United States v. Jarrett , 119 F. App'x 429 ( 2004 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4412
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM ADDERSON JARRETT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior
District Judge. (CR-02-11)
Submitted: November 30, 2004 Decided: December 22, 2004
Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jeffrey L. Everhart, RICE, EVERHART & BABER, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Michael J.
Elston, Brian R. Hood, Assistant United States Attorneys, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
William Adderson Jarrett pled guilty to manufacturing
child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2000), and receiving child
pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) (2000) (five counts),
reserving the right to appeal the district court’s order denying
his motion to suppress. Jarrett subsequently filed a motion for
reconsideration of the denial of the motion to suppress. The
district court deemed the motion to reconsider to include a motion
to withdraw the guilty plea if the motion to suppress was granted;
therefore, in granting the motion to suppress, the court granted
Jarrett’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On appeal by the
Government, we reversed the district court’s order suppressing the
evidence and remanded for further proceedings. United States v.
Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
1457 (2004). At sentencing, Jarrett moved to reenter a plea of not
guilty. The district court, concluding that this court mandated
reinstatement of the guilty plea, denied the motion and sentenced
Jarrett to 235 months imprisonment. On appeal, Jarrett argues that
the district court erred in (1) reinstating his guilty plea and (2)
applying a revised version of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual when
he was convicted of offenses committed before and after the
effective date of the revised edition. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.
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Jarrett first argues that the district court erred in not
allowing him to reenter his plea of not guilty after this court
reversed the district court’s order granting his motion to
suppress. Specifically, Jarrett maintains that the district court
should have deferred to its earlier ruling in withdrawing Jarrett’s
guilty plea in light of the fact that this court did not address
that issue in its opinion.
Clearly, Jarrett’s guilty plea was conditioned on his
right to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion to
suppress. The district court, in granting the motion to suppress
on reconsideration, considered the guilty plea inextricably linked
to its order granting the motion to suppress, and therefore deemed
a motion to withdraw the guilty plea implicit in the motion to
reconsider. Because this court reversed the suppression of
evidence, the district court reinstated the guilty plea.
“Few legal precepts are as firmly established as the
doctrine that the mandate of a higher court is ‘controlling as to
matters within its compass.’” United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66
(4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S.
161, 168 (1939)). That is, a district court must abide by the
mandate of an appeals court and may not consider questions resolved
by that mandate. Id. When a district court engages in further
proceedings related to the matter resolved by the appellate court,
the district court must follow both the letter and the spirit of
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the mandate, taking into account the appellate court’s opinion and
the circumstances it embraces. Id. at 66-67.
Although this court’s opinion was silent with respect to
the guilty plea, given that the motion to suppress and the guilty
plea were inextricably linked and that this court reversed the
suppression of the evidence, the district court was following the
“letter and spirit of the mandate” in reinstating Jarrett’s guilty
plea. At best, Jarrett’s motion to reinstate his plea of not
guilty can be construed as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
“A defendant has no ‘absolute right’ to withdraw a guilty
plea, and the district court has discretion to decide whether a
‘fair and just reason’ exists upon which to grant a withdrawal.”
United States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 413 (4th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1523 (2004). The district court’s denial of a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d 1300, 1305 (4th Cir.
1996). Given that Jarrett has proffered no “fair and just reason”
for withdrawal, we find no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s denial of Jarrett’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
Jarrett also contends that the district court’s
application of a five-level enhancement under U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 4B1.5(b)(1) (2003) constituted an ex post facto
application of the guidelines, in violation of USSG § 1B1.11(b)(1).
This court reviews the district court’s factual findings at
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sentencing for clear error, and its interpretation of a sentencing
guideline de novo. See United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213,
217 (4th Cir. 1989). We find no error in the district court’s
application of the enhancement. See USSG § 1B1.11(b)(3) (“If the
defendant is convicted of two offenses, the first committed before
and the second after, a revised edition of the Guidelines Manual
became effective, the revised edition of the Guidelines Manual is
to be applied to both offenses.”); see also United States v. Lewis,
235 F.3d 215, 217-18 (4th Cir. 2000) (explicitly rejecting an ex
post facto argument when a revised edition of the Guidelines Manual
was applied to offenses that predated and postdated the revision).
Accordingly, we affirm Jarrett’s convictions and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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