Thompson v. Brisk Transportation, LP ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-1947
MICHAEL THOMPSON
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
BRISK TRANSPORTATION, LP; SUPERVALU
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:06-cv-01968-WDQ)
Argued: September 24, 2010 Decided: November 15, 2010
Before SHEDD and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and Robert J. CONRAD,
Jr., Chief United States District Judge for the Western District
of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the opinion
in which Judge Keenan and Judge Conrad joined.
Eugene Alan Shapiro, SHAPIRO & SCHAUB, PA, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellant. Alice Kelley Scanlon, ANDERSON & QUINN,
Rockville, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
SHEDD, Circuit Judge:
Michael Thompson appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to Brisk Transportation, LP and
SuperValu, Inc. For the reasons below, we affirm.
I.
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to
Thompson, the non-moving party. Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404,
415 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc). SuperValu owns a trucking
facility in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, where tractor trailers are
loaded for delivery; Brisk Transportation maintains and owns a
majority of the trailers at the facility. Thompson was an
independent tractor-trailer operator for Brisk Transportation.
On December 9, 2004, Thompson attempted to hook his tractor
up to his assigned, pre-loaded trailer. However, SuperValu
employees known as yard jockeys had positioned the pre-loaded
trailer too high for Thompson to properly couple with his
tractor. Thompson tried to make the coupling himself by turning
a crank under the trailer to lower its landing gear. As
Thompson began turning the crank, he noticed the landing gear
was bent and sliding. The crank handle then spun out of
Thompson’s hand and struck him on the face.
Thompson brought this action against Brisk Transportation
and SuperValu, alleging various causes of action in negligence.
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The district court granted defendants’ summary judgment motions
on various grounds, including lack of causation.
II.
Thompson argues that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment as to his various negligence claims against
both Brisk Transportation and SuperValu. Summary judgment is
appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
If the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case,” the moving party is entitled to summary judgment.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548,
2552 (1986). We review the district court's order granting
summary judgment de novo. Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d
686, 694 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
Under Pennsylvania law, which the parties agree controls,
causation is an essential element of a negligence cause of
action. See Martin v. Evans, 711 A.2d 458, 502 (Pa. 1998). As
noted, the district court granted summary judgment, at least in
part, because Thompson failed to offer any admissible evidence
of causation. Thompson did not offer expert testimony to
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establish causation, and the district court ruled that Thompson
cannot testify himself as to causation or submit a theory of res
ipsa loquitur to the jury.
A.
Thompson argues that the district court abused its
discretion in holding that expert testimony was necessary to
prove causation. Specifically, Thompson argues that the court
should have permitted him to testify as to causation pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 701. The court found that
although Thompson’s testimony may be helpful in understanding
how the accident occurred, it “offers no insight [into] whether
the equipment was defective because of someone’s negligence.”
J.A. 240.
We review the district court's evidentiary ruling for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 470 (4th
Cir. 2007). “A district court abuses its discretion when it
acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to consider judicially
recognized factors constraining its exercise of discretion,
relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, or commits an
error of law.” Id.We hold that the district court acted within its discretion
in requiring expert testimony and excluding Thompson’s testimony
as to causation. The district court made a reasonable
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determination that the operation of a tractor-trailer’s landing
gear and crank is not within the common knowledge of a juror
and, consequently, requires expert testimony, which Thompson
failed to offer. See Kale v. Douthitt, 274 F.2d 476, 481 (4th
Cir. 1960) (expert testimony is necessary in “cases in which the
conclusions to be drawn by the jury depend on the existence of
facts which are not common knowledge”). Therefore, Thompson
could not supply such testimony as a lay witness. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 701 (a witness not testifying as an expert is limited to
those opinions “not based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702”); TLT-
Babcock, Inc. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 33 F.3d 397, 400 (4th Cir.
1994) (affirming district court’s refusal to admit lay testimony
not based upon witness’ own perceptions).
B.
Thompson also argues that the district court erred by
refusing to permit him to submit the theory of res ipsa loquitur
to the jury in order to allow the jury to infer that the harm he
suffered was caused by Brisk Transportation’s negligence.
However, Thompson did not make similar claims against SuperValu.
Pennsylvania recognizes the theory of res ipsa loquitur where a
plaintiff can make three requisite showings by a preponderance
of the evidence: (1) the event is of the kind that ordinarily
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would not occur in the absence of negligence; (2) the
elimination of other responsible causes, including the conduct
of the plaintiff and third persons; and (3) the alleged
negligence is within the scope of defendant’s duty to the
plaintiff. Gilbert v. Korvette, Inc., 327 A.2d 94, 100-101 (Pa.
1974).
Upon review, we find that Thompson has not eliminated other
potentially responsible causes of his accident. Notably,
Thompson argues that the yard jockeys employed by SuperValu bent
the landing gear, thereby causing his accident. Additionally,
Thompson failed to eliminate his own actions as a possible cause
of the accident. Therefore, we find that Thompson failed to
eliminate other possible causes of the accident and,
consequently, the jury could not reasonably draw an inference of
negligence against Brisk Transportation pursuant to the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. See Longsdale v. Joseph Horne Co., 587
A.2d 810, 815-816 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (finding that where
plaintiff did not sufficiently eliminate other responsible
causes of the accident, the jury could not reasonably conclude
that it was more likely than not that her injuries were the
result of the defendant’s negligence). Accordingly, we find no
error in the district court’s refusal to submit the theory of
res ipsa loquitur to the jury.
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III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order granting
summary judgment to the defendants.
AFFIRMED
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