United States v. James , 356 F. App'x 636 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5176
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BERTIL DESMOND JAMES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Beaufort. Sol Blatt, Jr., Senior District
Judge. (9:07-cr-01229-SB-1)
Submitted: October 27, 2009 Decided: December 4, 2009
Before MOTZ and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James W. Smiley, IV, LAW OFFICES OF JAMES W. SMILEY, IV,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. W. Walter Wilkins,
United States Attorney, Alston C. Badger, Assistant United
States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Bertil Desmond James entered a conditional guilty plea
to possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more
of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006),
reserving his right to challenge the district court’s denial of
his motion to suppress eleven kilograms of cocaine seized from
the vehicle he was driving and any inculpatory statements made
to law enforcement officers during the vehicle search. James
was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment. Finding no error, we
affirm.
On appeal, James’s counsel contends that the district
court erred in denying the motion to suppress. We review the
factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress
for clear error and the court’s legal conclusions de novo.
United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 943 (2009). The evidence is construed
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below.
United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 704 (4th Cir. 2006).
James was stopped by Officer Joshua Small for
traveling 114 miles per hour on Interstate 95. Appellate
counsel does not challenge the inception or the duration of the
traffic stop. Rather, counsel contends that the district court
erroneously concluded that James consented to the search of the
vehicle he was driving and the luggage therein.
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The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches
and seizures, merely those found to be unreasonable. Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991). Although a warrantless search
generally “is per se unreasonable[,] . . . one of the
specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both
a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted
pursuant to consent.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
219 (1973) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
When consent to search a particular area is “general and
unqualified,” it extends to closed containers located within
that area. United States v. Jones, 356 F.3d 529, 534 (4th Cir.
2004); see also Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251-52 (determining that if
it is reasonably understood that consent extends to a container
within a vehicle, explicit authorization is not required).
However, “general, blanket consent to search . . . by itself
would not permit officers to break into a locked container
located within the area being searched.” Jones, 356 F.3d at 534(emphasis in original).
Here, James informed Officer Michael Brewton that law
enforcement could search the vehicle he was driving. While this
information was not specifically conveyed to the other officers
on the scene prior to the initiation of the search, this does
not render the consent invalid. Moreover, Brewton testified
that he would have instructed the officers to stop the search if
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James had not consented. Although the luggage found in the
vehicle was locked, officers did not force it open. James
informed Brewton that his wife, a passenger, had the keys, and
in the meantime Mrs. James had willingly unlocked a bag and
turned the keys over to Small, without objection from James.
His “failure to object (or withdraw his consent) . . . is a
strong indicator that the search was within the proper bounds of
the consent search.” Jones, 356 F.3d at 534.
To the extent counsel argues that the Government’s
witnesses were incredible because their testimony contradicted
James’s testimony, it is not the province of this court to
second-guess the credibility determinations of the factfinder.
See United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 283 (4th Cir. 2007).
Therefore, we conclude the district court’s factual
determinations were not clearly erroneous and that the court
properly denied the motion to suppress. *
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
*
Because we have concluded that James consented to the
search, we decline to address counsel’s alternative arguments.
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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