Jeffrey Atkins v. Eric Holder ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2418
JEFFREY ATKINS,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
ERIC HOLDER, Attorney General, Federal Bureau of Prisons,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. J. Michelle Childs, District
Judge. (4:10-cv-01296-JMC)
Submitted: May 28, 2013 Decided: June 18, 2013
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Lewis Mann Cromer, James Paul Porter, J. LEWIS CROMER &
ASSOCIATES, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Barbara M. Bowens,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jeffrey Atkins appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to the Defendant on his claims for
disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, racial
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, and age
discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. *
Prior to his termination, Atkins was a correctional counselor
with the Bureau of Prisons. Atkins suffered from
polyarthropathy of the right knee and degenerative disc disease
in his back. All of Atkins’ doctors imposed significant
restrictions on his physical activity and concluded that his
restrictions were permanent. On appeal, Atkins challenges the
district court’s disposition of his disability discrimination,
racial discrimination, and retaliation claims. We affirm.
We review the district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, viewing the facts and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th
Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is properly granted “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
*
The district court remanded a breach of contract claim to
state court following the resolution of the federal law claims.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The relevant inquiry is “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
Atkins first contends that he was terminated from his
position because of his disability, in violation of the
Rehabilitation Act. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
provides, in relevant part: “No otherwise qualified individual
with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his
disability” be subject to discrimination with regard to federal
employment. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006). In order to establish a
violation of the Rehabilitation Act for disparate treatment, a
plaintiff must prove: “(1) that he has a disability; (2) that he
is otherwise qualified for the employment or benefit in
question; and (3) that he was excluded from the employment or
benefit due to discrimination solely on the basis of the
disability.” Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261,
1265 (4th Cir. 1995).
There is no dispute that Atkins was disabled at the
time of his termination. However, we conclude that the district
court did not err when it held that Atkins was not otherwise
qualified for his position. Only persons who are “qualified”
for the position in question may state a claim for disability
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discrimination. Tyndall v. National Educ. Centers, Inc. of
California, 31 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1994) (claim under ADA).
A “qualified individual with a disability” is “an individual
with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)
(2006). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2012). At the time of
his termination, Atkins was under several medical restrictions
that significantly curtailed the time he was allowed to walk or
stand. Prior to being barred from the institution, Atkins was
assisted by two metal canes with forearm braces and stated that
he was afraid for his safety. Because the correctional
counselor position was a law enforcement position that required
Atkins to physically restrain and control inmates, and no
accommodation could be made to alleviate his restrictions, we
conclude that Atkins did not make a prima facie claim for
disability discrimination.
Next, Atkins argues that the district court erred by
granting summary judgment on his Title VII racial discrimination
claim. A plaintiff pursuing a Title VII discrimination claim
may either offer direct evidence of discrimination or, using
indirect evidence, may rely on the burden-shifting framework
that was adopted by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Under the latter
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standard, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing
a prima facie case. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). Because Atkins offered no
direct evidence of discrimination, his claim is appropriately
analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title
VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he was a member of a
protected group; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action;
(3) he was performing his job satisfactorily at the time of the
adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees
outside his protected class were treated more favorably.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; White v. BFI Waste Servs.,
LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2004). Where a plaintiff makes
a showing sufficient to support a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer produces a
legitimate reason for the action, the burden once again shifts
to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s rationale is a
pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804-05. The plaintiff can
prove pretext by showing that the defendant’s “explanation is
unworthy of credence or by offering other forms of
circumstantial evidence sufficiently probative of . . .
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discrimination.” Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 336 (4th Cir.
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court determined that Atkins had failed
to establish a prima facie case because he could not show that
similarly situated employees were treated more favorably than
he. We conclude that the district court should not have
restricted the scope of potential comparators to only those
individuals who shared Atkins’ immediate supervisor while
ignoring the fact that the warden of the institution made the
final decision to terminate Atkins. See Mitchell v. Toledo
Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that to
establish a prima facie case, an employee generally must show
that his comparator was subject to action by the same supervisor
or decision-maker). Because we also recognize that a dispute
exists in the record as to whether Atkins’ proffered comparators
had permanent disabilities, we proceed to assess Atkins’ claim
that the Defendant’s legitimate reason for terminating him was
pretextual. The Defendant contends that Atkins was terminated
because he was unable to perform his duties as a result of his
medical condition. For the reasons stated above, we hold that
Atkins has not provided sufficient evidence to label this belief
as mere pretext for racial discrimination.
Lastly, Atkins alleges that the Defendant terminated
him in retaliation for filing an EEO complaint. A plaintiff may
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establish a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating
that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant
took an adverse action against him; and (3) there was a causal
connection between the first two elements. Price v. Thompson,
380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004). If a prima facie case is
established, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a
legitimate, non-retaliatory basis for the action. Id. Once
this burden is met, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that the proffered reasons are pretextual. Id.Atkins satisfies the first two prongs of the prima
facie case. However, he did not establish a causal connection
between his EEO complaint and his termination. Atkins did not
receive notice that he would be terminated until four months
after he filed his EEO complaint. Therefore, because his
termination was not temporally very close to his protected
activity, Atkins must show other relevant evidence to support
causation. See Lettieri v. Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 650 (4th
Cir. 2007). We conclude that Atkins has not made this showing,
and therefore the district court did not err when it held that
Atkins failed to state a prima facie case for retaliation.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the material before this
court and argument will not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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