United States v. Ryan Holland , 489 F. App'x 666 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5144
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RYAN LAMAR HOLLAND,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (1:10-cr-00445-JAB-1)
Submitted: July 19, 2012 Decided: July 23, 2012
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Milton Bays Shoaf, ADDISON & SHOAF, Salisbury, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Graham Tod Green, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ryan Lamar Holland pled guilty to conspiracy to
distribute cocaine base. The district court sentenced him to
292 months’ imprisonment. Holland’s attorney filed a brief in
accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
certifying that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but
questioning whether application of the Fair Sentencing Act would
result in a lesser sentence and whether the court adequately
considered mitigating circumstances. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.
We review a sentence imposed by a district court for
reasonableness, applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007).
Such review requires consideration of both the procedural and
substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id. at 41; see United
States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009).
The district court appropriately determined the amount
of drugs attributed to Holland based on his admissions to
receiving certain quantities of cocaine base between 2007 and
2008, and, between 2008 and 2010, acquiring quantities of
cocaine hydrochloride and cooking the cocaine hydrochloride into
cocaine base. Based on the district court’s determination that
11.8 kilograms of cocaine base were attributable to Holland, the
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Fair Sentencing Act would not result in a lesser Guidelines
range.
The district court followed the necessary procedural
steps in sentencing Holland, appropriately treated the
sentencing Guidelines as advisory, properly calculated and
considered the applicable Guidelines range, and weighed the
relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, including
considering Holland’s age, his criminal history, the fact that
he has young children, and the need to protect the public,
provide deterrence and provide punishment. We examine the
substantive reasonableness of a sentence under the totality of
the circumstances. United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473
(4th Cir. 2007). This court accords a sentence within a
properly calculated Guidelines range an appellate presumption of
reasonableness. United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212,
216 (4th Cir. 2010). Such a presumption is rebutted only by
showing “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against
the [§ 3553(a)] factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445
F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We conclude that the district court’s consideration
of the § 3553(a) factors and imposition of the 292-month
sentence was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion. See
Gall, 552 U.S. at 41; United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193
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(4th Cir. 2007) (applying appellate presumption of
reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentence).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Holland, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Holland requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Holland. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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