Binswanger Companies v. Merry-Go-Round Enterprises, Inc. ( 2001 )


Menu:
  •                          UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    THE BINSWANGER COMPANIES,             
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    MERRY-GO-ROUND ENTERPRISES,
    INCORPORATED; DEBORAH HUNT                      No. 01-1378
    DEVAN, Trustee; MGR DISTRIBUTION
    CORPORATION; MGRR,
    INCORPORATED,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
    J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge.
    (CA-00-3192-JFM, BK-94-50161)
    Argued: October 31, 2001
    Decided: December 6, 2001
    Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Paul R. Rosen, SPECTOR, GADON & ROSEN, P.C.,
    Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. Cynthia Louise Leppert,
    NEUBERGER, QUINN, GIELEN, RUBIN & GIBBER, P.A., Balti-
    more, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Leslie Beth Baskin,
    2         THE BINSWANGER CO. v. MERRY-GO-ROUND ENTER.
    Kelly R. Ramsdell, Robert H. Kwait, SPECTOR, GADON &
    ROSEN, P.C., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. Deborah
    Hunt Devan, NEUBERGER, QUINN, GIELEN, RUBIN & GIBBER,
    P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant, The Binswanger Companies (Binswanger), challenges
    an order of the district court affirming a bankruptcy court order enter-
    ing judgment against Binswanger on its claim for recovery of a bro-
    kerage commission. Finding no error, we affirm.
    I.
    Binswanger is an association of companies specializing in broker-
    ing commercial and industrial real estate. In late 1995, Binswanger
    learned that a Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding involving Merry-
    Go-Round Enterprises, Incorporated (MGR) would likely be con-
    verted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. Binswanger approached MGR with
    the hope of obtaining an exclusive listing contract for the sale of
    MGR’s distribution center ("the Facility").
    Although MGR had not yet decided to sell the Facility or to
    employ Binswanger as its broker, Binswanger, attempting to impress
    MGR, immediately began attempts to find a buyer for the Facility.
    With MGR’s permission, Binswanger showed the Facility in January
    1996 to representatives from The May Department Store Company
    (MDSC). Soon thereafter, MGR’s board of directors authorized its
    chief financial officer to enter into an agreement with Binswanger to
    list the property. The parties began negotiations, but still had not
    entered into a final agreement by February 23. On that date, the
    THE BINSWANGER CO. v. MERRY-GO-ROUND ENTER.               3
    board, anticipating the conversion of the Chapter 11 reorganization to
    a Chapter 7 proceeding, revoked its authorization for MGR to enter
    into an agreement with Binswanger. On March 1, the anticipated con-
    version from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 occurred, and a trustee, Debo-
    rah Hunt Devan, was subsequently appointed.
    Several days later, on March 5, Binswanger sent a letter to the
    trustee requesting that she employ Binswanger to broker the sale of
    the Facility. Binswanger also forwarded a copy of a $15 million offer
    from MDSC dated February 27, 1996. This offer, which required that
    MGR remove certain equipment from the Facility at a cost to the
    seller of approximately four million dollars, was not accepted by the
    trustee. Furthermore, the trustee decided to employ Keen Realty
    (Keen), rather than Binswanger, to broker the sale.* Counsel for the
    trustee sent Binswanger a letter on March 25 taking the position that
    the trustee would not be obligated to pay Binswanger any commission
    in the event that MDSC eventually purchased the Facility.
    By March 25, 1996, MDSC had not made a firm decision regarding
    purchase of the Facility, and it was seriously considering several
    alternatives. Nevertheless, on that date, MDSC submitted an offer of
    $16.5 million (that did not require removal of the equipment) directly
    to the trustee. Another prospective buyer, The Gap, subsequently
    began submitting offers for purchase of the Facility. Ultimately, the
    trustee accepted a $19 million offer from MDSC (that did not require
    removal of the equipment) that was dated June 12, 1996. Pursuant to
    her agreement with Keen, the trustee paid Keen a $215,000 commis-
    sion.
    Binswanger filed suit within the MGR bankruptcy proceedings,
    alleging, inter alia, that Binswanger was entitled under Maryland
    state law to a brokerage commission for the sale of the Facility to
    MDSC. Binswanger subsequently moved for summary judgment,
    contending that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its
    allegation that it was the "procuring broker" for the sale. See 
    Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 14-105
     (1996). The bankruptcy court denied
    the motion, concluding (1) that there was a genuine issue of material
    fact regarding whether Binswanger was the procuring broker, and (2)
    *The bankruptcy court subsequently approved Keen’s appointment.
    4         THE BINSWANGER CO. v. MERRY-GO-ROUND ENTER.
    that even if Binswanger was the procuring broker, it could be pre-
    vented from recovering on the basis that the Binswanger brokers who
    brokered the sale were not licensed in Maryland, see 
    Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 17-516
     (2000). See Binswanger Cos. v. Merry-
    Go-Round Enters. (In re Merry-Go-Round Enters.), 
    231 B.R. 241
    (Bankr. D. Md. 1999). The trustee then moved for summary judg-
    ment, arguing that the fact that the individuals who brokered the sale
    of the facility were not licensed in Maryland entitled the trustee to
    judgment as a matter of law. The bankruptcy court denied that motion
    as well, however, concluding (1) that the license requirement would
    not prevent Binswanger’s recovery should the bankruptcy court
    decide to approve Binswanger as the broker of the sale on a nunc pro
    tunc basis, see 
    11 U.S.C.A. § 327
    (a) (West 1993); 
    Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 17-102
    (1) (2000), and (2) that there existed a
    genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Binswanger was
    entitled to nunc pro tunc approval.
    After a trial, the bankruptcy court concluded that Binswanger
    would be entitled to nunc pro tunc approval only if it was entitled
    under Maryland law to a commission. Turning to that issue, the court
    found that Binswanger’s introduction of MDSC and MGR was purely
    voluntary, that the trustee never employed Binswanger formally, and
    that any implied employment ended on March 25, 1996. The court
    also determined that Binswanger failed to prove that MDSC was
    ready, willing, and able by March 25 to meet the terms under which
    the sale was eventually made. On this basis, the court concluded that
    Binswanger was not the procuring broker for the offer the trustee
    accepted; therefore, the trustee did not impliedly accept Binswanger
    as its broker by accepting that offer. Accordingly, the bankruptcy
    court granted judgment to the trustee.
    The district court affirmed, concluding (1) that Maryland’s licens-
    ing requirement precluded any recovery under a procuring broker the-
    ory, (2) that the finding that Binswanger was not the procuring broker
    was not clearly erroneous, and (3) that denial of nunc pro tunc
    approval was appropriate in light of Binswanger’s unjustified failure
    to request appointment by the bankruptcy court prior to the sale of the
    Facility. See Binswanger Cos. v. Merry-Go-Round Enters., 
    258 B.R. 608
     (D. Md. 2001).
    THE BINSWANGER CO. v. MERRY-GO-ROUND ENTER.                5
    II.
    Binswanger contends that the district court erred in affirming the
    bankruptcy court order, arguing primarily that the bankruptcy court
    erred in finding that Binswanger was not the procuring broker of the
    June 12 offer. Having had the benefit of oral argument and the par-
    ties’ briefs, we conclude that the district court correctly decided the
    issues before it. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the dis-
    trict court.
    AFFIRMED
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-1378

Judges: Wilkins, Niemeyer, Luttig

Filed Date: 12/6/2001

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024