United States v. Waldron , 389 F. App'x 283 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4682
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
OTIS WALDRON, a/k/a Bruce Millington,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. W. Earl Britt,
Senior District Judge. (7:07-cr-00101-BR-2)
Submitted: July 14, 2010 Decided: July 26, 2010
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas R. Wilson, GREENE & WILSON, P.A., New Bern, North
Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States
Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Otis Waldron appeals his convictions of conspiring to
distribute marijuana, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime, and being a convicted felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(c) (2006) and 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). On
appeal, Waldron contends that the district court erred in
failing to pose Waldron’s requested question to the jury during
voir dire, the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions, and the district court erred in allowing admission
into evidence of Waldron’s prior drug and firearms convictions.
We affirm.
I. Voir dire
Waldron first argues that the district court erred in
refusing to ask a question requested by Waldron during voir
dire. Prior to trial, Waldron requested for the court to pose
the following question to the potential jurors: “Defendant, by
his Rastafarian religious association and requirements, wears
his hair in what are commonly called ‘dreadlocks.’ Does
Defendant’s choice in this appearance, by his religion, disable
or prejudice any juror in deciding Defendant’s guilt or
innocence of the crime alleged by the [G]overnment.” The
district court agreed to question the jury regarding any
prejudice toward dreadlocks, but refused to raise the issue of
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Waldron’s religion, finding that it was not relevant to the
trial. Waldron challenges this refusal on appeal.
“The conduct of voir dire is committed to the sound
discretion of the district court, and thus it is only a rare
case in which a reviewing court will find error in the trial
court’s conduct.” United States v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192, 203 (4th
Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Therefore, there are only limited circumstances in which the
Supreme Court has dictated the subject matter of voir dire. See
United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734, 739 (4th Cir. 1996).
For example, “[w]hen racial issues are inextricably bound up
with the conduct of the trial, the constitutional guarantee of a
trial by an impartial jury requires that a court not refuse a
request for voir dire directed to racial prejudice.” United
States v. Barber, 80 F.3d 964, 968 (4th Cir. 1996). Conversely,
where “the proposed question does not address issues of racial
or ethnic prejudice, . . . the district court need not pursue a
specific line of questioning on voir dire, provided the voir
dire as a whole is reasonably sufficient to uncover bias or
partiality in the venire.” Id. at 739-40. However, appellate
courts will find an abuse of discretion where the questions
posed the venire do not yield “a reasonable assurance that
prejudice would be discovered if present.” Id. at 740 (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). After reviewing the
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record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to question the jury regarding Waldron’s
religion.
II. Sufficiency of the evidence
Waldron next challenges whether the evidence was
sufficient to convict him of each offense. “A defendant
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy
burden.” United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 245 (4th Cir.
2007). This court reviews a sufficiency of the evidence
challenge by determining whether, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of
fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. United States v. Collins, 412 F.3d 515, 519
(4th Cir. 2005); see Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80
(1942). This court reviews both direct and circumstantial
evidence, and accords the government all reasonable inferences
from the facts shown to those sought to be established. United
States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008). This court
will uphold the jury’s verdict if substantial evidence supports
it, and will reverse only in those rare cases of clear failure
by the prosecution. Foster, 507 F.3d at 244-45.
A. Conspiracy
In order to support Waldron’s conviction for
conspiracy to distribute marijuana, the Government had to prove:
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(1) that Waldron agreed with one or more individuals to possess
with intent to distribute marijuana; “(2) that [he] had
knowledge of that conspiracy; and (3) that [he] knowingly and
voluntarily participated in the conspiracy.” United States v.
Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007); see United
States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
“A defendant may have constructive possession of contraband even
if it is not in his immediate possession or control.” United
States v. Shorter, 328 F.3d 167, 172 (4th Cir. 2003). In order
to demonstrate constructive possession, the government must
prove “that the defendant exercised, or had the power to
exercise, dominion and control over the item.” Id. After
reviewing the record, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to
allow a rational trier of fact to find Waldron guilty of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana.
B. Possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime
Waldron also challenges his conviction for possession
of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. To
establish the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) violation, the Government
had to present evidence “indicating that the possession of [the]
firearm furthered, advanced, or helped forward a drug
trafficking crime.” United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705
(4th Cir. 2002). As noted above, a defendant may have
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possession of the firearm even if it is outside his immediate
control, as long as he had the power to exercise dominion or
control over the firearm. Shorter, 328 F.3d at 172.
Additionally, Lomax provides further guidance when determining
whether the possession was in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime:
When making this factual determination, the fact
finder is free to consider the numerous ways in which
a firearm might further or advance drug trafficking.
For example, a gun could provide a defense against
someone trying to steal drugs or drug profits, or it
might lessen the chance that a robbery would even be
attempted. Additionally, a gun might enable a drug
trafficker to ensure that he collects during a drug
deal. And a gun could serve as protection in the
event that a deal turns sour. Or it might prevent a
transaction from turning sour in the first place.
Furthermore, a firearm could help a drug trafficker
defend his turf by deterring others from operating in
the same area.
293 F.3d at 705. Additionally, several factors may suggest a
connection between the possession of firearms and drug
trafficking, including the “accessibility of the firearm, the
type of weapon, whether the weapon is stolen, the status of the
possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun is loaded,
proximity to drugs or drug profits, and the time and
circumstances under which the gun is found.” Id. After
reviewing the record, we conclude that a rational trier of fact
could find Waldron guilty of possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.
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C. Possession of a firearm by a felon
Finally, Waldron challenges his conviction for
possession of a firearm by a felon. In order to prove a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the Government had to
demonstrate (1) that Waldron was a convicted felon at the time
of the offense; (2) he possessed the firearm intentionally and
voluntarily; and (3) the firearm had traveled in interstate
commerce. United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 136 (4th
Cir. 2001). Waldron largely contends that, because the
Government never presented evidence that the firearm found in
the car travelled in interstate commerce, he could not have been
convicted of violating § 922(g)(1). However, the parties
stipulated both that the firearms found in the trailer had
travelled in interstate commerce, and that Waldron was a
convicted felon. (JA 43-44). Additionally, the evidence
clearly demonstrates that Waldron constructively possessed the
firearms in question. Accordingly, we conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to
find the elements of this crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
III. Prior convictions
Waldron next challenges the district court’s denial of
his motion in limine to exclude his prior convictions for
possession of cocaine and discharging a weapon into an occupied
dwelling. Waldron contends that, because he did not place his
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intent at issue during trial, his past convictions are
irrelevant, not probative, and highly prejudicial. Under Fed.
R. Evid. 404(b), evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts,
though inadmissible to prove a defendant’s character and “action
in conformity therewith,” may be admissible to prove “motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identify, or
absence of mistake or accident.” Therefore, such evidence is
admissible “if the evidence is (1) relevant to an issue other
than the general character of the defendant; (2) necessary to
prove an element of the charged offense; and (3) reliable.”
United States v. Hodge, 354 F.3d 305, 312 (4th Cir. 2004).
Additionally, under Fed. R. Evid. 403, the probative value of
the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. Id.This court reviews the admission of evidence under
Rule 404(b) for abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of
discretion occurs when “the district court judge acted
arbitrarily or irrationally in admitting evidence.” United
States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 326 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted). After reviewing the record, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the admission of evidence of Waldron’s prior
convictions. Moreover, in light of the overwhelming evidence of
Waldron’s guilt, any Rule 404(b) error was clearly harmless.
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately expressed in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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