United States v. Jose Juarez-Santamaria ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5061
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOSE CIRO JUAREZ-SANTAMARIA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District
Judge. (1:11-cr-00217-LO-1)
Argued: January 31, 2013 Decided: March 8, 2013
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and KEENAN and THACKER, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Eugene Victor Gorokhov, Arlington, Virginia, for
Appellant. Patricia Tolliver Giles, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Charles
Burnham, Ziran Zhang, BURNHAM & GOROKHOV, PLLC, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney,
Michael J. Frank, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jose Ciro Juarez-Santamaria, a/k/a Sniper, (“Juarez”) was
indicted on charges of transporting a minor for prostitution,
sex trafficking of a minor, and conspiracy. Prior to trial,
Juarez attempted to plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement.
Because the court was not satisfied that Juarez was admitting to
the offense conduct at the Rule 11 hearing, it refused to accept
his guilty plea. The case proceeded to trial, where a jury
convicted Juarez of all counts in the indictment. Juarez now
challenges several aspects of the Rule 11 hearing. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
I.
Juarez is a member of the MS-13 gang. Through his
involvement in the gang, Juarez and his associates orchestrated
the prostitution of a twelve-year-old girl named G.T. During
the course of three to four months, Juarez set up clients for
G.T. in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, and he
transported her to meet these clients. Although he never
physically drove G.T. in a vehicle to meet with clients, he
always either asked someone to drive for him while he rode along
or he transported G.T. on the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority.
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In May 2011, Juarez was indicted for conspiracy to
transport a minor for the purpose of prostitution and for sex
trafficking, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1591, 2423(a) (“Count 1”);
transporting and aiding and abetting the transportation of a
minor for the purpose of prostitution and unlawful sexual
activity, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2423(a) (“Count 2”); and sex
trafficking and aiding and abetting the sex trafficking of a
child, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1591 (“Count 3”). In July 2011,
Juarez entered into a plea agreement with the government through
which he agreed to plead guilty to Count 2 in exchange for the
dismissal of the other counts in the indictment. He and the
government also signed a joint statement of facts in which
Juarez stipulated to the allegations contained in Count 2 of the
indictment.
The day after entering into this plea agreement, Juarez
appeared before the district court for his Rule 11 hearing. At
the hearing, Juarez admitted that his signature appeared on the
plea agreement and on the joint statement of facts. However,
when asked whether the joint statement of facts was “true and
accurate in all respects,” Juarez said “[i]t [was] not the
truth.” J.A. 44. When the court began to recess the matter and
set the case for trial, Juarez protested, claiming that he
misunderstood the court’s question. The court then repeated the
question in Spanish, which is Juarez’s native language, and
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Juarez initially acknowledged that the statement of facts was
true.
Later in the plea colloquy, however, the court emphasized
that for the government to convict Juarez on Count 2, it would
have to prove that he “transported” G.T. J.A. 60. The court
then asked Juarez again whether he committed the acts charged in
Count 2, but Juarez would not say “yes.” Instead, he insisted,
“I was with the person who was transporting her. It wasn’t me
who was transporting her.” J.A. 61. The court then asked
defense counsel if he needed a recess to communicate with his
client. Instead of taking the recess, defense counsel attempted
to explain to the court Juarez’s alleged confusion, saying that
he “believe[d] the distinction [was] the word ‘transport’, and
Mr. Juarez ha[d] difficulty in distinguishing between the word
‘transporting’ and driving the car.” J.A. 62. The court then
asked more pointed questions about Juarez’s role, but Juarez
continued to refuse to admit to playing any role in transporting
G.T. At that point in the plea colloquy, defense counsel asked
for a five-minute recess, but the court did not respond and
merely continued questioning Juarez.
Finally, the court asked Juarez one final, specific
question: “Did you, with another person, take this young woman,
this child, somewhere for purposes of prostitution?” J.A. 64.
Juarez responded, “That’s what I said, but it was not true.”
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J.A. 64. At that point, the court refused to accept Juarez’s
guilty plea and set the case for trial. As noted, a jury
ultimately convicted Juarez of each count in the indictment, and
he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
II.
Juarez’s first argument on appeal is that the court’s
denial of his request for a five-minute recess violated his
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, or alternatively
amounted to an abuse of discretion. The Sixth Amendment
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to the assistance of
counsel at all “[c]ritical stages,” which includes “the entry of
a guilty plea.” Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012).
However, “[n]ot every restriction on counsel's . . . opportunity
to . . . consult with his client . . . violates a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S.
