Chaplin v. Du Pont Advance Fiber Systems ( 2005 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-1469
KEVIN LAMBERT CHAPLIN; JAMES PHILIP JONES;
ROBERT COLEMAN LEWIS; MARVIN L. OLIVER; LYNN
EUGENE RITENOUR; DAVID EUGENE ROWLETTE;
STEPHEN JACKSON TURLEY,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
DU PONT ADVANCE FIBER SYSTEMS; DU PONT
SPRUANCE; DU PONT TEXTILE & INTERIORS,
INCORPORATED,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
SOUTHERN LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER, INCORPORATED;
KIRK D. LYONS,
Parties in Interest.
No. 04-1471
KEVIN LAMBERT CHAPLIN; JAMES PHILIP JONES;
ROBERT COLEMAN LEWIS; MARVIN L. OLIVER; LYNN
EUGENE RITENOUR; DAVID EUGENE ROWLETTE;
STEPHEN JACKSON TURLEY,
Plaintiffs,
versus
DU PONT ADVANCE FIBER SYSTEMS; DU PONT
SPRUANCE; DU PONT TEXTILE & INTERIORS,
INCORPORATED,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
SOUTHERN LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER, INCORPORATED,
Party in Interest,
versus
KIRK D. LYONS,
Party in Interest - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (CA-03-469)
Argued: December 3, 2004 Decided: March 10, 2005
Before WILLIAMS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and Henry F. FLOYD,
United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Kirk David Lyons, SOUTHERN LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER,
INCORPORATED, Black Mountain, North Carolina, for Appellants.
Niall Anthony Paul, SPILMAN THOMAS & BATTLE, P.L.L.C., Charleston,
West Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: James S. Crockett, Jr.,
SPILMAN THOMAS & BATTLE, P.L.L.C., Charleston, West Virginia;
Jonathan P. Harmon, Robert F. Holland, MCGUIREWOODS, L.L.P.,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
2
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
Appellant Kirk D. Lyons (Lyons) appeals the award of sanctions
against him in connection with his clients’ Title VII claims for
religious and racial discrimination. Lyons asserts that the
district court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions against
him pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3) because he conducted an
objectively reasonable investigation of the factual basis for the
claims prior to filing the action.
Appellants Kevin Lambert Chaplin, James Philip Jones, Robert
Coleman Lewis, Marvin L. Oliver, Lynn Eugene Ritenour, David Eugene
Rowlette, and Stephen Jackson Turley (collectively, “Appellants”)
appeal the award of attorney’s fees imposed upon them in connection
with their Title VII claims for national origin, religious, and
racial discrimination. Appellants contend that the district court
abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-5(k)(West 2003) because Appellants’ claims were not
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
In September 2000, Du Pont Advance Fiber Systems, Du Pont
Spruance, and Du Pont Textiles & Interiors, Incorporated
(collectively, “Du Pont”) instituted a policy banning the display
of offensive symbols on Du Pont property. Included in the policy
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is a ban on the display of the Confederate battle flag on Du Pont’s
Spruance Plant in Richmond, Virginia.
Each of the seven Appellants is an employee at Du Pont’s
Spruance plant, and each professes to be a Caucasian, a Christian,
and a Confederate Southern American. As a result of Du Pont’s
policy, Appellants brought a Title VII action, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e
et seq., alleging employment discrimination based upon their race,
religion,1 and national origin.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
dismissed Appellants’ action as to all counts pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Chaplin v. Du Pont Advance Fiber Systems, 293 F.
Supp. 2d 622 (E.D.Va. 2003) (Chaplin I). Prior to the ruling of
the court, Du Pont served upon Appellants its Rule 11 motion for
sanctions, along with a letter requesting that they voluntarily
dismiss the action within twenty-one days. Thereafter, when
Appellants failed to dismiss their claims, Du Pont filed its
sanctions motion with the district court. Du Pont also filed a
motion for attorney’s fees and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-5(k).
In a hearing on Du Pont’s motions, the district court denied
Du Pont’s Rule 11 motion for sanctions and granted its motion for
attorney’s fees and expenses against both Appellants and Lyons.
However, because 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k) does not provide for an
1
Appellant Stephen Jackson Turley did not join in this claim.
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award of fees against counsel, the district court vacated its
decision to award attorney’s fees against Lyons and its decision to
deny Du Pont’s motion for sanctions.
The district court issued a subsequent order granting Du
Pont’s motion for fees and expenses against Appellants as to all
claims and granting in part its motion for sanctions against Lyons
as to the religious and racial discrimination claims. Chaplin v.
Du Pont Advance Fiber Systems, 303 F. Supp. 2d 766 (E.D.Va. 2004)
(Chaplin II). Appellants noticed this appeal after the court
denied their motion to alter or amend the judgment.
II.
We review for abuse of discretion both the district court's
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions on a practicing lawyer, Cooter &
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990), as well as its
award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e)-5(k). Arnold
v. Burger King Corp., 719 F.2d 63, 66 (4th Cir. 1983).
III.
A.
The district court levied sanctions against Lyons pursuant to
subsection (b)(3) of Rule 11, which requires an attorney to assure
that “the allegations and other factual contentions [within the
complaint] have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
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identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery[.]”
