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Environmental Tech v. State of SC ( 2000 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY
    COUNCIL, formerly known as
    Hazardous Waste Treatment
    Council, on behalf of itself and its
    members,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; JIM
    HODGES, Governor; COMMISSIONER,
    SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
    HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL
    CONTROL; SOUTH CAROLINA
    DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND                           No. 99-1672
    ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL; SOUTH
    CAROLINA BOARD OF HEALTH AND
    ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL,
    Defendants-Appellants,
    and
    SIERRA CLUB; ENERGY RESEARCH
    FOUNDATION; CITIZENS FOR CLEAN AIR
    AND WATER; CITIZENS ASKING FOR A
    SAFE ENVIRONMENT, INCORPORATED
    (CASE); ENVIRONMENTALISTS,
    INCORPORATED,
    Intervenors - Defendants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.
    Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior District Judge.
    (CA-90-1402-3-0)
    Argued: April 7, 2000
    Decided: June 2, 2000
    Before MOTZ, Circuit Judge, Samuel G. WILSON,
    Chief United States District Judge for the
    Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation,
    and Gerald Bruce LEE, United States District Judge
    for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Tracey Colton Green, Assistant Attorney General,
    Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants. Stuart Henry Newberger,
    CROWELL & MORING, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
    ON BRIEF: Charles Molony Condon, Attorney General, Treva Ash-
    worth, Deputy Attorney General, Kenneth P. Woodington, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appel-
    lants. Laurel Pyke Malson, Kesha Evans, CROWELL & MORING,
    L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    South Carolina appeals the district court's grant of attorneys' fees
    to Environmental Technology Council ("ETC") on the grounds that
    ETC does not qualify for such an award under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
     or,
    2
    alternatively, that the amount was not justified based on an appropri-
    ate attorneys' fee analysis. The district court's award was predicated
    on ETC having prevailed on the merits of its claims that certain haz-
    ardous waste management restrictions promulgated by South Carolina
    violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . We affirm.
    I.
    Plaintiff-Appellee ETC is a non-profit, nationwide association of
    commercial firms that provide fully licensed and permitted services
    for the treatment, storage, recycling, and disposal of hazardous waste
    in accordance with the requirements of federal and state law.
    It brought this action in the United States District Court for the Dis-
    trict of South Carolina in June 1990, seeking declaratory and injunc-
    tive relief to prohibit the implementation of certain restrictions placed
    by Defendant-Appellant South Carolina upon treatment and disposal
    of hazardous waste generated in other states. ETC challenged these
    restrictions under the Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the
    Privileges and Immunities Clause, and 42 U.S.C.§ 1983. ETC also
    sought, pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
    , an award of the costs and attor-
    neys' fees incurred in prosecuting this action.
    Following the district court's entry of final judgment in April 1995,1
    ETC filed its initial Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. In that
    May 1995 Petition, ETC expressly reserved its right to seek additional
    fees arising out of any appeals of the April 1995 judgment and litiga-
    tion of its fee petition.
    In August 1997, following resolution of South Carolina's second
    appeal to this Court and the United States Supreme Court's denial of
    certiorari, ETC filed a Supplemental Petition, incorporating the addi-
    tional fees and costs incurred in (1) responding to the state's 1996
    appeal to this Court, (2) opposing the state's Petition for Writ of Cer-
    tiorari, and (3) preparing its Fee Petition.
    _________________________________________________________________
    1 The district court holding was affirmed in all respects by this Court
    in October 1996.
    3
    In April 1999, the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina awarded ETC $486,489.42 in attorneys' fees pursuant
    to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
    .
    II.
    It is well established that organizations satisfying the requirements
    for representational standing may bring actions to vindicate the fed-
    eral rights of their members under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . See, e.g., Wilder
    v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 
    496 U.S. 498
     (1990) (permitting 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action brought by association on behalf of its mem-
    bers); cf. Maryland Highways Contractors Ass'n v. Maryland, 
    933 F.2d 1246
     (4th Cir. 1991). Moreover, actions to vindicate Commerce
    Clause violations should proceed no differently than those brought
    under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     to vindicate other federal rights. See gener-
    ally, e.g., Medigen of Kentucky, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of West
    Virginia, 
    985 F.2d 164
    , 167 n.3 (4th Cir. 1993).
    ETC having succeeded in its 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     claim, it follows
    naturally that the group was entitled to an award of attorneys' fees
    and costs pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
     -- regardless of whether
    South Carolina sought to categorize it as an "unincorporated" associa-
    tion. Furthermore, not only was ETC the "prevailing party" here
    under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
    , but, as the district court explained, it estab-
    lished its 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     standing over the course of the litigation
    and, similarly, its right to attorneys' fees. See generally Warth v.
    Seldin, 
    422 U.S. 490
    , 511 (1975). Consequently, South Carolina's
    appeal on this ground is not well-founded.
    Insofar as the ultimate amount of attorneys' fees awarded by the
    district court is concerned, this Court reviews such a grant only for
    abuse of discretion. See Alexander S. v. Boyd , 
    113 F.3d 1373
    , 1381
    (4th Cir. 1997). We must lend deference to the judicial discretion of
    the trial judge, who had close and intimate knowledge of the efforts
    expended by ETC and the value of the services rendered. See Barber
    v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 
    577 F.2d 216
    , 226 (4th Cir. 1978). Overturning the
    trial court's judgment is not warranted unless, under all the facts and
    circumstances, it is clearly wrong. See 
    id.
     Moreover, mindful that a
    request for attorneys' fees should not result in a second major litiga-
    tion, this Court has held that attorneys' fees appeals that simply con-
    4
    cern questions of fact or of the district court's exercise of its
    discretion will seldom warrant a remand. See Trimper v. City of Nor-
    folk, 
    58 F.3d 68
    , 74 (4th Cir. 1995).
    A review of the record in this case reveals that, indeed, the district
    court did consider and make findings commensurate with the Barber
    v. Kimbrell's, Inc. lodestar factors. See Barber, 
    577 F.2d at
    226 n.28.
    Its analysis is reflected in its written Order of April 13, 1999. Cf.
    Alexander v. Tyler, 
    1999 WL 305029
    , at *2 (4th Cir. May 14, 1999)
    (explaining that district court not even required to recite each of the
    twelve relevant factors in its fee decision). For example, despite South
    Carolina's submissions to the contrary, the district court found that
    ETC's billing records were sufficiently detailed to enable it to con-
    clude that the fees incurred were "reasonable and appropriate."
    Additionally, the district court found that significant attorney
    resources were necessary to vindicate ETC's rights under the Com-
    merce Clause and recognized the biographical information of various
    attorneys working on the case. It also found in-house counsel legal
    work "entirely necessary" to coordinate the legal arguments and briefs
    submitted to the Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court. Finally, the dis-
    trict court took into consideration the use of attorneys from other
    communities when making its determination of whether billed rates
    were "excessive."2
    Given the record in this case and the district court's spirited lode-
    star analysis, this Court does not view the trial judge's award of
    $486,489.42 in attorneys' fees and costs to ETC as an abuse of discre-
    tion. The Order of the district judge was, therefore, justified.
    AFFIRMED
    _________________________________________________________________
    2 It is worth noting here, as the district court did, that counsel for South
    Carolina, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, charged comparable, if not
    higher, rates than ETC's counsel, Crowell & Moring, LLP.
    5