United States v. Antonio Holton , 469 F. App'x 265 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5321
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ANTONIO HOLTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:08-cr-00553-RDB-1)
Submitted: March 6, 2012 Decided: March 16, 2012
Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, LaKeytria W. Felder,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Traci L.
Robinson, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Antonio Holton appeals from his conviction for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006), and his resulting 288-month sentence,
entered pursuant to a jury verdict. On appeal, Holton asserts
that admission of statistical Crime Lab evidence violated his
rights under the Confrontation Clause and that subjecting him to
a mandatory statutory minimum sentence improperly limited the
sentencing discretion of the district court. We affirm.
First, we find it unnecessary to address whether a
Confrontation Clause error existed because, in this case, any
error was harmless. Constitutional trial errors are harmless
only if the reviewing court is “able to declare a belief that
[the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). When the error involves
wrongly admitted evidence, “the impact of the error can be
evaluated in light of the other evidence which was properly
admitted.” United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1262 (4th
Cir. 1992). To determine whether the admission of the
statistics was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we review the
entire trial record and determines whether “it is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned [a guilty]
verdict[]” even if the evidence had not been introduced. Id. at
1263. This determination requires a quantitative assessment of
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the impact of the error measured against the other evidence
presented and a qualitative assessment of the proof as to
whether the erroneously admitted evidence was cumulative. Id.
at 1262; Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231 (1973).
The Crime Lab statistics were introduced to prove that
the fact that no fingerprints were found on the firearm at issue
or the recovered firearm casing was not determinative of whether
Holton possessed (and touched) the gun. However, there was
overwhelming other evidence that Holton possessed the firearm
and, in fact, other evidence that fingerprints on firearms are
rare. Specifically, officers heard a shot fired near Poplar
Green and then saw Holton running away from the area. A police
officer testified that he saw Holton holding the firearm and
discharging it, several other officers testified that a gun was
found near where Holton collapsed, gunshot residue was found on
Holton’s hands, and the gun found near Holton had earlier
discharged a bullet near Poplar Green. In addition, and most
notably for these purposes, a latent fingerprint expert
testified as to his own personal experience with fingerprint
evidence. He explained numerous reasons why a fingerprint is
not left even if someone touches an item, and he provided
certain factors that would smear or wipe away fingerprints, even
if they were left. In addition, he noted that, in processing
firearm evidence, he would normally find a suitable print in
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only five percent of cases and that he had never pulled a
suitable print off an actual handgun. Moreover, he testified as
to several reasons why the particular gun at issue would be
found with no suitable prints on it. Finally, Holton
cross-examined the expert exclusively and extensively on the
disputed Crime Lab statistics, * pointing out to the jury that the
expert was not familiar with the underlying factual bases for
the statistics.
Based on the foregoing, we find that there is no
reasonable probability that the evidence complained of
contributed to the conviction. Given the evidence at trial,
there was no reasonable doubt that firearm evidence is not
conducive to fingerprints. The expert testimony on this subject
(discounting the Crime Lab statistics) was detailed and
unchallenged by Holton. Accordingly, any Confrontation Clause
error was harmless.
Next, Holton argues that 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006)
conflicts with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) and that the latter
statute trumps the former. Section 924(e)(1) requires a
sentence of not less than fifteen years for a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) by a person with three or more previous
*
These statistics showed that, in 2008, the Crime Lab as a
whole found prints on .3 percent of firearm-related evidence.
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convictions of violent or serious drug offenses. Section
3553(a) sets forth factors for a sentencing court to consider
and mandates that a court “impose a sentence sufficient, but not
greater than necessary” to punish the offense, deter criminal
conduct, protect the public from the defendant, and to provide
the offender with training, medical care, and treatment. Holton
claims that a fifteen-year sentence is greater than necessary to
achieve those purposes in his case and, thus, § 924(e) requires
the imposition of a sentence violative of § 3553(a).
The Government argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (2006)
modifies § 3553(a) so as to eliminate any conflict with
mandatory minimum sentences. That section states:
Except as otherwise specifically provided, a defendant
who has been found guilty of an offense described in
any Federal statute . . . shall be sentenced in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter so as
to achieve the purposes set forth in subparagraphs (A)
through (D) of section 3553(a)(2) to the extent that
they are applicable in light of all the circumstances
of the case.
Other courts have found that the “otherwise specifically
provided” language of § 3551(a) includes mandatory minimum
sentences and thus no conflict exists between § 3553(a) and
statutorily-mandated sentences. See United States v. Sutton,
625 F.3d 526, 529 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kellum, 356
F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he mandatory minimum sentences
[the defendant] was exposed to pursuant to [statute] clearly fit
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within the ‘except as otherwise specifically provided’ exclusion
of § 3551(a).”). Based on the statutory language of § 3551(a),
we conclude that Holton’s claim is without merit.
Accordingly, we affirm Holton’s conviction and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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