Pursuant to this rule, before filing a claim, an attorney must
conduct a reasonable investigation of the factual bases underlying
the claim. Cleveland Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scrap Corp., 827 F.2d
984, 987 (4th Cir. 1987). When there is no factual basis for a
particular claim, the attorney has violated Rule 11(b)(3). In re
Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 516 (4th Cir. 1990).
1.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it found
that the religious discrimination claim lacked any factual basis.
In a Title VII action for employment discrimination based upon the
plaintiff’s religion, the plaintiff must show either that he
suffered disparate treatment as a result of his religion or that
the employer failed to accommodate his religious practices.
Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1017 (4th Cir.
1996) (citations omitted). Lyons argues only that the district
court erred in awarding sanctions on Appellants’ failure to
accommodate claim.
To establish a prima facie religious accommodation claim, a
plaintiff must establish that (1) he has a bona fide religious
belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he
informed the employer of this belief and requested an accommodation
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thereof; and (3) he was disciplined for failure to comply with the
conflicting employment requirement. Id. at 1019.
Appellants failed to meet the second prong of the test.2
Although Appellants apparently informed Du Pont of their religious
beliefs, no evidence exists in the record to suggest that
Appellants requested an accommodation of these beliefs prior to the
filing of their Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
charge. In fact, it was not until months after their EEOC charges
had been filed and subsequently denied that Appellants submitted
letters to their supervisors requesting that they be allowed to
display confederate flag symbols. As noted by the district court,
Lyons’ eleventh-hour attempt to bolster his clients’ religious
discrimination claim was disingenuous at best, and supports the
court’s finding that Lyons had no factual foundation upon which to
base the claim. Chaplin II, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 774. Accordingly,
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded
sanctions against Lyons for failure to comply with Rule 11(b)(3).
2.
The district court also awarded sanctions against Lyons in
connection with Appellants’ racial discrimination claim. The court
based the award upon its finding that the claim was “neither
2
The district court declined to address the first and third
prongs of the failure to accommodate analysis in its ruling on Du
Pont’s sanctions motion.
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factually supported nor supportable” as pled because Appellants
failed to suggest that “Du Pont’s policy discriminates, directly or
indirectly, against Caucasians.” Chaplin II, 303 F. Supp. 2d at
771. Although we believe the district court was incorrect in its
analysis of Appellants’ race discrimination claim, we do not
believe that the court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions
and, thus, affirm on other grounds.
According to the district court, the fact that Appellants’
national origin class is multiracial “practically eviscerates”
their racial discrimination claim. Id. However, this logic is
problematic. Generally speaking, every national origin class is
multiracial. Thus, it is quite possible that an employee could
have cognizable causes of action for both national origin
discrimination and race discrimination. An employer could
discriminate against all Caucasian employees, as well as all
employees of Confederate Southern American descent, or that
employer could discriminate against only Caucasian employees who
were also of Confederate Southern American descent. An attorney
representing a member of both classes should not be threatened with
the risk of sanctions for bringing causes of action for both race
discrimination and national origin discrimination. As such, the
district court erred in awarding sanctions against Lyons on this
basis.
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Lyons’ actions are sanctionable, however, under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11(b)(2), which allows the district court to award sanctions for
unwarranted legal contentions. Rule 11(b)(2) requires an attorney
to certify that “the claims . . . are warranted by existing law or
by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law . . . .”
It is well-established that to set forth a prima facie case of
employment discrimination, the plaintiff must assert that he
suffered some sort of adverse employment action. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Appellants
failed to aver that they had suffered any adverse employment
action. Clearly, then, their race discrimination claim, as pled,
was unwarranted by existing law. Moreover, to the extent that
Lyons was attempting to expand the law of adverse employment
action, the record fails to provide any guidance as to what action
taken by Du Pont Appellants claim was adverse. We may affirm a
judgment on any ground supported by the record. See MM v. School
District, 303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir. 2002). Thus, we find that
the district court’s award of sanctions against Lyons in connection
with Appellants’ race discrimination claim was proper pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).
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B.
In addition to warranting sanctions against Lyons, the absence
of an adverse employment action in this case supports an award of
attorney’s fees against Appellants. Title VII allows a district
court, in its discretion, to award a prevailing defendant
reasonable attorney’s fees if the plaintiff’s case was “frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in
subjective bad faith.” Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
412, 421 (1978). To make this determination, the district court
should “examine the suit against the background of the law at the
time of the filing and the facts known to [the plaintiff].” Lotz
Realty Co., Inc. v. United States Dept. Of Housing and Urban Dev.,
717 F.2d 929, 932 (4th Cir. 1983).
Each of Appellants’ claims is missing the allegation that
Appellants suffered an adverse employment action, an essential
element to an employment discrimination claim under McDonnell
Douglas. It was unreasonable for Appellants to bring the action
based upon a policy that caused them nothing more than aggravation.
Accordingly, the award of attorney’s fees by the district court was
proper on all counts.3
3
Additionally, for the reasons discussed in section III.A.1,
the award of attorney’s fees was appropriate on the religious
discrimination claim because Appellants knew that they failed to
request an accommodation prior to the filing of or within their
EEOC charges, thereby making the claim frivolous, unreasonable, and
without foundation.
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IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing discussion and analysis, we affirm
the district court’s award of sanctions and attorney’s fees.
AFFIRMED
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