the officers’ initial entry was not justified by exigent
    circumstances         and     that     the        unlawful         entry     tainted      the
    subsequently obtained warrant.                 We need not reach the issue of
    exigent       circumstances,         however,           because      the     warrant     was
    supported by probable cause even without the evidence obtained
    as a result of the officers’ initial entry.
    14
    The determination by a judicial officer to issue a warrant
    on   probable    cause      involves      “a     practical      commonsense       decision
    whether, given all the circumstances[,] . . . there is a fair
    probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
    in a particular place.”              Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 238
    (1983).      When     a    warrant     is      supported     in    part     by    evidence
    obtained    in   an       unlawful    search,       we    routinely        exclude       that
    evidence and consider whether probable cause exists based on the
    remaining facts.           E.g., United States v. Allen, 
    631 F.3d 164
    ,
    173 (4th Cir. 2011).          Under this approach, a warrant is valid if
    after     excising    the     unlawfully          obtained      evidence,        there     is
    “sufficient      untainted         evidence       . . .    to     establish       probable
    cause.”     
    Id.
     (quoting United States v. Karo, 
    468 U.S. 705
    , 719
    (1984)); United States v. Moses, 
    540 F.3d 263
    , 271 (4th Cir.
    2008).
    Probable    cause      for    the     511   W.   Pratt      search    warrant      was
    based both on the prior search at 601 N. Eutaw and evidence from
    the initial entry at 511 W. Pratt.                  The first two paragraphs of
    the affidavit recounted the evidence recovered from the search
    at 601 N. Eutaw, including the ammunition, drugs, identification
    cards, and truck rental receipt that led officers to 511 W.
    Pratt.     The third paragraph highlighted the circumstances that
    led to the officers’ initial entry at 511 W. Pratt, including
    the smell of marijuana and sound of movement from within the
    15
    apartment.          Finally, the third paragraph described the marijuana
    and handguns that officers observed in plain view after entering
    the apartment.
    Like    the    district        court,      we        need    not     consider      whether
    exigent        circumstances            justified             the       officers’          initial
    warrantless entry into 511 W. Pratt.                            Even after excising the
    third paragraph describing the results of the initial entry, the
    affidavit       for    511     W.    Pratt    contained             sufficient      evidence    to
    establish probable cause.                   The affidavit averred that officers
    seized     evidence       of        drugs    and      weapons         from    601    N.     Eutaw,
    collected       evidence       tying    Felder          to    the    contraband,      suspected
    Felder had moved to 511 W. Pratt based on the truck rental
    receipt,       and    confirmed       with       building       management       that      he   had
    recently rented the apartment.                     Based on this information alone,
    there    was        probable    cause       to     believe          officers     would     locate
    evidence       of    criminal       activity       at    511    W.     Pratt.        Cf.    United
    States v. Grossman, 
    400 F.3d 212
    , 218 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is
    reasonable to suspect that a drug dealer stores drugs in a home
    to which he owns a key.”).
    Felder nevertheless contends for the first time on appeal
    that no reasonable officer could have believed the warrant for
    511 W. Pratt was valid because it was signed following execution
    of the search.           Felder points out that the note in the judge’s
    signature block for the 511 W. Pratt search warrant indicated it
    16
    was signed at 7:31 p.m., while the return stated that the search
    occurred at 7:10 p.m.               According to Felder, this discrepancy
    proves officers executed an unsigned warrant.                     We disagree.
    Because Felder did not raise this issue in the district
    court,    we   review       for   plain    error,       which   requires      Felder    to
    demonstrate      an       error   that    is    plain    and    affects    substantial
    rights.       United States v. Claridy, 
    601 F.3d 276
    , 285 (4th Cir.
    2010).     The discrepancy in the time notations could very well
    have been clerical in nature.                  In any event, because Felder did
    not alert the district court to the issue, it did not receive
    testimony or make any specific findings.                       There is no question,
    however, that a judge ultimately signed the warrant and that it
    was supported by probable cause.                    Accordingly, we find no plain
    error and hold that the warrant was valid.
    D.
    Finally, Felder contends that the statements he made to
    officers following his arrest were tainted by the illegal search
    and    must     be    suppressed.              Felder    concedes      that    officers
    administered Miranda warnings and that his statements were not
    otherwise involuntary.              Because we conclude that the searches
    were   lawful,       we    reject   Felder’s        argument     and   hold   that     his
    statements were voluntary.
    17
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
    district court.
    AFFIRMED
    18