Wells v. Montgomery Cnty MD ( 2000 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM WELLS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND;
LAYTONSVILLE VOLUNTEER FIRE
DEPARTMENT (LVFD); J. B. KLINE,
No. 00-1028
Chief, Individually; BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, LVFD; STANLEY SUTTON,
President, Individually, Board of
Directors, LVFD; MATT
MONTGOMERY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge.
(CA-97-2605-DKC)
Submitted: August 31, 2000
Decided: September 15, 2000
Before WIDENER and KING, Circuit Judges, and
HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Suzanne Levin, Bethesda, Maryland, for Appellant. William J. Carter,
Thomas L. McCally, CARR GOODSON WARNER, Washington,
D.C., for Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
William Wells appeals the district court's order granting summary
judgment to Montgomery County, Maryland (the "County"), on his
claim that the County retaliated against him for reporting an incident
of sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-3(a) (1994). He also
appeals the district court's denial of relief on his claims under 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2000) against Laytonsville Volunteer
Fire Department, its Board of Directors, and several individuals for
violations of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.*
We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion grant-
ing summary judgment in the County's favor on Wells' retaliation
claim and find no reversible error. Although the district court required
Wells to show that the County's proffered legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason was pretextual and that the real reason for its actions was
retaliatory, we find that Wells failed to meet his burden of proof
_________________________________________________________________
*Wells does not challenge on appeal the district court's dismissal with-
out prejudice of his pendant state law claim. He therefore has abandoned
that claim on appeal. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231,
241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that issues not briefed or argued on
appeal are deemed abandoned).
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under the standard announced in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods. Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 68 U.S.L.W. 4480, 4484 (U.S. June 12,
2000) (No. 99-536) (holding that "a plaintiff's prima facie case, com-
bined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted jus-
tification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the
employer unlawfully discriminated" and abrogating this court's
"pretext-plus" formulation). Accordingly, we affirm the denial of
Title VII relief substantially on the reasoning of the district court. See
Wells v. Montgomery County, Md., No. CA-97-2605-DKC (D. Md.
Dec. 7, 1999).
With regard to Wells' claims against the remaining Defendants for
violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the district
court held that these Defendants were not state actors for purposes of
§ 1983. After the district court granted summary judgment on this
ground, we held that a Maryland volunteer fire department is, as a
matter of law, a state actor and "may be held liable as a state actor
without the demonstration of a nexus--a connection between the indi-
cia of state action and the specific acts comprising the alleged consti-
tutional violation." Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co.,
218 F.3d 337, 339-40, 348 (4th Cir. 2000). Because the district court
did not have the benefit of our decision in Goldstein, we vacate this
portion of the district court's order and remand for further proceed-
ings.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART;
AND REMANDED
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