Cross v. State Farm Mutual ( 1996 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    SHEILA CROSS, individually as next
    friend of Deven Cross,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                                No. 96-1241
    STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
    INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg.
    Irene M. Keeley, District Judge.
    (CA-95-75-1)
    Argued: December 6, 1996
    Decided: December 31, 1996
    Before RUSSELL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and MICHAEL,
    Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of
    Virginia, sitting by designation.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Paul Joseph Harris, HARRIS & BUSH, Elkins, West Vir-
    ginia, for Appellant. Boyd Lee Warner, WATERS, WARNER &
    HARRIS, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
    Frank P. Bush, Jr., HARRIS & BUSH, Elkins, West Virginia, for
    Appellant. G. Thomas Smith, WATERS, WARNER & HARRIS,
    Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Sheila Cross was injured in an automobile accident in July, 1992
    when Bernard Bohon allegedly ran a red light and collided with the
    vehicle in which Cross was a passenger. Because of her injuries,
    Cross was unable to work for some time.
    State Farm Insurance Co. insured Bohon. State Farm's initial deter-
    mination was that Bohon was primarily at fault for the accident and
    so a claims adjuster contacted Cross soon after the accident and
    offered her approximately $1200 to settle the claim. Unsatisfied with
    the offer, Cross hired a lawyer. State Farm then refused to make any
    further lost wages or medical bill payments until final settlement.
    Although Cross regained employment three months after the accident,
    during the subsequent two years she underwent shoulder surgery, sur-
    gery for carpal tunnel syndrome, and extensive physical therapy. In
    January 1995, the parties settled the accident claim for $35,000.
    Cross first brought a suit against State Farm and the Bohons in
    West Virginia state court in November 1992. The court dismissed
    Cross' bad faith claim because her underlying claim as to liability for
    the accident was still pending. After settling the underlying case,
    Cross reinstated her bad faith claim, which is the action at issue here,
    again in West Virginia state court. State Farm removed the case to
    federal court. Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for
    summary judgment; the district court granted State Farm's motion
    and dismissed Cross' motion with prejudice.
    2
    Cross appeals to this court, making three arguments. With regard
    to two of these, we adopt the reasoning of the district court. Like the
    district court, we conclude it would have prejudiced State Farm to
    continue paying Cross' medical bills and lost wages without any adju-
    dication of liability or the extent of Cross' damages; thus State Farm
    did not violate the terms of W. Va. Code State R.§ 114-14-6(6.8)
    ("[P]ayment for [undisputed elements of a claim] shall be made . . .
    where such payment can be made without prejudice to either party.").
    Similarly, we believe the district court correctly concluded that, like
    most other jurisdictions, West Virginia would not allow third parties
    to assert common law causes of action for bad faith.
    However, we part with the district court in its determination that
    Cross could not establish a claim under W. Va. Code§ 33-11-4(9)
    (Michie 1992) for unfair claim settlement practices"with such fre-
    quency as to indicate a general business practice" because all of the
    alleged violations of the statute arose from the same claim. Although
    this was a fair reading of the law when the district court ruled, subse-
    quently, in Dodrill v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., No. 23090,
    
    1996 WL 591026
    , at *1 (W. Va. Oct. 15, 1996), the West Virginia
    Supreme Court of Appeals held that:
    To maintain a private action based upon alleged violations
    of 
    W. Va. Code § 33-11-4
    (9) in the settlement of a single
    insurance claim, the evidence should establish that the con-
    duct in question constitutes more than a single violation of
    
    W. Va. Code § 33-11-4
    (9), that the violations arise from
    separate, discrete acts or omissions in the claim settlement,
    and that they arise from a habit, custom, usage, or business
    policy of the insurer, so that, viewing the conduct as a
    whole, the finder of fact is able to conclude that the practice
    or practices are sufficiently pervasive or sufficiently sanc-
    tioned by the insurance company that the conduct can be
    considered a "general business practice" and can be distin-
    guished by fair minds from an isolated event.
    Dodrill, at *1 (Syllabus point 4). Thus, West Virginia's highest court
    has now made it clear that it is possible to find a violation of § 33-11-
    4(9) "based upon alleged violations . . . in the settlement of a single
    insurance claim." Id.
    3
    The Dodrill court sustained a jury award in a bad faith claim under
    § 33-11-4(9) under circumstances substantially similar to those pre-
    sented here. See Dodrill, at *1-*11. Therefore, we reverse and remand
    to the district court to reconsider, in light of Dodrill, its conclusion
    as to Cross' claim of alleged violation of § 33-11-4(9).
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    4
    n
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 96-1241

Filed Date: 12/31/1996

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014