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In re: Jackson v. ( 1999 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-7287
In Re: RONALD FLOYD JACKSON,
Petitioner.
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.   (CR-90-254)
Submitted:   December 16, 1999         Decided:    December 30, 1999
Before MURNAGHAN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Cir-
cuit Judge.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ronald Floyd Jackson, Petitioner Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Floyd Jackson filed this petition for a writ of manda-
mus seeking an order from this court granting his immediate release
from the Federal Correctional Institution in Jesup, Georgia.   Man-
damus is a drastic remedy to be used only in extraordinary circum-
stances.    See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court,
    426 U.S. 394
    , 402
(1976).    Mandamus relief is only available when there are no other
means by which the relief sought could be granted, see In re Beard,
    811 F.2d 818
    , 826 (4th Cir. 1987), and may not be used as a sub-
stitute for appeal.    See In re United Steelworkers,
    595 F.2d 958
    ,
960 (4th Cir. 1979). The party seeking mandamus relief carries the
heavy burden of showing that he has "no other adequate means to
attain the relief he desires" and that his right to such relief is
"clear and indisputable." Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc.,
    449 U.S. 33
    , 35 (1980).    Jackson has not made such a showing.*
Accordingly, although we grant to leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, we deny mandamus relief.    We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
*
Jackson’s contention is premised on the incorrect assumption
that the question of whether he has been convicted of a qualifying
offense is determined by South Carolina’s classification of his
crime. In fact, the statute itself defines a qualifying offense as
one “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) (1994). South Carolina’s classification statute
is irrelevant to Jackson’s federal conviction. See
    S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-20
     (Law. Co-op. 1985) (repealed 1995).
2
decisional process.   Jackson’s “Motion for Immediate Hearing” is
denied as moot.
PETITION DENIED
3