Llora v. H K Research Corp ( 1997 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
ANNA M. LLORA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 96-1552
H. K. RESEARCH CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville.
Graham C. Mullen, District Judge.
(CA-93-15-5-MU)
Submitted: October 14, 1997
Decided: October 29, 1997
Before LUTTIG and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
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Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Oma H. Hester, Jr., OMA H. HESTER, JR., P.C., Hickory, North
Carolina, for Appellant. E. Murray Tate, Jr., Vanessa Barlow Haw-
kins, TATE, YOUNG, MORPHIS, BACH & TAYLOR, L.L.P.,
Hickory, North Carolina, for Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Anna M. Llora appeals the district court's orders awarding her
attorney's fees as a prevailing party in a civil action brought under the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("the Act"), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (West
1978 & 1985 & Supp. 1997), and denying her Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)
motion to amend the fee order. The district court did not use the
approved lodestar method to calculate the amount of award and did
not provide a detailed explanation of those factors considered in mak-
ing the award; therefore, we find that the district court abused its dis-
cretion. Accordingly, we vacate and remand the order awarding
attorney's fees.
In the underlying suit, Llora alleged that as a means of retaliation,
her employers discriminated against her with respect to the payment
of her salary and the rate of compensation for her annual bonuses, and
discharged her from her employment.1 The jury found in Llora's favor
only on the claims challenging the payment of salary and annual
bonuses. The district court entered judgment for Llora for a total
amount of $4061.22 and awarded her attorney's fees in the amount
of $1353.74.
As a successful party under the Act, Llora is entitled to an award
of reasonable attorney's fees.2 Although the amount of the award rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court, 3 the calculation of the
amount of the award must be done on a principled basis clearly
explained by the court.4 The Supreme Court noted that "[t]he most
useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee
is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multi-
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1 Llora filed a previous lawsuit against her employers for overtime
compensation; it was settled prior to trial.
2 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b).
3 See Burnley v. Short, 730 F.2d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 1984).
4 See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437-40 (1983).
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plied by a reasonable hourly rate."5 This calculation, the "lodestar"
fee, "provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate
of the value of a lawyer's services."6
The Supreme Court has "adopted the lodestar approach as the cen-
terpiece of attorney's fee awards."7 In Lyle v. Food Lion, Inc., 954
F.2d 984, 988 (4th Cir. 1992), factually similar to the present case, we
followed the reasoning in Blanchard to hold that the district court
abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees based on a custom-
ary contingent-fee arrangement rather than using the lodestar approach.8
Llora's counsel submitted his affidavit, schedule of activities, and
incurred expenses9 as proof that he expended 94.42 hours in this case
at his customary hourly rate of $90 per hour. However, the district
court did not follow Lyle and multiply the two to yield the lodestar
fee of $8497.80 (94.42 x $90). Rather, the district court awarded
attorney's fees in the amount of $1353.74 (one-third of the amount of
the judgment award), without any factual findings or explanation
other than stating, "[a]ttorney fee awards are to bear a reasonable rela-
tion to the results in the case."
We find that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to
award attorney's fees that equaled one-third of the judgment award
without adequately explaining its reasoning for failing to use the lode-
star amount. We therefore vacate the award as to its amount only, and
remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with
Lyle. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal con-
tentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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5 Id. at 433.
6 Id.7 Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94 (1989).
8 See Lyle, 954 F.2d at 988 (contingent-fee approach is inappropriate
under the Fair Labor Standards Act)
9 Llora's counsel separately itemized her expenses, totaling $650.79.
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