United States v. Jackson ( 1996 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 95-5409
MILTON D. JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Claude M. Hilton, District Judge.
(CR-94-539-A)
Submitted: December 19, 1995
Decided: January 17, 1996
Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
John Clifton Rand, LAW OFFICES OF J.C. RAND, Alexandria, Vir-
ginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Morris
R. Parker, Jr., Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Milton D. Jackson pled guilty to escape from the Lorton Refor-
matory, 18 U.S.C.A. § 751(a) (West Supp. 1995), and received a sen-
tence of 27 months. He contends on appeal that the district court erred
in refusing to give him a reduction in offense level under USSG
§ 2P1.1(b)(3).* Finding no error, we affirm the sentence.
Guideline section 2P1.1(b)(3) provides a 4-level reduction if "the
defendant escaped from the non-secure custody of a community cor-
rections center, community treatment center, ``half way house,' or
similar facility." "Non-secure custody" is defined as custody with no
significant physical restraint, and may include time spent on a work
detail outside a secure facility. USSG § 2P1.1, comment. (n.1).
This court has adopted a two-part test for determining whether the
reduction in § 2P1.1(b)(3) applies. First, the defendant must have
escaped from a non-secure facility and, second, the non-secure facil-
ity must be similar to a community corrections center, community
treatment center, or half-way house. United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d
618, 623 (4th Cir. 1994). The government concedes that Jackson was
(however temporarily) in non-secure custody at the time of his escape
but asserts that the Lorton Facility was not a community corrections
center. Jackson argues that Lorton should be considered a community
corrections center because, as a District of Columbia facility rather
than a federal facility, it is by nature a local or community facility.
We reject this contention and find that the district court correctly
found that the reduction did not apply.
Community corrections centers have been defined as community-
based programs which are used for intermediate punishment such as
probation or supervised release, or as a transitional service for prison-
ers nearing release; they are distinguished from institutional confine-
ment even of the minimum security variety. See United States v.
Tapia, 981 F.2d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir.) (citing United States v. Kahn,
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*United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov.
1994).
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789 F. Supp. 373, 377 (M.D. Ala. 1992)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
61 U.S.L.W. 3835 (U.S. June 14, 1993) (No. 92-8631). Lorton Refor-
matory is an integral part of the District of Columbia prison system.
See Wright v. Jackson, 505 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (4th Cir. 1974). As
such, Lorton provides institutional confinement rather than a
community-based program. When Jackson escaped, he was serving
sentences of 20 months to 5 years for attempted cocaine distribution,
1 year (consecutive) for failure to appear, and not less than 13 years
for assault and firearms convictions. On this information alone, the
district court did not err in finding that Lorton was neither a commu-
nity corrections center nor a similar facility.
We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argu-
ment would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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