United States v. Reginald Chavers , 459 F. App'x 249 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4421
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
REGINALD CHAVERS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:08-cr-00834-PMD-1)
Submitted: December 20, 2011 Decided: December 22, 2011
Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Derek J. Enderlin, ROSS AND ENDERLIN, P.A., Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Peter Thomas Phillips, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
While on supervised release, imposed as part of his
sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006), Reginald Chavers had his
release revoked. Chavers was thereafter convicted of violating
his supervised release. The district court sentenced him to
eleven months of imprisonment, two years of supervised release,
and six months of home confinement. Counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but raising the
following issues, whether: (1) the district judge should have
recused himself; (2) the court erred by finding that Chavers
violated his supervised release because of his arrest for
domestic violence; (3) the court erred by imposing as a
condition of his supervised release that Chavers could not be
employed where he would be required to carry a weapon; (4) the
court erred by finding that Chavers changed employment in
violation of a condition of his supervised release; (5) the
court erred by sentencing him to six months of home confinement;
(6) Chavers was entitled to a detention hearing; and (7) defense
counsel had a conflict of interest. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
As conceded by Anders counsel, claims one, two, three,
and six are reviewed only for plain error, as Chavers raises
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them for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (detailing plain error standard).
Chavers fails to meet the demanding burden of establishing plain
error for any of these claims. Chavers provides no precedent
for his argument, and we find none, that Senior Judge Duffy had
a conflict of interest in adjudicating his supervised release
violation because he also adjudicated his underlying § 922(g)
conviction. The court heard the facts underlying the domestic
violence incident and determined by a preponderance of the
evidence that Chavers violated his condition not to engage in
new criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2011). The district court imposed as a condition of
Chavers’ supervised release that he not be employed in a
capacity where he would wear a uniform, badge, or carry a
weapon. This was reasonable in light of the fact that Chavers
was employed as an armed security guard at the time of his
underlying § 922(g) conviction. Chavers did not timely request
a detention hearing, which may be waived under 18 U.S.C. § 3142
(2006), and such claims generally are moot following conviction.
See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (observing that
defendant’s “claim to pretrial bail was moot once he was
convicted” (emphasis in original)).
Chavers remaining claims also fail. The court did not
abuse its discretion by finding that Chavers failed to provide
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his probation officer with prior notice of his change of
employment, United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th
Cir. 1999) (providing standard), the court did not err by
imposing a term of supervised release and home confinement,
United States v. Hager, 288 F.3d 136, 137-38 (4th Cir. 2002),
and Chavers’ defense counsel did not have an actual conflict of
interest because Chavers previous counsel, who was dismissed,
also worked for the public defenders’ office. Mickens v.
Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168-69 (2002).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
Chavers’ sentence was imposed within his advisory Sentencing
Guidelines range and the prescribed statutory range and is not
plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
438-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We therefore affirm Chavers’ conviction
and sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Chavers,
in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Chavers requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Chavers. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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