Gasperson v. Sprint Communication ( 1997 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
JOHN D. GASPERSON; EDITH C.
GASPERSON, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
No. 96-1940
v.
SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY
L.P.; NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY
COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville.
Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge.
(CA-95-208)
Argued: October 31, 1997
Decided: December 16, 1997
Before HAMILTON, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
ARGUED: Allan Ray Tarleton, VAN WINKLE, BUCK, WALL,
STARNES & DAVIS, P.A., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appel-
lants. J. Emmett Logan, MORRISON & HECKER, Kansas City, Mis-
souri; Reid L. Phillips, BROOKS, PIERCE, MCLENDON,
HUMPHREY & LEONARD, L.L.P., Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: Marvin K. Blount, Jr., Greenville, North Car-
olina, for Appellants. Frank P. Graham, ROBERTS & STEVENS,
P.A., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee Sprint. Robert A.
Singer, James R. Saintsing, BROOKS, PIERCE, MCLENDON,
HUMPHREY & LEONARD, L.L.P., Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee Norfolk Southern.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
This appeal is from the district court's orders dismissing appellants
John and Edith Gasperson's (the Gaspersons) claims of violations
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, and for conversion under North
Carolina common law and granting summary judgment in favor of
appellees Sprint Communications Co., L.P. (Sprint) and Norfolk
Southern Railway Company (Norfolk Southern) as to the Gaspersons'
trespass claim. In 1987, Sprint and Norfolk Southern entered into a
license agreement, under which Sprint was granted a non-exclusive
right to use a right-of-way owned by Norfolk Southern, part of which
ran through the Gaspersons' property in Buncombe County, North
Carolina, for the purpose of installing fiber optic cable and related
telecommunications equipment. In the fall of 1987, without the per-
mission or apparent knowledge of the Gaspersons, Sprint installed
telecommunications equipment on the portion of Norfolk Southern's
right-of-way that traversed the Gaspersons' property in Buncombe
County. The Gaspersons filed suit, individually and on behalf of simi-
larly situated property owners, on October 6, 1995. In their amended
complaint, the Gaspersons asserted causes of action under RICO and
for conversion and trespass under North Carolina law.
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On April 16, 1996, the district court granted Sprint and Norfolk
Southern's motions to dismiss the Gaspersons' RICO and conversion
claims. See Gasperson v. Sprint Communications Co., L.P., No. 95-
CV-208 (W.D.N.C. April 16, 1996). The district court held that the
Gaspersons had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted under RICO because they had failed to allege a predicate act
that was illegal. With respect to the Gaspersons' conversion claim, the
district court held that the Gaspersons had failed to allege facts that
would support a finding that Sprint or Norfolk Southern had exercised
any right of ownership over goods or personal property belonging to
the Gaspersons. On June 17, 1996, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Sprint and Norfolk Southern as to the Gasper-
sons' trespass claim. See Gasperson v. Sprint Communications Co.,
L.P., No. 95-CV-208 (W.D.N.C. June 17, 1996). Specifically, the dis-
trict court held that the applicable three-year statute of limitations,
found in § 1-52(17) of the North Carolina General Statutes, barred the
Gaspersons' claim of trespass.
We have carefully examined the record, the briefs, the arguments
of counsel, and the opinions of the district court. Like the district
court, we conclude that the Gaspersons have failed to state causes of
action for violations of RICO or for conversion in violation of North
Carolina common law. We also agree with the district court that the
three-year statute of limitations contained in § 1-52(17) of the North
Carolina General Statutes bars the Gaspersons' trespass claims.
Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.
AFFIRMED
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