Delaney v. City of Hampton ( 1998 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
PATRICIA E. DELANEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THE CITY OF HAMPTON, VIRGINIA, A
Municipal Corporation; ARTHUR
No. 97-2393
PARKER, Individually and in his
capacity as Senior Public Works
Foreman for the City of Hampton,
Department of Public
Works/Operations,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News.
Robert G. Doumar, Senior District Judge.
(CA-96-90-2)
Submitted: January 27, 1998
Decided: February 11, 1998
Before MURNAGHAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Patricia E. Delaney, Appellant Pro Se. Stanley Graves Barr, Jr., Ste-
phen Edward Noona, Richard Mark Feathers, Ashley Lionel Taylor,
Jr., KAUFMAN & CANOLES, Norfolk, Virginia; Arthur Parker,
GREENSVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Jarratt, Virginia, for
Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Patricia Delaney appeals the district court judgment dismissing her
claims against the City of Hampton, Virginia, and Arthur Parker
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). Delaney filed suit after Parker
allegedly sexually assaulted her while both were working for the City
of Hampton's Department of Public Works. Following a jury trial, the
district court dismissed Delaney's claims against the City pursuant to
a jury verdict and dismissed Delaney's claims against Parker as a
matter of law. We affirm.
Delaney's brief expresses her dissatisfaction with the outcome of
her trial but assigns no legal error to the proceedings below. Although
this court liberally construes the claims of pro se litigants,1 our review
is limited to those claims discernible from Delaney's informal brief.2
Delaney's primary claim is that her attorney provided ineffective
assistance of counsel. However, because counsel was not constitution-
ally mandated in this civil action, even if counsel was ineffective, this
is not grounds for reversal. See Sanchez v. United States Postal Serv.,
785 F.2d 1236, 1237 (5th Cir. 1986). Her remedy, if any, is to bring
a legal malpractice action. Id._________________________________________________________________
1 See generally Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Noble v.
Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994).
2 See 4th Cir. Local R. 34(b).
2
Delaney also questions why counsel allowed a witness for the City,
Diane Bohlman, to sit with the City's attorney when witnesses were
supposed to be excluded. This apparent expression of dissatisfaction
with her counsel's performance is not a ground for reversal. More-
over, under Fed. R. Evid. 615, a non-natural party may designate a
representative who is not subject to a party request for the exclusion
of witnesses. The City of Hampton states that it designated Bohlman
as its representative at trial which would explain why she was not
excluded.
Finding no merit to Delaney's claims, we affirm. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
3