1, 11 (1983). In this case, prior to defense counsel’s request
for a brief recess, the court offered him a brief recess, which
he did not take. Moreover, while the court prevented counsel
from temporarily communicating with Juarez in private, it did
not prevent him from communicating with Juarez in public, in
open court. Under these circumstances, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by denying the brief recess, see United
States v. LaRouche, 896 F.2d 815, 823 (4th Cir. 1990) (“In order
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to prove an abridgment of the sixth amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel based on an allegedly wrongful denial of a
continuance, a defendant must first demonstrate that the
district court abused its discretion in denying the motion.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)), and the denial of the
recess did not amount to a Sixth Amendment violation, see
Morris, 461 U.S. at 11.
III.
Juarez’s second argument is that the district court abused
its discretion, see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262
(1971), in refusing to accept his guilty plea. * We disagree.
“There is . . . no absolute right to have a guilty plea
accepted,” and “[a] court may reject a plea in exercise of sound
judicial discretion.” Id. at 262. Rule 11 requires that
*
The government argues that Juarez never objected to the
court’s rejection of his plea and that we, therefore, review for
plain error only. We do not think Juarez, after asking the
court to accept his plea, was required to object when the court
refused to accept it. See United States v. Mancinas-Flores, 588
F.3d 677, 686 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that when a “defendant
ask[s] the court to accept his plea and argue[s] in favor of
it,” he does “not have to ask the court to reconsider its
decision or point out possible errors in the decision” in order
to preserve the claim for appellate review). And even if he was
required to object, we believe that he satisfied that
requirement by stating, in reference to the joint statement of
facts, “But I signed it. I signed it. Why am I going to go to
trial?” J.A. 44.
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“[b]efore entering judgment on a guilty plea, the [district]
court must determine that there is a factual basis for the
plea.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). “The trial court has wide
discretion in determining whether a factual basis exists,”
United States v. Morrow, 914 F.2d 608, 611 (4th Cir. 1990), and
the court may make that determination “by having the accused
describe the conduct that gave rise to the charge.” Santobello,
404 U.S. at 261.
Juarez’s first claim, couched as two separate arguments in
his brief, is that the court failed to exercise any discretion
at all and instead refused to accept the guilty plea based on a
misunderstanding of the law. According to Juarez, the court
incorrectly believed it could not accept the guilty plea unless
Juarez believed he was guilty and admitted to the offense
conduct during the plea hearing. See United States v. Mastrapa,
509 F.3d 652, 660 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he district court need
not rely only on the Rule 11 plea colloquy [and] may conclude
that a factual basis exists from anything that appears on the
record.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
To support his contention that the court misunderstood its
legal obligation, Juarez points to two statements made by the
district court during the plea colloquy:
You see, Mr. Juarez, . . . if you don’t think that you
committed the crime, if you don’t think that you did
this . . . we’ll have to try the case. . . . If you
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think that you didn’t commit this crime, then you’re
entitled to a trial by jury, and we’ll proceed. I’m
not going to allow you to plead guilty unless I’m
persuaded that you actually did what you’re pleading
guilty to.
J.A. 61-62.
You can’t accept the charge and plead guilty in this
court unless you actually transported this young woman
for purposes of prostitution. If you didn’t do it,
I’m not going to accept your plea.
J.A. 64.
In our view, these statements show nothing more than the
court pursuing its obligation to ensure that the plea was
voluntary and supported by a factual basis. See Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(b)(2 & 3). Simply because the district court is not
required to rely solely on the Rule 11 hearing, however, does
not mean that the court abuses its discretion if it chooses to
rely on the Rule 11 hearing. In this case, the court exercised
its discretion to reject the guilty plea because, in its
estimation, Juarez refused to admit to the core conduct of the
offense, thus raising questions about the factual basis for the
plea. In light of the “deference [that we must accord] to the
trial court’s decision as to how best to conduct the mandated
colloquy with the defendant,” United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d
114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991), we cannot conclude that the court
abused its discretion in this respect.
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Relying primarily on United States v. Mancinas-Flores, 588
F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009), Juarez also contends that the court
abused its discretion because it failed to articulate its
reasoning for rejecting the guilty plea. In Mancinas-Flores,
the district court gave no reason for rejecting the defendant’s
plea and its reasons were not apparent from the record, thus
leaving the Ninth Circuit to guess whether the district court
considered the defendant’s plea to be a standard plea, a nolo
contendere plea, or a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25 (1970).
In the instant case, however, the court made its reasons
abundantly clear—the court found an insufficient factual basis
for the plea after Juarez continually refused to admit to the
core conduct of the offense. Under these circumstances, the
district court exercised its “wide discretion,” Morrow, 914 F.2d
at 611, and refused to accept the plea. We cannot say the court
abused its discretion in this regard.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
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